The governmental and non-governmental approaches to maintain medium and long-term disaster resilience after a mega-disaster : Case study: Aceh Province, Indonesia after 2004 the Indian Ocean Tsunami by Sari, Siswani
  
 
 
                                                                
 
 
THE GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
APPROACHES TO MAINTAIN MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM 
DISASTER RESILIENCE  
AFTER A MEGA-DISASTER 
Case study: Aceh Province, Indonesia after 2004 the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
  
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
zur 
Erlangung des Doktorgrades (Dr. rer. nat.) 
der 
Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 
vorgelegt von 
SISWANI SARI 
aus Langsa, Indonesien 
Bonn 2019 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Angefertigt mit Genehmigung der Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der  
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn  
1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr-Ing Jörn Birkmann  
2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Klaus Greve  
Tag der Promotion: 22.07.2019 
Erscheinungsjahr: 2019 
ii 
 
 
Abstract 
After the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the Government of Aceh started to promote disaster 
risk reduction and to build disaster resilience in order to address the current challenges in 
disaster risk mitigation in Aceh Province, Indonesia. One of the remarkable changes in the 
disaster management setting following the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 was the establishment 
of disaster risk management institutions and laws at the national, sub-national and local levels 
in Indonesia. The rationale of this study emanates from the emerging problems faced by the 
local government in maintaining disaster resilience after the rehabilitation and reconstruction 
phase ended in 2010 in Aceh following the mega-disaster. This study will focus on the concept 
of resilience within Aceh’s disaster management agenda and how the government of Aceh 
developed organizational and political capacities to become „a resilient province “.  
After the interventions and engagement of various international and national organizations in 
the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases in Aceh, it remains unclear whether and how local 
and provincial institutions are able to maintain and strengthen disaster resilience in the 
medium- and long-term, and whether resilience issues are implemented and integrated also six 
and ten years after the Tsunami event in medium and long-term development plans. This thesis 
will enhance the knowledge about post-disaster resilience building by focusing on medium and 
long-term resilience building processes, analysis of key tools and strategies to maintain 
resilience and challenges in multi-actor collaboration.  
The PhD thesis focuses on different strategies to build resilience after the crisis of the Indian 
Ocean tsunami, particularly comparing strategies and tools conducted by governmental and 
non-governmental actors and to develop an evaluation framework for the process of building 
disaster resilience. This research aims to provide in-depth knowledge and systematize the 
knowledge about how the disaster resilience concept is translated into different policies and 
long-term development plans and examines which legal tools or measures have been used to 
promote disaster resilience. In this regard, the PhD research also aims to assess how different 
stakeholders and local actors are involved in disaster resilience, particularly in the learning and 
implementation of specific DRR measures to build disaster resilience.  
The dissertation is based on a mixed-methods approach in three case study areas in Aceh 
Province (Banda Aceh, Sabang, and Aceh Jaya). The content analysis of the existing policy 
document aims to identify the use of the “disaster resilience” concept by actors. In addition, 
the semi-structured expert interviews were conducted with members of local government 
iii 
 
 
agencies and non-governmental organizations involved in disaster risk reduction and tsunami 
resilience building efforts in order to explore how they judge the opportunities and limitations 
to promote resilience after disasters through the different strategies and measures. The aim of 
these interviews was to elicit information about the key informant’s perspectives and 
reflections on the process of building disaster resilience in the province of Aceh. Next to the 
document analysis and expert interviews, a household survey was conducted to explore how 
households have increased their resilience and how they evaluate different strategies and the 
implementation process of other formal and informal actors. 
The interviews revealed that integration of the resilience concept is still weak, meaning that the 
local government struggles to integrate the tsunami resilience concept in the current 
development agenda and respective plans. Challenges in communication and coordination 
between agencies and with local actors were identified. In addition, the lack of trust among the 
local actors and a lack of leadership by the local government in governing and promoting 
disaster resilience are seen as major obstacles in the implementation of resilience building after 
the mega-disaster. Interestingly, the study shows that cultural and religious aspects are not seen 
as major obstacles, but rather as an opportunity to also encourage informal actors to promote 
resilience, even though the level of coordination between these organizations and formal 
governmental institutions seem to still be weak.  
The household survey underscored that many people are aware of various strategies and 
approaches that aim to build disaster resilience, such as the implementation of evacuation plans, 
vertical evacuation shelters, and an early warning system. The evidence suggests that the 
community has sufficient knowledge and experience to respond to disaster events, however, 
many of the strategies discussed had not sufficiently considering the specific community needs 
that the people interviewed mentioned. As such, the effectiveness of these strategies is 
insufficient.  
In addition, it is important to define more specific goals and a common understanding of 
disaster resilience that connects the concept to the spatial specific conditions in the region and 
that allow to measure progress towards disaster resilience. Finally, the sustainability of 
approaches, tools, and institutions is an issue that needs to receive more attention, if building 
disaster resilience is more than just a short-term exercise after a disaster. 
Keywords: maintaining disaster resilience, learning, self-organization, collaboration,   
                   local level, post-disaster 
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Zusammenfassung 
Nach dem Tsunami im Indischen Ozean im Jahr 2004 begann die Regierung von Aceh, die 
Katastrophenvorsorge und die Resilienz gegenüber Katastrophen zu fördern, um den aktuellen 
Herausforderungen im Katastrophenschutz und Risikomanagement in der Provinz Aceh, 
Indonesien, zu begegnen. Eine der bemerkenswerten Veränderungen nach dem Tsunami 2004 
war die Schaffung von spezifischen Institutionen und Gesetzen für Katastrophenschutz und 
Risikomanagement auf nationaler, subnationaler und lokaler Ebene in Indonesien. Diese 
Doktorarbeit gründet sich auf den sich abzeichnenden Problemen der lokalen Regierung bei 
der Aufrechterhaltung der Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen nach Abschluss der 
Rehabilitations- und Wiederaufbauphase in Aceh im Jahr 2010. Diese Studie wird sich auf das 
Konzept der Resilienz zur Analyse des Katastrophenschutzplans von Aceh konzentrieren und 
untersuchen, wie die Regierung von Aceh organisatorische und politische Kapazitäten 
entwickelt hat, um zu einer "resilienten Provinz" zu werden.  
Nach den Interventionen und dem Engagement verschiedener internationaler und nationaler 
Organisationen in der Rehabilitations- und Wiederaufbauphase in Aceh bleibt unklar, ob und 
auf welche Weise Institutionen auf lokaler und auf Provinzebene in der Lage sind, die Resilienz 
gegenüber Naturkatastrophen mittel- und langfristig aufrechtzuerhalten und zu stärken. Ebenso 
bleibt offen, ob Fragen bezüglich Resilienz auch sechs und zehn Jahre nach dem 
Tsunamiereignis in mittel- und langfristigen Entwicklungsplänen umgesetzt und integriert 
werden. Diese Doktorarbeit wird das Wissen über ‚post-disaster resilience building‘ erweitern, 
indem sie sich sowohl mittel- und langfristigen Prozessen, als auch der Analyse von zentralen 
Methoden und Strategien zur Aufrechterhaltung von Resilienz widmet und sich den 
Herausforderungen einer Zusammenarbeit mit mehreren Akteuren stellt.  
Diese Dissertation konzentriert sich auf die Analyse verschiedener Strategien zur Stärkung der 
Resilienz nach der Tsunami Katastrophe im Indischen Ozean.  Insbesondere werden Strategien 
und Instrumente staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Akteure miteinander verglichen. In diesem 
Sinne wird ein Evaluationskonzept zur Untersuchung von Strategien zum Aufbau von 
Resilienz entwickelt. Ziel dieser Forschung ist es, zu verstehen, wie das Konzept der Resilienz 
in verschiedene Politikmaßnahmen und langfristige Entwicklungspläne einfließt und 
umgesetzt wird. Es wird hierbei untersucht, welche rechtlichen Instrumente oder Maßnahmen 
zur Stärkung der Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen eingesetzt wurden. Diese 
Doktorarbeit zielt auch darauf ab, zu bewerten, wie verschiedene Interessengruppen und lokale 
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Akteure an der Stärkung von resilienten Strukturen und Prozessen beteiligt sind. Von 
besonderem Interesse sind die damit in Verbindung stehende Lernprozesse und die Umsetzung 
spezifischer Maßnahmen zum Aufbau von Resilienz.  
Diese Forschung basiert auf einem Mixed-Methods Ansatz mit Fallstudien in drei 
Untersuchungsgebieten in der Provinz Aceh (Banda Aceh, Sabang und Aceh Jaya). Methodisch 
stützt sich diese Arbeit auf eine Inhaltsanalyse bestehender Strategiepapiere der Regierung. 
Dies zielt darauf ab, zu ermitteln, ob und in welcher Form das Konzept der Resilienz von 
zentralen Akteuren verwendet wird. Darüber hinaus wurden semi-strukturierte 
Experteninterviews durchgeführt mit Vertretern lokaler Regierungsbehörden und 
Nichtregierungsorganisationen, die an der Katastrophenvorsorge und dem Aufbau von 
Tsunami-Resilienz beteiligt sind. Ziel ist es, zu untersuchen, wie diese Akteure die Chancen 
und Grenzen von Maßnahmen und Strategien im Kontext von ‚post-disaster resilience 
building‘ bewerten. Insbesondere dienten die Interviews dazu, Informationen zu gewinnen über 
individuelle Meinungen und Bewertungen von Schlüsselinformanten zum Prozess des Aufbaus 
der Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen in der Provinz Aceh. Neben der 
Dokumentenanalyse und den Experteninterviews wurde eine quantitative Haushaltsbefragung 
durchgeführt, um zu untersuchen, wie Haushalte ihre Resilienz gegenüber Tsunamis erhöht 
haben und wie sie die verschiedenen Strategien und den Umsetzungsprozess anderer formeller 
und informeller Akteure bewerten. 
Die Interviews zeigen, dass das Konzept der Resilienz bisher nur in geringem Maße von der 
Regierung in die aktuelle Entwicklungsagenda und die entsprechenden Pläne integriert werden 
konnte. Insbesondere Herausforderungen in der Kommunikation und Kooperation zwischen 
den Behörden und den lokalen Akteuren wurden hierbei deutlich. Als Haupthindernis für den 
Aufbau von Resilienz nach dem Tsunami im Jahr 2004 wurde das mangelnde Vertrauen der 
lokalen Akteure in die lokale Regierung und deren Führungsschwäche bei der Steuerung und 
Förderung der Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen identifiziert. Die Studie verdeutlicht, 
dass kulturelle und religiöse Aspekte nicht als große Hindernisse angesehen werden, sondern 
als Chance, auch informelle Akteure zu ermutigen, Resilienz zu fördern, obwohl die 
Koordination zwischen diesen Organisationen und formalen staatlichen Institutionen noch 
schwach zu sein scheint.  
Die Auswertung der Haushaltsumfrage unterstreicht, dass viele Menschen Strategien und 
Ansätze kennen, die darauf abzielen, Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen aufzubauen, wie 
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zum Beispiel Evakuierungspläne, die Lage von Evakuierungsunterkünften und das 
Frühwarnsystem. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Haushalte über genügend Wissen 
und Erfahrung verfügen, um auf Katastrophenereignisse zu reagieren. Jedoch haben viele der 
diskutierten Strategien die spezifischen Bedürfnisse der Bürger nicht ausreichend 
berücksichtigt. Die Wirksamkeit dieser Strategien ist daher als unzureichend zu bewerten.  
Insgesamt hat die Studie verdeutlicht, dass spezifischere Ziele und ein gemeinsames 
Verständnis von Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen definiert werden müssen. Es ist ein 
Resilienzkonzept erforderlich, das mit den spezifischen Bedingungen in der Region verbunden 
werden kann und das es ermöglicht, die Fortschritte im Sinne der Resilienz gegenüber 
Tsunamis zu messen. Weiterhin ist die Nachhaltigkeit von Konzepten, Instrumenten und 
Institutionen ein Thema, dem mehr Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden muss, wenn der Aufbau 
von Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen mehr sein soll als nur eine kurzfristige Aufgabe 
nach einer Katastrophe. 
Key Words: Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen, Lernen, Selbstorganisation, 
Zusammenarbeit, lokale Ebene, Post-Disaster 
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1 Introduction 
After the rehabilitation and reconstruction following the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, 
officially ended in 2010, Aceh local government, NGOs, and communities take over the 
responsibility to build disaster resilience from the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction Agency (BRR). However, as the Aceh government takes over these 
responsibilities, it faces considerable challenges due to its limited capacity and the unclear 
commitment of the local government to continue to priorities the resilience building process in 
the current development agenda. However, nearly fifteen years after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
in 2004, the process of building tsunami resilience has not been sufficiently assessed to 
determine whether resilience building has been maintained in Aceh Province.  
On December 26th 2004, an earthquake of an estimated magnitude Mw = 9.1 to 9.3  occurred 
and was followed by the Tsunami waves that destroyed more than  139.000 houses and 
displaced 635.384 number of people solely in Aceh Province (IOC-UNESCO 2009; BRR 2009; 
NOAA 2006). 127.707 fatalities were recorded and 93.285 people missing (BRR 2009). In 
addition, an estimated 750,000 people lost their livelihoods (MDF-JRF Secretariat 2012). But, 
even before the tsunami, the region had been exposed to more than thirty years (1976-2005) of 
political conflict between the Government of Indonesia and GAM (Free Aceh Movement) 
(Featherstone 2014). This conflict is believed to have led to approximately between 10.000 to 
30.000 people being killed and 400.000 displaced, particularly during military operations in 
1989-2004 (Aspinall 2008; Amnesty International 2015). 
The process of resilience building that officially started after the tsunami disaster, involved 
different key players from both governmental and non-governmental agencies. There were a 
handful of international and national recovery activities. The Multi Donor Fund (MDF) 
collected $655 million in contributions from 15 donors (MDF-JRF Secretariat 2012). 140.304 
permanent houses were built, 67,979 hectares of agricultural land reclaimed, and 3,696 
kilometres of road constructed (BRR 2009; Oxfam 2014). Of particular note, the conflict 
resolution and peace process were embedded in the post-tsunami recovery process (The 
Government of Indonesia; Free Aceh Movement 8/15/2005).  
Following the tsunami disaster, building disaster resilience has become a key strategy for 
people and organizations in Aceh to prepare for crises situations and learn lessons from the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami event of 2004 (BNPB 2014b).The concept of building resilience was 
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promoted by the government and should be supported by communities. The resilience concept 
is used and interpreted differently by different stakeholders (Pemerintah Aceh 2009; BPBA 
2012). The complexity and abstract level of the resilience concept become a problem for the 
local actors because of the limited communication among local actors, in terms of knowledge 
sharing and management. This research sheds light on the discussion and examines more 
precisely, how resilience has been integrated into development strategies and the legal 
(planning) documents. This is followed by an analysis to answer the question of what kind of 
actor networks have communicated and dealt with resilience at the local level. In this regard, 
this dissertation explores how different collaborations have emerged and developed and to what 
extent these collaborations are still working, or not, as the case may be. 
Next to the question of which strategies were used to build resilience, the PhD thesis explores 
how state and non-state actors sustained a process that allowed the promotion of resilience 
building at the level of organizations and individual households. In this regard, the activities of 
different actors were examined from 2005 to 2010 (see figure 1). However, the level of 
engagement of local actors is often not sufficiently clear after the emergency and rehabilitation 
ended, so it is important to have more information on known how different local actors such as 
government agencies, civil societies, religious leaders, academic and educational communities 
worked together after the Indian Ocean Tsunami and in these days in order to sustain activities 
in maintaining long-term disaster resilience. In this regard, information related to the current 
collaborative process and problems in building disaster resilience are required. 
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Figure 1 Disaster resilience timeline in Aceh Province 
Source: own 
1.1 Problem definition  
The main aim of this thesis is to analyze which legal tools or measures have been used to 
implement disaster resilience strategies following the tsunami disaster. In this regard, it is 
important for the community to be aware of the strategies, measures, and tools that used by the 
local authorities (Oktari et al. 2014; Tim Kaji Cepat 2012). To complement the local actor 
perspectives, this dissertation will provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of the legal tools 
used to implement disaster risk reduction strategies at the local and community levels, building 
in perspectives from the communities themselves. This evaluation will reveal to what extent 
local people or communities are aware of the measure and how they judge the effectiveness of 
the implementation process compared to the various strategies advertised by the local 
government.  
Although the institutional arrangement of disaster risk reduction at the levels of the province, 
regencies and municipalities has been established, the function and performance of this disaster 
management agency is not sufficiently clear, and the roles and capacities of the provincial and 
local institutions and actors are also not well examined and documented. For example, the 
commitment of these local institutions to integrate disaster resilience in the medium and long-
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term development plans (UNDP Indonesia 2012; Australian National University 2012). In 
addition to a better definition and understanding of the different roles of institutions it is also 
essential to examine the capacities and resources of different organizations, particularly against 
the discourse that networks of state, private or civil society institutions in disaster risk 
management in Aceh need to be strengthened in order to create synergies for resilience building 
after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (Illy 2012). 
The next problem is the complexity and abstract level of the disaster resilience concept; 
however, this research will shed light on this discussion and examine more precisely, how 
disaster resilience has been integrated into legal tools as well as document strategies 
(BAPPENAS 2014). Therefore, the following dissertation provides an in-depth exploration 
into how the concept of disaster resilience has been defined, used and applied by provincial 
and local governmental institutions. Hence, the dissertation aims to explore how disaster 
resilience is translated and put into practice at the provincial and local level by state and non-
state actors in different fields, such as disaster risk management and spatial/urban planning. 
According to a study of the village government, conducted three years after the Indian Tsunami 
in 2004 (Thornburn 2008), the government, civil societies, and local actors should prepare „a 
long term time frame“ for engagement. That means that not only the comprehensiveness of 
resilience building strategies but also their sustainability and stability in terms of medium and 
long-term impacts is important. At the same time, the level of engagement of local actors is 
often not sufficiently clear and some have concluded that various local actors have little 
engagement during and after the rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh Province (Craig 
2007).  This engagement is needed to improve the governance at the local level, specifically to 
solve the problems of multi-stakeholder forum and improve the capability and skills of local 
actors. Moreover, the lack of engagement among the actors hampers the process of improving 
the local capacities and finding long-term solutions in maintaining disaster resilience, since 
stakeholders and networks are key to building resilience and promoting disaster risk reduction 
at the local level.  
In the context, Djalante and Thomalla (2012) also underscore that one challenge for promoting 
resilience after the Tsunami disaster is the limited capacities that local governments have and 
the limited support they have received from the national government in terms of technical and 
financial support, particularly in inviting multiple stakeholders to participate and coordinate in 
building resilience at the local level.  While these important findings are presented in literature, 
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most of the information presented is still incomplete and fragmented, particularly on the 
question of how these local actors can work together and support the development of 
comprehensive strategies to maintain disaster resilience overtime. The next question is to 
identify the factors that are missing from the development of local collaboration in terms of 
technical, funding and other resources to build capacities to work together in promoting disaster 
resilience.   
The Government of Aceh has developed important efforts to promote disaster risk reduction 
and built disaster resilience, such as local disaster management regulations and establishing a 
local disaster management agency (BPBD). However, the effective risk reduction and building 
of disaster resilience needs a clear definition of the role of various government institutions and 
other organizations that are involved in different sectors and which are important for building 
disaster resilience in the short-, medium and long-term. Since the roles of provincial 
government, regencies and municipalities plus village government level are critical, the 
performance of these organizations will be examined in relation to the implementation of their 
strategies through concrete measures and planning processes. This thesis will provide in-depth 
analysis of the local actor perspectives on the process of building resilience, particularly their 
contribution and reflection in this process. 
The other significant problem in building resilience is the vulnerability of women in disaster 
situations. According to Doocy et al. (2007), two-thirds of the tsunami victims in Aceh 
Province were women . Women were more vulnerable after losing their husbands either as a 
result of the political conflict or the 2004 Tsunami, particularly women have to work and 
support their families financially and emotionally and at the same time, looking after children 
(Gender Working Group 2007). As such, the resilience building process needs to consider 
different gender roles and invite more women to participate actively in this process. This thesis 
analyzes the challenges in involving women in the process of building disaster resilience at the 
community level. 
The literature suggests that the long-lasting political conflict in Aceh caused trust issues among 
the governmental authorities, local NGOs, and, community. This destabilization factor 
hampers the collaborative process, particularly in terms of building trust among the local actors 
to work together (Fara 2012). Consequently, the dissertation also aims to provide new insights 
on how the engagement of and cooperation between different local actors has evolved to build 
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their trust and willingness to collaborate in maintaining long-term disaster resilience after the 
conflict and Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004.  
In Aceh’s case, there is no in-depth and systematic knowledge about how learning evolved in 
the medium and long term after the tsunami. The ability to learn and improve following a 
disaster event is an important element in managing future disaster risk and a fundamental aspect 
of disaster risk management. This learning process needs the cooperation of multiple 
stakeholders (Lebel et al. 2006; Tschakert, Dietrich 2010). Based on the interpretation of 
resilience theory (Berkes, Turner 2006; Folke 2016), learning and collaboration can enhance 
resilience after disaster. Therefore, various actors and different types of knowledge should be 
integrated, particularly to bring together the local government, NGOs and community 
knowledge. Besides the need to better understand how the knowledge generation and 
coordination between the various local actors is organized and takes place to promote resilience 
building, it is also essential to examine how different stakeholders are involved, particularly in 
the learning and knowledge development processes. 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
The main objective of this research is to provide  in-depth insights that explain and take a step 
towards systematizing learning about how  the concept of disaster resilience has been translated 
into different policies and long-term development plans in Aceh Province. In this regard, the 
PhD research assesses how different stakeholders and local actors are involved in disaster 
resilience, particularly in learning and the implementation of specific DRR measures to build 
disaster resilience. In addition, this dissertation’s objective is to explore the level of cooperation 
and the commitment of the institutions and local actors to implement the selected disaster risk 
reduction strategies and approaches. 
Based on the core objective outlined above, the PhD research develops a framework for 
resilience focused collaboration that demonstrates approaches to enhance the collaboration 
between different state and non-state organizations to build resilience in terms of linking 
important components and activities of various local actors in order to sustain the promotion 
of disaster resilience in the medium- and long-term following the tsunami in 2004 in Aceh. 
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1.2.1 Main research questions 
Against the background of the problem definition and in the context of the core goals of the 
dissertation outlined above, the key research question of the dissertation is: 
“how disaster resilience strategies and activities are defined and how different local state and 
non-state actors cooperate to achieve disaster resilience in medium and a long-term” 
1.2.2 Research sub-questions 
In the light of the core question, sub-questions of the PhD work are as follows: 
1. How do different local actors define and conceptualize disaster resilience for the province 
of Aceh? What are key characteristics of building disaster resilience at the provincial and 
local level? 
2. What strategies and approaches are employed and preferred by governmental institutions 
and community groups to build disaster resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 
in Aceh Province? Which differences exist between approaches employed? 
3. How do local actors collaborate with each other in the development and maintenance of 
building resilience to disasters? 
4. What are factors that hamper the development and / or the sustainability of multi-actor and 
comprehensive strategies to promote disaster resilience at the local and provincial levels? 
1.3 Research approach 
The PhD research is based on three case study areas in Banda Aceh, Sabang, and Aceh Jaya, 
two municipalities and a regency in Aceh Province in order to examine the governmental 
strategies, institutions, and tools in building disaster resilience. These municipalities and 
regency have different geographical conditions (urban, small island, rural areas), size of the 
areas, and the impacts from the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. While Banda Aceh and Aceh Jaya 
were highly devastated in the Tsunami disaster with 61.065 death and major destruction 21.757 
houses destroyed, the loss and damaged in Sabang was less severe (Doocy et al. 2007; 
Frankenberg et al. 2011). Interestingly, the structures and institutions for disaster management 
and capacities for DRR are in theory the same in three case study areas. However, the PhD 
revealed some important difference. 
This study builds on the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in answering the 
research questions. By employing a mixed-methods approach, the research integrates both 
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qualitative and quantitative data, performing triangulation to test for validity and 
complementary empirical findings. In this study, mixed-methods research is appropriate to 
examine various governmental organizations, NGOS, and community strategies in building 
disaster resilience. Both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis were essential 
to capture the local meanings and targets of disaster resilience. For example, conducting semi-
structured interviews with the respected governmental officials and then confirming the 
findings from these interviews with the household surveys among targeted community 
members.  
In this regard, primary data collection included observations, semi-structured interviews and 
household surveys.  Qualitative data was analyzed by transcribing interviews and initiating 
coding schemes by looking at the research questions. Quantitative data from the household 
surveys was analyzed through descriptive statistics. Secondary data was gathered from 
governmental statistics, documents and reports as well as recent studies or projects related to 
Tsunami risk reduction in Aceh. In addition, media material was examined. Figure 2 provides 
an overview about the research workflow and the respective research tasks. 
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Figure 2 Reserch workflow and tasks  
Source: own
10 
 
1.4 Rationale and significance 
Even though the experiences and lessons learned during the phase of emergency management, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction are important and provide a foundation for governmental and 
non-governmental organizations to further build disaster resilience, there is very little data and 
evidence to show whether and how resilience building took place in the last 4 years – hence 
nearly 15 years after the Tsunami disaster. Improving the knowledge base on how resilience 
building has emerged after the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase is important in order to 
understand whether and how resilience building after disasters can be maintained also in the 
medium- and long run. In addition, it is key to identify a framework and measures that can help 
to sustain approaches in resilience building after disasters, since only with continued awareness 
activities and a high level of preparedness can future disaster risk in the region can be reduced.  
This PhD research uses resilience theory which highlights environmental factors and focuses 
particularly on issues of governance and capacity to manage resilience (Lebel et al. 2006; Folke 
2016) to examine how governmental and non-governmental organizations in Aceh developed 
and implemented approaches to build disaster resilience after a mega disaster in 2004. In this 
regard, a broader framework and context for defining and analysing disaster resilience is 
applied that combines the theoretical and conceptual work of the social-ecological resilience 
research community  (Holling 1973; Carpenter et al. 2012), the natural hazard, and disaster risk 
research community (Lebel et al. 2006; DFID 2011; Cutter et al. 2008; emBRACE 2012; 
Birkmann et al. 2015).  
The goal of applying resilience theories in this thesis is to reveal how resilience is used and 
interpreted differently by different stakeholders (see subchapters 5.1 and 5.2). For example, 
how concepts of disaster resilience after the Tsunami have been defined, used and applied by 
governmental institutions and NGOs. The conceptualization and interpretation of disaster 
resilience underpin the ability to learn and improve after crises, particularly to build knowledge, 
choose better measures, communicate and reflect on the implementation process (Folke 2016; 
Tschakert, Dietrich 2010). The following empirical analysis focuses on how resilience is 
defined or conceptualized by actors and how this influences their ability to maintain resilience 
over time by providing a critical examination of the existing approaches and strategies from 
the local actors (see subchapter 5.3).  
One of the key challenges in applying the resilience concept [or using the resilience concept as 
a frame] is that it is fairly nebulous. This makes it difficult to define and operationalize the 
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concept for specific purposes and means that the standard resilience concept needs to be 
considered with other theories that enable resilience to be refined for a specific domain. (see 
e.g. Brand, Jax 2007; Cutter 2016). These theories allow more a comprehensive analytical 
framework to be established to support the study and systematization of the recovery process, 
lessons learned, and challenges in building disaster resilience. As such, this thesis draws on, 
governance and collaboration theories to provide conceptual clarity and practical relevance of 
resilience theory in the context of collaborative resilience building at the local level, following 
a disaster. 
Governance approaches are used to inform the empirical analysis, particularly to identify legal 
tools or measures that were used to implement the disaster resilience building strategies after 
the tsunami. Governing disaster resilience includes inviting various non-governmental actors 
and civil society organizations in managing disaster resilience and increasing governmental 
capacity to collaborate with different actors  (Bevir 2006). In this respect, governance theory 
will contribute information on what the local stakeholder roles and functions are in maintaining 
resilience after a disaster (see chapter 6).  In this study, the governance approach is applied to 
the question of how the resilience concept has burst onto the Aceh government’s political 
agenda, particularly how the governance structures contribute to supporting cooperation in 
building disaster resilience (see subchapters 6.1 and 6.2).  
The linkage between disaster risk reduction, development policies and planning processes is 
important to understand whether and how resilience building can also be mainstreamed into 
the medium- and long-term development programmes of these municipalities. The additional 
values that governance theory contributes is the promotion and understanding of different 
strategies and mechanisms in building resilience, particularly how to enhance better 
coordination and cooperation from non-governmental actors in managing disaster risk (see sub 
chapter 6.3). In this regard, as proposed by Birkmann et al. (2016b), joined up governance can 
strengthen resilience, particularly for improving the coordination between different agencies to 
solve local problems related disaster risks.  
Collaboration theories (National Research Council 2011; Champagne et al. 2014; Kapucu 
2006; Noran 2014a) provide basis for the analysis on how the engagement of and cooperation 
between different local actors have evolved directly after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in the 
emergency and rehabilitation phase (see chapter 7). Effective collaboration to maintain disaster 
resilience is best developed by inviting various local actors and community members, with 
their diverse knowledge, capacities, and  experiences (National Research Council 2011). This 
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theory can be useful in evaluating the network actors that have communicated and dealt with 
resilience at the local level. This analysis will develop an understanding of existing problems 
that face the Aceh multi-stakeholder forum (see subchapter 7.1). More fundamentally, it is also 
essential to assess the level of cooperation and the commitment of the local actors to implement 
the resilience building strategies (see subchapters 7.2 and 7.3).  
Moreover, the case studies provide an important laboratory to test how municipalities and cities 
in Indonesia after the mega-disaster have attempted to sustain efforts to build resilience and 
how different actors cooperate with each other– particularly governmental and non-
governmental institutions. The findings and the newly developed framework to improve the 
sustainability and range of resilience building strategies at the local level also in the medium- 
and long-term after disasters is also important for other cities that might have experienced 
disasters in the past but also cities that might experience disasters in the future and want to 
learn from Indonesia’s experience to ensure that resilience building is not limited to the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. In addition, the sharing of experiences and lessons 
from the research in the PhD work can also support the Aceh Government to identify good 
practices that will help to promote disaster risk reduction in a comprehensive manner with a 
long-term perspective. Also, the shortcomings and problems identified in the research can help 
to overcome existing problems or at least can help to articulate them.  
1.5 Organization of the dissertation 
This dissertation work is structured into nine chapters. While chapter 1 encompasses an 
introduction and frames this study within the context of Aceh Province after the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami in 2004. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical foundation of the research, particularly on 
the key concepts of building disaster resilience in post-disaster contexts such as learning and 
self-organization and focusing on resilience, governance and collaboration theories and 
concepts. This is followed by defining key concepts of an analytical framework devised by the 
author for this research. In chapter 3, the methodologies used are presented. These show how 
the data collection and analysis was conducted to examine different strategies of governmental 
and non-governmental actors to build resilience. The fourth chapter describes the context of 
the study areas related to the regulations, framework, and institutional architecture of building 
resilience in Aceh Province. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 report the detailed findings of the research. 
These empirical chapters focus on the three key themes: disaster resilience concepts and 
interpretations, governance, and collaboration in managing and strengthening disaster 
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resilience building. Chapter 8 focuses on dealing with the discussion and interpretation of the 
research results. The final chapter draws upon the entire thesis, tying up the various theoretical 
and empirical strands, to formulate core conclusions, to provide recommendations and to 
identify future research needs.  
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2 Theory 
This theory chapter introduces a relevant discussion on the theoretical and conceptual 
assumptions related to the main research questions on how disaster resilience strategies and 
activities are defined and how different local state and non-state actors are cooperated to 
achieve disaster resilience in medium and a long-term. In addition, this research aims to 
develop an evaluation framework of building disaster resilience in Aceh Province following 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. These theory and framework will apply to guide the empirical 
analysis in chapter 5, 6, and 7 and to discuss and interpret the findings in chapter 8.  
The research links the theoretical approaches and concepts of disaster resilience (Folke 2016; 
Cutter 2016), governance (Tierney 2012; Lebel et al. 2006), and collaboration (National 
Research Council 2011; Noran 2014b) to better understand how strengthening and maintaining 
disaster resilience after mega-disasters can be achieved and explored. That means the research 
is underpinned by theoretical concepts which center on the interface of three main subjects: (1) 
resilience, (2) governance, and (3) collaboration. These three key concepts are central to 
understanding how disaster resilience is built and maintained after the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase of the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 ended.  
This theory chapter considers some main literature to analyze how the concept of disaster 
resilience has been defined and put in practice by the local actors  (Lebel et al. 2006; Folke 
2016; Cutter 2016). Resilience approaches may explain the meaning of disaster resilience 
concept and identify the main goals in resilience building activities by the local actors. At the 
same time, this approach provides practical perspective on the interpretation of this concept by 
different actors. The next step in the application of resilience theory is to identify the main 
factors that contribute in building disaster resilience after the crises and how these factors 
support the sustainability of maintaining resilience over time. In this context, resilience 
approaches allow to better understand of the concrete features and directs connection of 
resilience factors that important to evaluate the progress and level of disaster resilience building 
at the local level. For examples, closely observing learning and self-organization that 
recognizes as important features in building disaster resilience. 
The governance approaches will apply to examine the participatory process and capacity of 
local actors in maintaining disaster resilience (Stoker 1998; Tierney 2012). The governance 
approach will advance deeper understanding of various governance challenges related to 
structural arrangements, planning, and decision making in developing comprehensive 
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strategies in building disaster resilience. Specifically, the governance approach will help to 
examine the implementation of strategies and practices in building disaster resilience. 
The collaboration approach will use to understand how the various local actors involved and 
organized to promote resilience building, particularly how they communicated and dealt with 
resilience at the local level (National Research Council 2011; Mayer, Kenter 2015). 
Consequently, these approaches are applied to anticipate the empirical findings in this 
dissertation. Theoretical and empirical works on collaboration may explain collaborative 
advantage in building resilience, particularly how to advance collaborative approach in 
sustaining disaster resilience building. Collaboration between non-governmental and 
governmental institutions might be key to ensure a high level of disaster resilience in 
communities and at the local level – here perhaps collaboration theory provides an interesting 
perspective.   
In practice, the combination of these theoretical concepts and approaches can provide new 
insights for the conceptualization and translation of disaster resilience, as an overarching 
approach to analyses the local disaster governance. These key theoretical principals will help 
to understand the interactions and cooperation of the actors at the local level. For example, to 
understand the existing mismatches that hampered the cooperation and hindered the 
development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy to build disaster resilience. In 
addition, this discussion of different concepts and their linkages is an important foundation for 
the development of the “resilience focused collaboration” framework that will develop in this 
reseach.  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section elaborates on the concept and 
definition of disaster resilience from different perspectives, particularly the key characteristics 
of disaster resilience that needed to maintain medium and long-term disaster resilience at the 
local level. The second section facilitate the discussion about the key characteristics of 
governance in managing disaster resilience at the local level. Specifically, governance theory 
can inform on what the local stakeholder’s roles and function in maintaining resilience after 
disaster. In addition, concepts of good governance also provide important normative 
information and concepts that are prerequisite for sustaining high levels of disaster resilience.  
The third section provides foundation for the analysis on how the engagement and the 
cooperation between different local actors evolved to build resilience, by identifying the key 
characteristics of collaboration. The fourth section deals with the development the analytical 
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framework of resilience focused collaboration. This final section will synthesis the discussion 
of the resilience, governance, and collaboration theories to develop an evaluation framework 
for the process of building disaster resilience. 
2.1 Key characteristics of disaster resilience 
The following section underlines the key characteristics and applications of resilience approach 
in post-disaster resilience building at the local level. Despite the discourse surrounding the 
resilience concept at the theoretical level, in practice, the recent policy trend has incorporated 
the resilience concept to manage environment and enhance human security, particularly in 
terms of building disaster resilience (Bara, Broennimann 2011; UN/ISDR 2005; DFID 2011). 
This resilience concept has been developed and integrated in risk management and 
development policy from the global community to the local level government. For example, 
the current development of the resilience concept has revolved through disaster risk reduction 
frameworks and strategies to reduce disaster risk from natural hazards at the global and local 
levels. However, in practice, the efforts to operationalize this concept into policies and 
institutions of disaster reduction are remained problematic because of the vague meanings of 
disaster resilience (Klein et al. 2003).  
The literature of resilience has progressed significantly and has brought a strong interest to 
climate change to enrich resilience theory. The IPCC (2012) defined resilience as “the ability 
of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the 
effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the 
preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions”. This 
definition places resilience in the context of extreme events and climate change and therewith 
underscores that the concept of resilience is used today not only in the social-ecological 
resilience research community, but also in various discussion and science-policy documents, 
particularly in natural hazards and climate change. 
Resilience concept is used in many areas of disaster studies, particularly in disaster 
management and disaster risk reduction. The concept of resilience helps to understand that 
crises can provide an important stimulus for changing behavior and conducting risk reduction 
and preparedness measures (Ejeta et al. 2015). Disaster resilience is defined as “the capacity of 
system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt by resisting or changing 
in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is 
determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase 
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its capacity for learning from the past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk 
reduction measures” (UN/ISDR 2004). Resilience approach is used as a much more specific 
term for the capability to prepare, response and recover from disaster hazards (Bhamra et al. 
2011).  
According to Folke (2016), “resilience thinking is about how periods of gradual communities, 
societies, cultures to adapt or even transforms into new development pathways in the face of 
dynamic changes”. In the context of building resilience after disaster, this definition is 
conceptualized as a process to embrace changes and improve after disaster, particularly with a 
more sustainable development agenda. It means to get better future protection and to improve 
risk reduction measures in development, there is a need for efforts to promote resilience in a 
system, community, or society. In addition, the two fundamental questions tackled in building 
disaster resilience are concerned either with resilience as a process or an outcome of the 
recovery and learning process after disaster (Manyena 2014). This dualism may be hard to 
distinct in practice, but it depends on how disaster resilience conceptualized and defined. 
From the discussion of resilience definitions and concepts above, it is evident that resilience 
today has emerged into different concepts. However, a common basis is that resilience deals 
with capacities and processes on how a system – e.g. a society or social-ecological system – 
can deal with and sustain its basic functions even in situations where it is exposed to major 
shocks and perturbations or disruptions (Gall 2013). Even though the resilience concept and 
various theoretical approaches remain often abstract, the concept has provided important new 
insights into disaster risk thinking. It underscored that crises and shocks might be a part of the 
“normal development” and therefore building resilience to these shocks and stressors is a key.  
Maintaining resilience requires certain key factors to achieve the disaster resilience. In this 
research, it will be argued that the explicit capacities and attributes must be developed and 
nurtured after a disaster to build disaster resilience.  In a broad sense, disaster resilience concept 
is concerned with (1) capacity to learn and improve after crises, (2) capacity to self-organize, 
(3) capacity to recover, (4) ability to bounce back, (5) ability to absorbs shocks, (6) ability to 
maintain major functions and its structures in crises and, (7) ability to adapt.  The key 
components and characteristics of resilience in the broader sense of disaster studies is presented 
in table 1.  
Table 1 Key components and characteristics of disaster resilience  
18 
 
Disaster resilience 
concepts 
Key components Characteristics 
Capacity to learn 
and improve after 
crises 
• Be aware of a problem 
• Build knowledge  
• Diversify their ideas  
• Reflect 
• Communicate 
• Develop a shared vision 
• Act 
(Tschakert, Dietrich 2010) 
• Building memory of 
past disaster events 
• Abandoning the 
nation of stability 
• Expected the 
unexpected 
• Bringing different 
kinds of knowledge 
(Berkes 2007) 
 
Capacity to self-
organize after 
crises 
• Number of actors that involve  
• Frequency of interactions 
among the actors 
• Goal of the action 
• Communication 
• Choice 
• Mutual adjustment 
(Comfort 1994; Berkes 2007) 
• Maintaining the local 
capacity for social 
and political 
organization 
in the face of 
disasters. 
• Cross-scale 
thinking and 
partnerships 
• Strengthening 
institutional memory   
learning-by-doing 
(Berkes 2007) 
Capacity to recover 
from crises 
• Trust 
• Social norms  
• Participation 
• Networks 
• Multidisciplinary 
• Formal collaboration 
(Aldrich 2015; Nakagawa, 
Shaw 2004) 
• More ties to their old 
communities 
• The overcoming of 
barriers to collective 
action 
• The provision of 
mutual aid and 
informal insurance 
• Strong networks and 
communities 
(Aldrich 2015) 
Ability to bounce 
back 
• Having a preparedness plan 
for disaster 
• Having a quick recovery   
after disaster 
• Build back better after disaster  
       (Aldunce et al. 2014) 
• Discontinuous 
change 
• Proactive 
• Open the opportunity 
to do better and 
differently 
• Radically innovate 
(Aldunce et al. 
2014) 
Ability to absorb 
shocks  
• Self-organizations after 
disaster 
• Learning from disaster 
• Absorbs disturbance 
and change  
• Re-organize 
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• Adaptation from future 
disaster risks  
• Renewal and continuous 
development after disaster 
(Aldunce et al. 2014) 
• Retain essentially the 
same function, 
structure, identity, 
and feedbacks 
(Walker et al. 2004) 
Ability to maintain 
major functions 
and its structures in 
crises 
• Disaster response 
• Disaster preparedness 
• Disaster mitigation 
• Recovery (Birkmann, 
Teichman 2010; Chang, 
Shinozuka 2004) 
• Strongly connected 
• Behave in nonlinear 
way 
• Unpredictable 
(Walker, Salt 2012) 
Ability to adapt 
after crises 
• Evaluating and negotiating 
tradeoffs 
• Communication among 
diverse groups 
• Social learning  
(Armitage et al. 2011) 
• Open and adaptable 
system 
• Flexibility 
• Readiness to adapt 
• Major change 
(Handmer, Dovers 
1996) 
Source: own 
According to Folke et al. (2002) the capacity to learn and improve after crises, capacity to self-
organize, and capacity to recover are the critical factors to build resilience after disaster. The 
following sections will discuss further these three critical capacities that require to deal with 
the process of maintaining medium and long-term resilience. 
2.1.1 Capacity to learn and improve after crises 
The resilience approach in this dissertation emphasizes changes and particularly the process of 
learning and improving after a disaster event (Folke 2016). In disaster research, learning is 
defined as “a key component for living with uncertainty and extreme events, and is nurtured 
by building the right kind of social/institutional space for learning and experimentation that 
allows for competing worldviews, knowledge systems and values, and facilitates innovative 
and creative adaptation.” (IPCC 2012). The concern about learning from past disasters is 
related to the ability to identify the lessons from the disaster experience. These identified 
lessons are critical for the formulation of recommendations and strategies to deal with future 
disaster risk. Based on these lessons, disaster resilience can be maintained better (Cutter et al. 
2008). Overall, these studies outline that learning is part of the knowledge management that 
should enhance after disaster (Koslowski, Longstaff 2015). 
Ideally, learning should begin immediately after disaster and involve not only the authorities 
but also the communities themselves. Due to other urgent agendas such as recovery activities, 
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learning mostly begins after the situation has returned to a normal condition. It means that 
learning rarely appear immediately after disaster. Toft, Reynolds (2005) argue that post-
disaster learning is more than having good recovery process, but it is a process to take proper 
actions to improve the condition. This type of learning is known as active learning that needed 
to practice by the authorities to improve the recovery process.  
Learning after disaster can be classified by their specific aims. For example, Gunderson (2010) 
introduces “episodic learning” and “transformational learning”. Episodic learning can be done 
by renewing the existing policies, plans, and strategies. Transformational learning offers 
innovation to solve problems that affect cross-scale systems with detailed variables. However, 
both types of learning may occur after disaster, which makes it difficult to distinguish and 
differentiate among these learning activities.  
In the context of building resilience, learning is one of the key characteristics that aim to shape 
capacities and outcomes from the process of building disaster resilience (Bahadur et al. 2010; 
Matyas, Pelling 2015). It means that learning is needed to develop the local actor’s capacities 
to build resilience, particularly for policy implementation (Miller 2010). At the same time, it is 
important to combine various local actor´s knowledge and experiences in learning to build 
resilience (Folke et al. 2002).  The evidence suggests that there are various types of learning 
capacities that can take place to build disaster resilience. For example, the capacity to collect 
knowledge and share information from scientific and indigenous sources, research and review, 
and social learning are important to develop in building resilience (Oxley 2013).  
As shown in table 1, the capacity to learn and improve after disaster comprise (1) capacity to 
be aware of a problem, (2) capacity to build knowledge, (3) capacity to diversify their ideas, 
(4) capacity to reflect, (5) capacity to communicate, (6) capacity to develop a shared vision and  
(7) capacity to act (Tschakert, Dietrich 2010).  These capacities can be achieved by (1) building 
memory of past disaster events, (2) abandoning the nation of stability, (3) expected the 
unexpected, and (4) bringing different kinds of knowledge (Berkes 2007). To develop these 
capacities, it needs a continuous learning process. It is almost certain that the willingness and 
commitment to continue to learn is needed to promote resilience after the disaster.  
2.1.2 Capacity to self-organize after crises 
Capability to self-organize is one of the core characteristics of resilience that give a system 
capacity to recover after crises (Berkes et al. 2002; Heylighen 2001). Most understandings of 
self-organization share a common interest in the capacity of an open system to reorganize at 
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critical points of instability, crises, or perturbations to achieve a larger goal and new order 
(Berkes et al. 2002; Comfort 1994; Fuchs 2003). As shown in table 1, the key characteristics 
of self-organization are including (1) maintaining the local capacity for social and political 
organization in the face of disasters (2) cross-scale thinking and partnerships, and (3) 
strengthening institutional memory learning-by-doing (Berkes 2007). As such, these 
characteristics will determine the capacity of local actors to self-organize in building disaster 
resilience after disaster.  
In the context of maintaining resilience after disaster, Lebel et al. (2006) emphasize that 
resilience can be achieved by increasing the capacities to self-organize, learn, and adapt after 
a crises. These components are needed for a system to be able to recover and improve after 
disaster (Koslowski, Longstaff 2015). Birkmann et al. (2013) argue that the ability to learn and 
self-organize after disaster is part of the adaptation process when the resilience is lacking or 
missing in a system. It means that self-organization allows the system to adapt after disaster. 
Self-organization refers to a natural tendency to organize formally or informally without 
command from the government or other important stakeholders to deal with change after 
disaster (Pelling 2011). 
In practice, the capacity to self-organize is one of the important components to build back 
better, particularly through community involvement in development plans (Kennedy et al. 
2008).  This ability is often seen as important factor in coping with community participation 
problems. The activation of community capacity to manage resilience may be triggered by the 
improvement of self-organization of the community (Berkes, Ross 2013). Self-organization is 
a long-term activity that depends on the community’s capacities to participate in various 
activities related to building disaster resilience. This seems to imply that it is challenging to 
prove the existence of resilience without understanding the community self-organization 
mechanisms.  
According to Folke et al. (2002), it is important to create opportunities to self-organizate by 
focus on governance, scale, and external drivers that can enhance self-organization. As shown 
in table 1, the self-organization to build resilience after disaster are determined by  (1) number 
of actors that involve, (2) frequency of interactions among the actors, (3) goal of the action, (3) 
communication, (4) choice, and (5) mutual adjustment (Comfort 1994; Berkes 2007).  In 
addition, Ostrom (2009) argues that self-organization may take place, when the leadership, 
trust, and respects occurs in the interactions among the local actors. These components can 
stimulate self-organization, particularly to resolve the challenges in maintaining long-term 
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disaster resilience (Carpenter et al. 2001). Together these studies provide insights into the 
importance of self-organization after disaster.  
2.1.3 Capacity to recover after crises 
Actions toward building resilience will require understanding of the capacity to recover after 
crises. In building disaster resilience context, recovery is defined as “the differential process of 
restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the physical, social, economic, and natural environment 
through pre-event planning and post-event actions” (Smith, Wenger D 2009).  The recovery 
process includes not only the rehabilitation of the infrastructure, livelihoods, and environment, 
but also the implemention of disaster risk reduction measures during the reconstruction process 
(UN/ISDR 2009).  
Capacity to recover after disaster is seen as the local actor´s ability to capitalized the “windows 
of opportunities” to promote change in society and effective disaster management after disaster 
(Birkmann et al. 2010). Table 1 provides the components of disaster resilience that will enhance 
the capacity to recover after crises, include trust, social norms,  participation, networks, 
multidisciplinary, formal collaboration (Aldrich 2015; Nakagawa, Shaw 2004). Most of these 
components related to the governance of building disaster resilience that consider the 
engagement and contribution of local actors and community in the recovery process.  
The long-term recovery plans and tools are the main components to manage infrastructures and 
resolve the wicked problems (Brandon 2011). The long-term recovery requires community 
involvement in the decision making process (Mileti 1999). In the recovery process, another 
option and opportunity to build disaster resilience is to incorporate social capital with the long-
term development plan (Fukuyama 2001).  It is almost certain that community recovery 
requires (1) more ties to their old communities, (2) the overcoming of barriers to collective 
action, (3) the provision of mutual aid and informal insurance, and (4) strong networks and 
communities (see table 1) (Aldrich 2015). These charactheristics are part of strong social 
capital as key components of community to recover and build disaster resilience (Dynes 2005). 
Masterson et al. (2014) underscore that social capital provides resources for victim that needs 
to recover after disaster. By drawing on this concept of social capital, it appears that 
participation in the emergency response can provide significant benefits for the disaster victims 
through strengthening/establishing their social relationships. In addition, Norris et al. (2008) 
indicate that social support, networks, and bounding will improve the capacity to recover after 
a disaster. On the other hand, Aldrich (2008) draws our attention to the disruption of social 
23 
 
capital because of the disaster victims relocated and often lost contact with each other after the 
disaster. This can have significant impacts on community relations after disaster. Aldrich 
(2008) suggests that recovery efforts should, therefore, include the reconstruction of social 
networks for the community that experiences a disaster. This can be achieved through disaster 
commemoration, traditional ceremonies, and anniversaries (Dynes 2005).  
Aldrich, Meyer (2014) argue that social capital positively affects and contributes to building 
resilience after a disaster. The communities that has strong social capital tend to be “efficient” 
in emergency response and post disaster recovery (Shaw et al. 2004). According to Dynes 
(2005) some communities had greater confidence and trust in their own capacities and 
resources after recovering from disaster. Cutter (2016) points out that social capital relates to 
the participation and engagement of community members in civic society and religious 
organizations. It means that the capacity to recover depend on the contribution of the 
community to take part in the recovery process 
 
2.2 Key characteristics of governance 
The following section underlines the application of governance theory related to building 
disaster resilience at the local level. In the context of building resilience, most of governance 
studies have focused on governance as a useful tool to analyze the institutions and increase the 
effectiveness of various strategies in building resilience (Schuppert 2015; Mehta 2006). 
Governance refers to “theories and issues of social coordination and the nature of all patterns 
of rule” (Bevir 2011). This definition focuses not only on theories and practices of governance 
but also on the dilemmas that encourage further theoretical reflection and practical activity. 
This means that governance allow the actors to extend access to resources and make collective 
decisions.  
Resilience is an approach that used widely in the governance of disaster, particularly in laws, 
regulations, and frameworks related disaster risk management. Disaster governance defines as 
“the interrelated sets of norms, organizational and institutional actors, and practices (spanning 
pre-disaster, trans-disaster, and post-disaster periods) that are designed to reduce the impacts 
and losses associated with disasters arising from natural and technological agents and from 
intentional acts of terrorism“ (Tierney 2012). With the focus on governing disaster, the major 
role of disaster governance is to “identify the mode operandi (strategies and mechanism used) 
that are more likely to allow a system (such as a community or a technical system) to achieve 
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resilience” (Koslowski, Longstaff 2015). This definition is consistent with the definition and 
function of governance that is widely accepted in different practices. 
There has been discussion around contribution of the application of resilience concept in 
governance. Duit et al. (2010) question whether resilience is a useful concept for governance 
when the contribution of this concept in governance is not clear. Previously, a number of 
studies have attempted to explain the relationship between governance and resilience in the 
context of the social ecological system (Larsen et al. 2011; Lebel et al. 2006; Garmestani, 
Benson 2013). This attempt is important to gain more understanding about building disaster 
resilience from both theories. As Tierney (2012) claims, governance is a relatively new concept 
in disaster research. For this reason, the interpretation and development of the combination 
from resilience and governance studies are encouraged.  
In the context of building disaster resilience, most strategies and approaches focus on the 
implementation of good governance. It argued that good governance improves the 
effectiveness of disaster governance, particularly in the implementation of disaster risk 
reduction measures (Tierney 2012). To ascertain whether governance is ‘good’, actors look at 
the mechanisms to promote it, the processes used, and the outcomes achieved (UNDP 2014). 
Good governance highlights the need to build the trust and accountability of decision makers, 
including the government as well as other stakeholders (Mehta 2006). In support, Aven, Renn 
(2010) lists six principles of good governance of actor engagement in governing disaster 
resilience, include (1) openness of the institutions to the general public, (2) participation of 
stakeholders, (3) accountability of actors, (4) effectiveness of policies, (5) coherent and 
understandable policies, and (6) proportionality and subsidiarity of the governance process. 
The implementation of good governance in building disaster resilience aims to achieve 
management effectiveness, particularly in planning, outputs, and outcomes (Lockwood 2010).  
The link between governance and disaster resilience is focused on defining the functions, roles, 
and responsibilities of the actors and understanding the changes and impacts that these actors 
contribute in the process (Lal et al. 2012). The central idea of governing disaster resilience is 
to identify the changes and shifts from the role of government to governance in maintaining 
disaster resilience. To achieve this target, there needs to be successful of implementation of 
various approaches and strategies in resilience process (Poterie, Baudoin 2015).  
It will be argued that it is important to recognize the components of resilience in governance. 
These components are useful to evaluate and improve the performance of the authorities and 
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stakeholders who are involved in the governance process for the long term. According to Twigg 
(2007), the concrete features of resilience in governance consist of (1) policy, planning, 
priorities and political commitment, (2) legal and regulatory systems, (3) integration with 
development policies and planning, (4) integration with emergency response and recovery, (5) 
institutional mechanisms, capacities and structures; allocation of responsibilities, (6) 
partnerships, and (7) accountability and community participation. Perhaps, the most serious 
challenge is to find all these components in practice because they do not appear naturally but 
must be developed by the authorities.  
 
Figure 3 Capacity to manage resilience framework (Lebel et al. 2006) 
Lebel et al. (2006) were among the first to propose a framework that brings the idea of linking 
governance and resilience theories related to managing resilience in the social ecological 
systems (Figure 2). Lebel’s framework is useful for assessing the relationship between 
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governance and the capacities of actors, institutions and their relationships by linking good 
governance as a foundation to build resilience. In this context, managing resilience means the 
promotion of good governance as a key component in developing capacities of actors and 
agencies (Lebel et al. 2006). However, in the context of maintaining disaster resilience, this 
framework would have been more useful if explicit resilience factors were recognized and used 
as the attributes of governance. 
The relevant strategies and mechanisms are beneficial for maintaining disaster resilience. 
Several attempts have been made to link disaster resilience with comprehensive disaster 
management strategies and activities before and after the disaster events. This can be achieved 
through the development of strong disaster prevention, preparedness, and mitigation measures 
as the main strategies to reduce and prepare future disaster risk. In general, these strategies 
comprise of a political and legal commitment, long term planning and infrastructure 
enhancement. (Kohler et al. 2004). These strategies rely upon social, political, economic, 
cultural, and environmental factors of the country (Lal et al. 2012). The programs and activities 
include development of organizational structures, warning and communication systems, 
evacuation of residents, promotion of public awareness, safety drills, and emergency response 
system (UNESCO 2008).  
After the emergency response and recovery phase has ended, sustainable funding is one of the 
main challenges for maintaining medium and long-term disaster resilience. In fact, the sources 
of funding support are multifarious, including from individuals, businesses, foundations, 
governments, religious organizations, community organizations, fee generation and 
partnerships (Coppola, Maloney 2009).  However, it may be that the mechanisms to apply for 
funding from donor organizations are complex and difficult to negotiate. Building disaster 
resilience requires improvements to the networking and collaboration between governmental 
and non-governmental organizations in order to provide sufficient funding, political support 
and other disaster resilience resources (Berke, Campanella 2006).  
As highlighted above, institutional capacity is a critical component in maintaining disaster 
resilience. In this research, it is argued that institutional capacity is linked to disaster 
management structures and infrastructure. Disaster management structures include emergency 
response, preparation, mitigation, recovery measures, plannings, tools  and strategies to reduce 
future disaster risk  (Cutter 2016; Coppola, Maloney 2009; Rubinoff, Courtney 2007). At the 
same time, institutions such as the laws, attitudes, cultures, actors and human environment are 
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also important as they provide opportunities to enhance the capacity of a society to deal with 
the complexity and uncertainty associated with natural hazards (Manyena 2006). 
On the other hand, the quality of disaster management institutions in maintaining resilience 
relies in the capacity of institutions to convert disruption and crisis into resilience (Masys 
2015).  However, Christoplos (2003) finds that it is difficult to maintain the quality of disaster 
management institutions when the situation has returned to a normal state after disaster.  Strong 
political commitment is needed to maintain their capacity and quality over a long period of 
time (Lucini 2014). One reason for that is because the effectiveness of disaster management 
policies and strategies may depreciate over time (Birkmann 2007).  
2.2.1 Participation and capacity of local actors 
Research on participation in disaster resilience governance focuses on how stakeholders and 
community are involved in building disaster resilience (UNISDR 2015; IPCC 2012). It has 
often been assumed that the participation of stakeholders and community is crucial in disaster 
resilience governance at the local level. Recent evidence suggests that stakeholders are the 
main factor in determining the success of resilience building (Larsen et al. 2012). The 
contribution of stakeholders can improve the quality and effectiveness of decision-making 
processes. Later, decisions are more likely to be accepted by the stakeholders (IRGC 2005).  
Stakeholders refer to “any individual, social group, or actor who possesses a stake (e.g., 
interest, legal obligation, moral right) in the decisions or outcomes of an organization (typically 
firms, corporations, or governments) and affected or being affecting the achievement of an 
organization´s objectives.” (Manuel-Navarrete, Modvar 2006). This includes people and 
groups who are typically disadvantaged and unsatisfied with the programs or decisions (Weiss 
1998).   
The literature on stakeholder participation explores the process of inviting relevant actors and 
community to participate in disaster governance. Recent evidences show that stakeholders have 
different roles and responsibilities in governing disaster resilience (Lal et al. 2012). Several 
attempts have been made to identify the stakeholders before accommodating them into the 
appropriate functions. The attempt begins with defining stakeholders in the governance 
arrangements by conducting a reliable stakeholdres analysis. Stakeholders analysis refers to 
“an approach, a tool or set of tools for generating knowledge about actors – individuals and 
organizations – so as to understand their behaviour, intentions, interrelations and interests; and 
for assessing the influence and resources they bring to bear on decision-making or 
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implementation processes  is used to identify and reveal the interest, roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships of the local actors” (Varvasovszky, Brugha 2000).  
In this analysis, the stakeholders are categorized based on their power and interests, including 
players, subjects, context setters, and crowds ((Bryson 2004; Bryson et al. 2011).  This exercise 
is helpful to increase the  effectiveness of governance because in some cases stakeholders tend 
to be unconscious and not clear about their status and roles  in governance (Jentoft 2007). Based 
on this analysis, stakeholder participation can be enhanced by empowering and increasing 
stakeholder interests with various methods. One of the methods that can be used to increase the 
interest in participating is by offering transformation in policies, reallocation budget, and 
redefining the responsibilities of the stakeholders (Kahan et al. 2009).  
At the same time, stakeholders engangement are needed to develop. According to Burnside-
Lawry et al. (2013), stakeholder engagement is „the overall practice of involving publics in 
policy-setting decisions of organizations or institutions”. These practices aim to improve the 
effectiveness of policy formulation and implementation (Helbig et al. 2015). In the context of 
governing disaster resilience, the stakeholder engagement can benefit in the improvement and 
evaluation of policy making, specifically when the government is able to convene the 
stakeholders in these practices. The other method to empower this engangement is by involving 
more local actors in order to produce “locally appropriate policies” (Duxbury, Dickinson 
2007).  
It has been argued that governance arrangements and participation mostly depend on 
government initiatives at the local level. The local level refers to “a range of places, social 
groupings, experience, management, institutions, conditions, and sets of knowledge that exist 
at a sub-national scale” (Cutter, S. et al. 2012).  The concept of governance at the local level 
refers to “how policies and decisions are being made at the local level” and the network 
between the governmental and non-governmental actors (Schaap 2006). In his paper (Kauzya 
2002) identifies local governance as governmental and non-governmental actors that have 
power and roles at the local level. In this sense, local governance serves as a decision making 
and implementing agency on behalf of the local population to fulfill their needs and aspirations 
(Kauzya 2002).  
Together, these studies outline that the state and non-state actors, including government 
agencies, NGOs, and civil society organizations (CSO)  have significant contribution to 
maintain medium and long-term disaster resilience at the local level. These local actors 
contributions depend on their interests, expertises, and experiences (Thornburn 2008; Kahan 
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et al. 2009). Table 2 shows the common roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in 
maintaining disaster resilience.  
Table 2 Stakeholders contribution in maintaining disaster resilience at the local level 
Stakeholders Contribution in maintaining disaster resilience 
Local Government to take the lead, convince other actors, regulate, 
monitor and evaluate 
Sectors (education, health, transport, 
environment, etc.) 
to integrate risk reduction as part of plans and 
responsibilities 
Academia, research center, scholar to provide research and data analysis, support the 
government with scientific-based policy making 
 
Citizens, community groups 
(indigenous communities, women, 
children, person with disabilities, older 
persons, migrants) 
to participate, be actively informed, and take 
individual responsibility 
 
 
 
Private sectors/business community to share resources, disseminate knowledge, 
practices and non- sensitive data 
 
Professional groups to provide technical expertise, raise awareness, 
collect data and inform the media 
 
Civil society (NGOs, CSO, CBO, 
Voluntary) 
to participate, organize communities, coordinate, 
help oversee, monitor, and evaluate 
 
National government and 
Parliamentary 
to guide, build, and develop policy, allocate 
financial and administrative resources, and provide 
political authority to guide and support the 
stakeholders 
 
International Organizations 
(Bilateral and Multilateral Agencies) 
to provide cooperation and consultation 
Media to raise public awareness and disseminate accurate 
disaster information 
 
Source : (UNISDR 2015; UN/ISDR 2005) 
In the case of actor’s participation, inclusiveness is an important strategy to promote good 
governance principles. Inclusiveness defines as the competency to involve actors and bring 
their perspective into consideration (Jentoft 2007). In practice, inclusiveness is more than direct 
participation of the stakeholders, but acknowledgement of their diverse “interests and 
viewpoints” that exist in the sphere of disaster resilience governance (Head 2007). However, 
the effectiveness of governing the stakeholders is not merely dependent on the principles of 
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inclusiveness but also rely on the process to achieve common goals (Manuel-Navarrete, 
Modvar 2006).      
Preliminary work on the evaluation of tsunami preparedness after the Indian Ocean tsunami 
2004 was undertaken by Said et al. (2011) and reveal that community involvement and 
participation of stakeholders are critical factors for developing good strategies, specifically in  
preparedness and response activities. In the context of early warning systems, Thomalla, Larsen 
(2010) argue that the engagement of governmental and non-governmental actors is crucial in 
implementing warning and evacuation policies. As indicated, the affected community need to 
be inform and effectively communicate about the strategies (Collins, Kapucu 2008). 
On the other hand, the community perceives participation as one of the empowerment forms 
that aim to increase their capacity to decide and show their interests and expectation in 
development agenda (White 1996). As Hattie, Timperley (2007) address, feedback provided 
by the community is an important information for the local government to improve their 
performance in building disaster resilience. 
2.2.2 Local government 
The local government has significant roles in maintaining medium and long-term disaster 
resilience. Most of the local governmet roles are mandated in various global disaster risk 
reduction frameworks, for example, UN/ISDR (2012) highlights that the local government’s 
roles are to develop and manage local collaboration in building disaster resilience. Specifically, 
the main tasks of local government are to provide reliable emergency response systems and to 
design effective disaster mitigation and preparedness measures. In addition, the local 
government should implement the preparedness and mitigation measures and seek support 
from the higher levels of government (Col 2007). At the same time, the synchronization of 
these local programs with the national government´s policy will attain strong political 
commitment (Kahan et al. 2009; Christoplos 2003). 
The reasons to improve the capacity of local government in building resilience because (1) 
disasters are experienced at the local level, (2) directly affect the community and individual 
quality of life, (3) local policy issues must be urgently solved, (4) the community relies upon 
the local authority, and (5) local policy is more effective than the higher level government 
policy (Cutter, S. et al. 2012; Nabatchi, Amsler 2014; Heitz et al. 2009).   On the other hand, 
the challenges that local governments face in this process are (1) lack of interest and capacities, 
(2) to understand local risks and vulnerabilities, (3) to maintain and upgrade critical 
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infrastructure, (4) to manage long-term processes, and (5) to learn from disasters (UN/ISDR 
2010). In general, the local government tends to be inconsistent and poor in disaster 
management planning and implementation (Wolensky, Wolensky 1990). 
As such, there is an urgent need to improve the performance of the local government in building 
disaster resilience. The improvement can be done by (1) acknowledgment of roles, 
responsibilities, and tasks, (2) sufficient budget, (3) coordination and collaboration with 
stakeholders, (4) integration with development plans and, (5) building local capacity (FAO 
2004).   The local government needs to invite the non-state actors, particularly the NGOs and 
community-based organizations (CBO) to participate in building disaster resilience. However, 
in practice, local government has a low interest to collaborate due to their insufficient 
experience and lack of capacity to engage (Gazley 2010).  
One of the attempts to answer this problem is by providing the regulatory affairs and 
appropriate funding to encourage local government to develop a collaboration arrangement 
with civil society and the relevant stakeholders at the local level (UNISDR 2015). Governing 
disaster resilience at the local level means to collaborate with the local actors and agencies and 
to incorporate their indigenous knowledge and abilities to adapt, as well as building their 
capacity to manage disaster risks (Olwig 2012). This local engagement may generate 
innovation and enhance good governance in managing disaster resilience (Werg et al. 2013). 
2.2.3 NGOs 
NGOs play an important role in the maintenance of resilience after a disaster event. In the 
context of this research, NGOs not only provide significant assistance and reliefs in the 
emergency response, but they also changed and shaped the social structure during and 
following the recovery phase of the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 (Thorburn 2007). Disasters 
open the opportunity for NGOs to coordinate not only with the local government but also with 
the military and civil protection (Giovanna 2005). NGO participation continues after their 
humanitarian mission has ended and involve in disaster resilience governance. However, most 
studies in disaster management focus on the involvement of NGOs in governing disaster 
resilience as they support the limited capacity of government that struggles to act on its own 
and resolve problems (Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff 2002). 
It is argued that there is no ideal type of formal relationship between NGOs and government, 
it depends on the compromise between both parties (Tvedt 2002). The development of 
collaboration follows the needs and natures of the NGOs and their respected partners (Coston 
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1998). However, most of the relationship between the government and NGOs can be difficult 
to define and maintain (Owen 2000). In practice, NGO contributions are varied, including the 
support NGOs provide the government in disaster resilience governance at the local level after 
disaster (UNDP Indonesia 2012). For instance, the NGOs often provide additional support, 
creating partnerships, and consulting in policy making process (Young 2010). However, 
Christoplos (2003) has also questioned how often the NGO actions are in line with their 
campaign to promote disaster resilience, due to their tendency to follow the agendas of the 
donors.  
2.2.4 Community-based organizations 
The participation of civil society in disaster resilience governance is encouraged through 
collaboration with community based-organizations. Community-based organizations can make 
significant contributions that are relevant to the community needs and characteristics, 
particularly relating to local grass-root community that directly affected by disaster. These 
organizations  have a great ability and opportunity to respond, channel the network, and utilize 
their knowledge of the local cultures and customs in disaster events (ASEAN 2016). Moreover, 
the contribution of community is beneficial to evaluate specific programs and policies where 
they are engaged and involved as participants, volunteers, or advisors (Weiss 1998). 
Admittedly, the engagement of community is a foundation of participatory governance that 
needs time, resources, and commitment (Reddel, Woolcock 2004).  
As indicated, it needs to promote the community engagement in disaster management through 
sustainable financial funding, organizational, personal and behavioral support by connecting 
community organizations and other actors (Shaw, Goda 2004). These community-based 
organizations are sometimes not recognized at the local level. On the other hand, it is clear that 
the interests of community members to engage also depends on public policy support to 
improve the capacity of stakeholders to organize themselves and collaborate  (Head 2007).  For 
example, there is a need to invite community members to engage in public awareness, 
preparedness and prevention activities, and promoting inclusiveness  (UNISDR 2015).  
2.2.5 Vulnerable groups 
Building disaster resilience requires the participation of the vulnerable population (Sullivan, 
Häkkinen 2006). The acknowledgment of the vulnerable with their specific needs and 
conditions are critical to open their access to the decision making process in emergency 
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response and preparedness (National Research Council 2011). Sullivan, Häkkinen (2006) 
identify several vulnerable groups who require significant attention and support in disaster 
planning and preparedness, including (1) persons with physical and mental disabilities, (2) 
elderly persons, (3) people with language barriers, (4) children and youth, (5) pregnant women, 
(6) the poor, (7) ethnic minorities, (8) undocumented persons, and (9) prisoners.  The low 
income populations are vulnerable because their limited access to disaster services (Zakour, 
Harrell 2004). It is also important to identify the people who live in vulnerable areas and 
disseminate emergency response information and warning before the disaster (Birkmann 
2007).  
The government of Indonesia has identified two main  vulnerable groups after the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami, they are (1) widows that need to single-handedly take care of children with no prior 
experience in the labor force and in an environment where communal networks have been lost, 
and (2) children who are orphaned and in need of care by other adults (Multi Donor Fund for 
Aceh and Nias et al. 2012).  Youths have already demonstrated their interest in participating in 
the social reconstruction after the tsunami in Aceh, therefore stakeholders should open access 
to the youth organizations to participate in disaster prevention (UNESCAP 2008). 
On the other hand, these vulnerable groups have significant roles to play in promoting disaster 
resilience to support the local government. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(2015-2030) acknowledge these vulnerable groups as important stakeholders in collaboration 
to manage disaster resilience for their specific contribution, commitment, knowledge, and 
experience (UNISDR 2015). It is important to involve the grassroots women´s groups (NGOs 
or faith-based organizations) to reach the vulnerable women in disaster preparedness programs 
and activities, particularly women with children, women living with HIV/AIDS, migrant 
women, homeless, and displaced women (Enarson et al. 2009). 
A preliminary study on the participation of women in the post tsunami reconstruction in Aceh 
at the village level was undertaken by Thorburn (2007). This work took place in a specific 
village which had been applying gender-mainstreaming. The study showed a notable increase 
in the participation of women in governance and decision making was supported by the men 
and community members. Other activities in the tsunami recovery project for housing 
reconstruction, gender mainstreaming activities and sufficient investment in the resources such 
as gender training for facilitators is recommended to improve the progress of female 
participation (Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias et al. 2012). These specific solutions have 
encouraged women to give their opinions and input in other aspects of project implementation. 
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As Birkmann (2006) points out that involving these vulnerable groups  is a prerequisite to 
promote resilience at the community level, since building resilience has also to focus first and 
foremost on the most vulnerable. 
2.3 Key characteristics of collaboration 
As highlighted in the sections above, governing disaster resilience requires good strategies and 
approaches that integrate actor participation and promote inclusiveness. Although many efforts 
are undertaken by the local government to build disaster resilience, collaboration is one of the 
key strategies to encourage participation of local stakeholders. According to Tierney (2012), 
collaboration is an increasingly important strategy in governing disaster resilience. 
Collaboration is defined as “the cooperative way that two or more entities work together toward 
a shared goal” (Frey et al. 2006). According to Gajda (2004) collaboration is a journey and not 
a destination, so a collaboration develops in stages and grows over time.   
The development of collaboration theory has helped to identify problems related collaboration 
in building resilience after disaster. Imperial (2005) argues that although collaboration is a 
useful approach to improve decision making and governance processes, collaboration cannot 
resolve all the disaster governance issues. On the other hand, the local government might lack 
the administrative ability due to an insufficient policy framework for collaboration and thus 
collaboration may simply be a formality without real outcomes (Kożuch 2009). In this regard, 
the government has the responsibility to maintain a continuous collaborative process in order 
to achieve effective engagement mechanism among the local actors (Brown, Keast 2003). At 
the same time, these collaborative efforts seek to develop networks, partnerships, and the 
inclusion of different organizations to deal with different problems and issues in the system 
(Bevir 2006; Rhodes, R. A. W. 1996). 
There is a growing need to promote collaboration as an effective approach for the governmental 
and non-governmental organizations to cope with and prepare for disaster events (Kapucu, van 
Wart 2006), specifically the need to involve non-governmental sectors and actors that have 
previously had limited opportunities to contribute in disaster management programs and 
activities to achieve the effective disaster resilience governance (Simo, Bies 2007; O'Sullivan 
et al. 2012; Agranoff, McGuire 2004).  
It is important to understand the local context in order to develop effective strategies for 
collaboration (Lasker, Weiss 2003). It is because collaboration among the local actors may take 
a long time and function appropriately (Peterson 1991). Community characteristics and social 
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vulnerability should be considered as critical factors to maintain disaster resilience (Jung, Song 
2014). Effective collaboration to maintain disaster resilience is best developed by inviting 
various local actors and community members, with their diverse knowledge, capacities, and  
experiences (National Research Council 2011; Lasker, Weiss 2003; Champagne et al. 2014). 
Collaboration enables indigenous knowledge from local actors to be integrated with science 
leading to new strategies in managing disaster resilience (Mercer et al. 2010; Davies 2015). 
Management of collaboration is the practical component to develop effective collaboration 
(Lasker, Weiss 2003). Managing collaboration refers to the process to overcome  challenges 
presented during the collaborative process (Bryson et al. 2015). In this regard, it is important 
to develop criteria to determine the range of actors who should collaborate (Huxham, 
Macdonald 1992). These criteria include targeting of stakeholders, endorsement of 
collaboration, and the power to bring people together are crucial elements in collaboration 
(Lasker et al. 2001). In support, the literature acknowledges important criteria in a 
collaboration, including  (1) clear purpose and mission of collaboration, (2) recruitment of 
committed key actors, (3) clear stage and structure of collaboration, (4) spatial dimension, and 
(5) detailed  mechanism  implementation, and (6) leadership (McQuaid 2002; Corwin et al. 
2012).  
National Research Council (2011) highlights challenges of collaboration to sustain community 
resilience: (1) the mismatches of scale resilience building activities and programs (2) diverging 
interests among the actors (3) the lack of coordination, inconsistencies, and fragmentation that 
occurs during the collaborative process. Further challenges to collaboration  have been 
identified, (1) loss of control, (2) loss of flexibility, (3) loss of glory, and (4) direct resources 
cost (Huxham, Macdonald 1992).  
Collaboration as a strategy to build resilience is helpful when the local government lack of 
political commitment and resources (UNDP 2014). Collaboration offers many opportunities to 
support the local government with a broad range of actors, particularly to find  new solutions 
and overcome organizational and financial obstacles (Carnwell, Carson 2005; Corwin et al. 
2012). These collaboration benefits include the creation of new funding sources, provision of 
human resources, and the possibility to perform good public relations in coping with disaster 
events (Kapucu et al. 2010). Sufficient funds are necessary to create and nurture effective 
collaborative works, specifically in the initiating phase (Mattessich, Monsey 1992). 
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2.3.1 Goals 
The main objective to develop collaboration in building resilience after disaster is to achieve 
additional advantages that difficult to achieve without the collaboration (Huxham, Vangen 
2002; Huxham, Macdonald 1992). For example, collaboration can enhance recovery, learning, 
and self-organization after disaster (DFID 2011). In this regard, goal setting is compulsory in 
a collaboration (Woodland, Hutton 2012).  Mattessich, Monsey (1992) even considers goals 
setting as an exercise by which the stakeholders define the reasons, vision, and task that 
collaboration will accomplish clearly and realistically. A shared goal, interests and mutual 
benefits are ideally achieved by working together rather than through the independent efforts 
of individuals or single organizations (Jung, Song 2014). As Nayar (2014) suggests that a clear 
description of goals will direct to collaboration success.  
In the collaborative processes, it is important for the collaborator to show their willingness and 
commitment to achieve shared goals, particularly through sharing responsibilities, rewards, and 
risks (Himmelman 1995). In the context of disaster management,  goals  are seen as the end 
products of complex political and administrative interactions which are essential for managing 
collaborative networks (Waugh Jr., Streib 2006; Collins, Kapucu 2008). The effective goal in 
collaboration is therefore concerned with the human dimensions (values, norms, cultures, 
attitudes, beliefs and relationships) in disaster management (Quero 2012). It is clear that strong 
will and capacity of key actors are two success factors to achieve the goals in collaboration to 
manage disaster resilience (Noran 2014a).  
2.3.2 Trust  
Building trust is critical to achieve effective collaboration in building disaster resilience (Lucini 
2014). In practice, most collaborations to build disaster resilience lack of trust because of 
different organizational cultures, standards, and motivation (National Research Council 2011).   
Trust building activities include continuous efforts to understand these differences in 
collaboration (Bryson et al. 2006). A  high level of trust is associated with substantial time 
commitments, honesty, and openness (Himmelman 1995; Mattessich, Monsey 1992).   
A continued trust building exercise aims to achieve collaborative advantage and minimalizes 
the risks related to collaboration  (Vangen, Huxham 2003).  According to Vangen, Huxham 
(2003), the first step to develop trust is by taking joint projects and build trust through working 
together. In the context building resilience, trust is needed to provide better communication 
and coordination in a crisis situation (Longstaff, Yang 2008). Edelenbos, Klijn (2007) find that 
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the level of trust may increase when the actors interact frequently and have high competency. 
Interactions among collaborators not only advance the trust level but also sustain the motivation 
to collaborate (Emerson et al. 2012). A possible explanation for this might be that because trust 
functions well when the personal relationships, emotions, energies, and efforts are present in a 
collaboration (Gajda 2004).  
2.3.3 Spanning boundaries 
Spanning the collaboration boundary is one of the practical solutions to maintain medium and 
long-term disaster resilience. Spanning boundary in maintaining disaster resilience means to 
build awareness to overcome problems and conflicts among local actors in a collaborative 
process (Leung 2013). This includes inviting stakeholders from various organizations and 
cultures to reveal their concerns in disaster resilience (National Research Council 2011). It is 
also important to collaborate with the stakeholders from practitioners and academia to be able 
to incorporate the scientific and practical aspects (Vogel 2001). Besides, working with the local 
agencies and managing good relationships with the community will enhance the effectiveness 
of the collaboration (National Research Council 2011).  
In the context of building resilience, communication to span the boundaries comprises of two 
aspects; communication among the collaborators and communication of risks (Aven, Renn 
2010). Effective information sharing may facilitate better communication in a collaboration, 
specifically in performing emergency response (Kapucu 2006). The communication are 
complex because of lack of incentives and understanding among the collaborators, 
inappropriate systems and processes of communication, as well as emotional benefits 
associated with providing information for others (Bharosa et al. 2010). The internal 
communication activities compromise of frequency and open interactions, updates, sharing, 
and discussing issues and knowledge (Mattessich, Monsey 1992). The communication  
strategies are crucial for spanning boundaries (Burnside-Lawry et al. 2013). For example, Sever 
(2014) argue that it is important to open and create various communication channels for 
vulnerable groups, volunteer groups and disability organizations.  
2.4 Resilience focused collaboration: a conceptual framework to maintain medium 
and long-term disaster resilience at the local level 
The following section describes the resilience focused collaboration framework as an 
evaluation framework in this research. The aim of this framework is to facilitate an analysis of 
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the current disaster resilience strategies and activities after disaster at the local level. This 
framework takes the shape of a synthesis discussion of existing approaches and concepts from 
resilience theory, governance theory, and collaboration theory. It includes the governance and 
capacity to manage resilience theories (Lebel et al. 2006; Folke 2016), disaster resilience 
concept (Cutter 2016; Birkmann et al. 2015), and the collaboration theories (National Research 
Council 2011; Champagne et al. 2014; Kapucu 2006; Noran 2014a).  
The important key concepts in this framework (disaster resilience, governance, and 
collaboration) have been clarified and reviewed in the previous sections (see sub chapters 2.1, 
2.2 and 2.3). The development of this conceptual framework is inspired by Lebel´s framework 
(Lebel et al. 2006) that introduced the concept of capacity to managing resilience. At the same 
time, this framework will evaluate the key challenge of state and non-state cooperation to 
promote disaster resilience by National Research Council (2011). Figure 4 shows the resilience 
focused collaboration framework.  
 
Figure 4 Resilience focused collaboration framework 
Source: own 
 
The goal of this framework is to analyze and examine the collaboration process that emerges 
after a disaster in order to build medium and long-term disaster resilience at the local level. The 
discussion of governance approach, for example, will reveal how the actor’s participation and 
capacity will contribute to develop this collaboration that aim to enhance disaster resilience. In 
other words, the resilience focused collaboration framework will provide an evaluation of the 
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conceptualization of disaster resilience, local actors strategies and approaches, and promoting 
collaboration as a concrete governance strategy to maintain resilience after a disaster.  
Maintaining resilience in this study focuses on the development of local actor’s collaboration 
after disaster to build and maintain disaster resilience. At the same time, building disaster 
resilience require capacity, capability, and competence of the individual or system to bounce 
back and recover from the disturbance, uncertainty or challenges (Koslowski, Longstaff 2015; 
Norris et al. 2008). In this context, the definition of maintaining disaster resilience is proposed 
as “the capacity of the local actors to recover, learn, and self-organize to maintain disaster 
resilience over time.”  In this study, governing disaster resilience indicates the invitation of 
various non-governmental actors and civil society organizations to participate in managing 
disaster resilience and increasing their capacities to collaborate (Bevir 2006).  In other words, 
maintaining disaster resilience means to improve the network and collaboration between the 
governmental and non-governmental organizations by resolving the challenges in sustaining 
disaster resilience. 
 
3 Methodology 
This chapter discusses the methodology of the dissertation. This dissertation builds on the 
mixed-methods research that involves and integrate both qualitative and quantitative data 
collection and analysis (Creswell 2014). The qualitative phase includes semi-structured 
interviews and observations collected from 75 experts in three case study areas in Aceh 
Province. This body of qualitative data helps to explore the disaster resilience building in Aceh 
Province after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. The results from the qualitative analysis are 
used to design a standardized questionnaire-based household survey. For this survey, 210 
households were interviewed in the same case study areas to cross-check and compare the 
information from the qualitative expert interviews with insights received at the community 
level.  
The purposes of this mixed-method research are (1) to explore in-depth knowledge and 
systematize the knowledge about how disaster resilience concept is translated to different 
policies and long-term development plans, (2) to assess how different stakeholders and local 
actors are involved in disaster resilience, particularly in learning and implementation of specific 
DRR measures to build disaster resilience, and (3) to explores the level of cooperation and the 
commitment of the institutions and local actors to implement of disaster risk reduction 
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strategies and approaches. In seeking to understand the process of building disaster resilience 
after disaster, this PhD research addresses one main research question: “How disaster resilience 
strategies and activities are defined and how different local state and non-state actors are 
cooperated to achieve disaster resilience in medium and a long-term”. The research addressed 
four sub-research questions: (1) How do different local actors define and conceptualize disaster 
resilience for the province of Aceh? What are key characteristics of building disaster resilience 
at the provincial and local level? (2) What strategies and approaches are employed and 
preferred by governmental institutions and community groups to build disaster resilience after 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 in Aceh Province? Which differences exist between 
approaches employed? (3) How do local actors collaborate with each other in the development 
and maintenance of building resilience to disasters? and (4) What are factors that hamper the 
development and / or the sustainability of multi-actor and comprehensive strategies to promote 
disaster resilience at the local and provincial levels? To answer the research questions with a 
comprehensive and proper empirical data set, this study builds on an extensive fieldwork phase. 
The fieldwork was carried out in nine months divided into two stages in Aceh Province. The 
aim of the first fieldwork phase was to conduct qualitative data; the second fieldwork was 
meant to collect quantitative data based on the results from the qualitative data.  
This chapter describes the study´s research methodology and includes discussions around the 
following areas: (a) description of case study selection, (b) rationale for mixed-methods 
research approach, (c) overview of research design (d) methods of data collection, (e) data 
analysis, (f) challenges in field research and limitations to conclude this methodology chapter. 
3.1 Case study selection 
Aceh Province consists of 23 regencies and municipalities. Half of these regencies and 
municipalities were affected by Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 (Republic of Indonesia 2005). 
In this research, the selection of the case study areas is based on a purposeful sampling 
procedure to represent the diversity of characteristics and conditions of regencies and 
municipalities in Aceh Province after this disaster. A purposeful sampling procedure is chosen 
because this sample strategy allows the researchers to implement their practical knowledge of 
the case study areas and to engage with the key informants that have special expertises and 
experiences that fit with the research purpose (Marshall 1996). In this context, the purposeful 
sampling method that apply to select the case study areas are based on these main criteria:  
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• All case study areas have a different level of impact caused by the tsunami 2004, 
including social economic and environmental consequences  
• All case study areas have different exposure patterns with respect to current natural 
hazards identified by the local government 
• All case study areas are characterized by different geographical conditions representing 
the range of characteristics in Aceh Province   
• All case study areas have different population sizes and densities 
• All case study areas have established disaster management agencies and enacted by the 
local regulations 
Building on these criteria, three case study areas were selected. The selected municipalities and 
regency provide a basis for a comprehensive case study addressing disaster resilience building 
in the context of Aceh after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 recovery. For this comparison, it 
is essential to select appropriate case study areas which cover as much of the range of local 
perceptions and peculiarities relevant to answering the research questions. Time constraint was 
also as the main consideration to decide only three municipalities and regency that include in 
this research which the maximum fieldwork duration allowed by the scholarship funding is 
nine months.  
 
The selected case study areas are Banda Aceh Municipality, Sabang Municipality, and Aceh 
Jaya Regency (figure 5). The main characteristics of the case study areas are summarized in 
table 3. The characteristics and rationale for choosing these three case study areas are explained 
in the following sub-sections. 
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Figure 5 Map of the three case study areas 
Source: own
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Case study  
area 
Number of victims of Indian 
Ocean Tsunami 2004 
Exposure to 
natural hazards 
Short 
characteristics 
of geographic 
condition 
Number of 
population, 
population 
density 
(people/km2), 
and households 
in 2016 
Establishment 
of local 
disaster 
management 
agency/ local 
regulations  
Number 
of expert 
interviews 
Number of 
households 
participating 
in survey 
Banda 
Aceh 
High impact on human 
victims, infrastructure, 
housing, ecosystem and 
human environment, and 
livelihood. 
15,394 people missing. 32,611 
survivors displaced 
Earthquake and 
tsunami 
Urban areas, 9 
districts and 90 
villages   
254 904 
4 552 people/ 
km2 
62 774 
2011 / Qanun 
number 3 year 
2011 
42 130 
Sabang Low impact on human 
victims and infrastructure 
25 people died, 108 people 
missing, 7,096 survivors 
displaced 
Earthquake   
tsunami, 
landslides, 
abrasion, high 
wind 
5 small islands, 
2 districts and 
18 villages 
33 622  
276 people/ km2, 
8615  
2011 / Qanun 
number 4 year 
2011  
16 30 
Aceh Jaya High impact on human 
victims, infrastructure, 
housing, ecosystem and 
human environment, and 
livelihood. 
16,797 people died, 77 people 
missing, 32,611 survivors 
displaced 
Landslides, 
floods, abrasion, 
high wind, 
wildfires, 
earthquake, 
erosion 
Rural areas, 9 
districts and 173 
villages 
87 622 
45 people/km2 
23 673 
2010 / Qanun 
number 4 year 
2010 
17 50 
Table 3 Case study areas description 
Source: BPS Provinsi Aceh (2017), BPBA (2012), UNIMS, BRR (2005)
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3.1.1 Banda Aceh 
Banda Aceh is located in the northwestern of Indonesia and the capital city of Aceh Province. 
Banda Aceh represents urban geographic and demographic characteristics of the case study 
areas in Aceh Province. The number of people killed in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar is 92,166 
people (UNIMS, BRR 2005). This number of victimes were aggregated with the number of 
victims in Aceh Besar because Banda Aceh is directly adjacent with the Aceh Besar, 
particularly along the coastal lines. This number is the highest number of the Tsunami victims 
in Aceh Province (Republic of Indonesia 2005). 
More than 95 % of buildings in the coastal areas until 2 km to the city center were  devastated 
by the earthquake and Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, particularly in six sub-districts Meuraxa, 
Kutaraja, Kuta Alam, Syiah, Kuala, Jaya Baru, and a part of Baiturrahman (Satuan Tugas 
Penanggulangan Bencana Aceh 2005). The main infrastructures damage were public facilities 
(e.g. schools, hospitals and infrastructures) and government offices because of their structures 
were not designed to protect buildings from earthquakes (Satuan Tugas Penanggulangan 
Bencana Aceh 2005). The major environmental problems that affected by the Tsunami 2004 
include damage to the coastal ecosystem, contaminated ground water, and undisposed waste 
(UNEP 2007).   
Most of the local actors and organizations which were involved in the emergency response and 
the recovery were based in Banda Aceh. The community was involved in various disaster risk 
reduction programs and activities conducted by NGOs during the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction after the Tsunami in 2004 (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia and UN 2005). The 
academic communities and research organizations which contributed to disaster resilience 
building in Banda Aceh are also located in Banda Aceh, including Syiah Kuala University and 
UIN Ar-Raniry that actively conducted research related Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 
(Syahputra, Munadi 2011).  
After the rehabilitation and reconstruction ended 2009, the Banda Aceh government has 
continued to develop various strategies related to disaster mitigation and building disaster 
resilience. During the formal recovery phase (2005-2009), local government has collaborated 
with various international organizations, civil societies, universities, and the central 
government to develop these strategies. For example, the local government supported by JICA 
have built four of the tsunami vertical evacuation buildings in the villages near the coastal areas 
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in Banda Aceh, including the Tsunami Museum (see picture 1) that can be functioned as a 
vertical shelter (Haiqal et al. 2016).  
 
Picture 1 Museum Tsunami Aceh in Banda Aceh 
An educational and exhibition centre for Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 in Banda Aceh; 
Source: own 
 
The Banda Aceh local government main strategy to build disaster resilience is to integrate 
disaster mitigation into city, district and village spatial planning and the development agenda 
(Pemerintah Kota Banda Aceh - GTZ-SLGSR 2006). The new spatial and urban planning focus 
on the development of tsunami hazard buffer zones and open new evacuation routes 
(Pemerintah Kota Banda Aceh 2009). Banda Aceh is the only municipality in Aceh Province 
which has a Tsunami early warning system with several sirens located along its coastal areas 
(Tim Kaji Cepat 2012). In addition, the local government has planned to build more Tsunami 
vertical shelters and open more routes for tsunami evacuation. 
3.1.2 Sabang 
Sabang is the capital city of Weh Island and one of the outer municipalities of Indonesia located 
in the northernmost part of Sumatera. Sabang Municipality represents the small island 
geographic and demographic characteristics of the case study areas in Aceh Province. As seen 
in table 3, the damages caused by the Tsunami in 2004 were smaller than in most other regions, 
but this volcanic island was isolated for one week after the event. Sabang was a shelter for 
fishermen and Tsunami victims from Banda Aceh. The geographical condition of the island 
provides natural vertical shelters in case of a tsunami as it is surrounded by mountainous areas. 
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Picture 2 Sabang, the capital city of the Weh Island 
Source: own 
 
However, the tsunami 2004 affected the coral reef and mangrove ecosystems in this island, 
particularly in the eastern side of Sabang (Purbani 2012).  Most of the reconstruction programs 
were therefore related to the restoration of coral reef ecosystems, fishery sectors and 
infrastructure (BRR 2006). Many of the fishermen villages were devastated by the Tsunami 
and had to be relocated during the rehabilitation and reconstruction stages. Beside the fisheries 
sectors, the main focus of development in Sabang is sustainable tourism. To support the tourism 
development, the Sabang government has included the tsunami zoning areas and mitigation 
plan in their  current spatial plan after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 (Pemerintah Kota 
Sabang 2012).  
3.1.3 Aceh Jaya  
Aceh Jaya is one of the new regencies that established in 2002 (Pemerintah Kabupaten Aceh 
Jaya 2014). It located in west coast of Aceh Province which was widely devastated by the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 (UNIMS, BRR 2005). Aceh Jaya represents the rural 
geographic and demographic characteristics of the case study areas in Aceh Province. In the 
context of Indian Ocean Tsunami recovery, the local government had limited experience in 
development. The social and economic situation had been affected by the long-lasting local 
political conflict between GAM and Indonesian government (Mahdi 2005). This area was the 
basis of the GAM and military operation. The community members suffered from this conflict 
thereby often choosing to move from this regency away to safer places outside of Aceh 
Province.  
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Picture 3 Aceh Jaya, new Tsunami housing relocation in Calang 
Source: own 
 
As seen in table 3, most of the people in Aceh Jaya died, were injured or displaced internally 
and only 18.2% percentages of population survived  (Brennan 2005). The rehabilitation and 
recovery programs focused on the development of main infrastructures such as roads, housing, 
government offices, and public facilities by BRR and international NGOs (BRR 2008). The 
local government has only slowly engaged in the resilience building process, including the 
establishment of the local disaster management agency, multi-stakeholder forum, and better 
tsunami evacuation routes in the spatial plan (Pemerintah Kabupaten Aceh Jaya 2014). 
3.2 Rationale for mixed-methods to approach the disaster research  
The selection and use of appropriate methods is vital in a research  (Kumar 1999). Mixed-
methods approach guides the analysis in this research. Mixed methods approach is often 
recognized as third of the three major research paradigms next to qualitative and quantitative 
research. It combines the qualitative and quantitative methods (Johnson et al. 2007). A mixed-
methods approach provides in particular the following advantages: (1) different methods are 
used for different research objectives (2), triangulation can build on data from different 
methods, (3) data from different method can help explaining the results gained from different 
method, (4) qualitative theory development is supported by quantitative data, (5) it is possible 
to creating complementary data sets (Migiro, Magangi 2011). In this research, all the 
advantages of the application mix-methods will focus to understand the complex issues of 
building disaster resilience after disaster.  
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Mixed-methods approach defines as “an approach to research in the social, behavioral and 
health sciences in which the investigator gathers both quantitative (closed-ended) and 
qualitative (open-ended) data, integrates the two, and then draws interpretations based on the 
combined strengths of both sets of data to understand research problems.” (Creswell 2014). 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches in both the data collection and 
analysis allows the integration of the meaning of actor´s experiences and the strategies 
evaluation in three case study areas to answer the research questions. In addition, this method 
is helpful to take on a local perspective and guarantee at the same time scientific reliability and 
validity research by separating between facts and speculation.  
It was researcher´s intention to combine the qualitative and quantitative methods to elicit the 
rich data needed to answer the research questions in this study. In the researcher´s view, the 
fundamental assumptions and key features from the mixed-methods research would fit well 
with this study that involved not only the local stakeholders but also the community members 
to listen to their own voice and understand their perspectives of building disaster resilience. 
For this study, a mixed-methods approach is important to portray the complete picture of how 
the local actors achieve disaster resilience in medium and a long-term after disaster. At the end, 
this research intends to provide practical recommendations that can contribute in the 
development of disaster policy in Aceh Province.  
The methodological design of this study aims to contribute to study extreme disaster and its 
consequences. Disaster is collectively experienced events (Norris 2006), that offered various 
knowledge exchanges and better understandings and explanations of the event and its 
consequences aftermath. Disaster research desires the comparison among different 
organizations and communities, regularities across events, and cross cultural responses 
(Drabek 1970). In this case, this post-disaster research intends to provide stories, perceptions 
and personals experiences from the actors involved in the resilience building process as well 
as from the community. This shall allow understanding the current efforts and strategies from 
various organizations involved in process.  
Drabek (1970, p.1) argued “there is neither a special set of strategies, which might be referred 
to as disaster methodology, nor a separate set of techniques which might be labelled disaster 
research methods”. On the other hand, the disaster research needs the “best methodologies and 
robust theories” to extend the understanding of human ability and capability to copes with 
disaster events include the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Kennedy et al. 
2009). This challenges the researcher to choose a simple, but sophisticated set of methods in 
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disaster research. As such, this mixed methods can  answer the challenges to provide a robust 
research method that can provide policy impact and transformation especially for planning, 
response, and copying with the future disaster risk (Dynes, Drabek 1994).  
3.3 Overview of research design  
Research design comprises  the development of research questions, data collection, selection 
of respondents, data analysis, and reporting the results (Marvasti 2004). The selection of an 
appropriate research design is crucial for enabling the researcher to have valid empirical, 
comparisons and conclusions (Kumar 1999). Figure 5 summarizes the exploratory sequential 
design employed in this research. As shown in figure 5, the design of this research is based on 
the single exploratory of mixed methods with one phase of qualitative data collection followed 
by one phase of the quantitative data collection. The aim to apply exploratory sequential design 
is to first explore the disaster resilience building problem through qualitative data collection 
(semi-structured interview) and analysis, then base on the qualitative results, develop the 
questionnaire for the quantitative data collection, and follow by conducting the household 
survey and analysis.  
In mixed methods design, the dominant paradigm and the type of phase will apply in the 
research design such as concurrently or sequentially (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie 2004). In this 
research, qualitative research forms the dominant approach. It means that the quantitative data 
will support the qualitative findings that dominate in this research as a sequential exploratory 
design. Johnson et al. (2007) defines a qualitative dominant approach of research as “the type 
of mixed research in which one relies on a qualitative while concurrently recognizing that the 
addition of quantitative data and approaches.” This sequential exploratory design is well suited 
for studying the local actors’ experiences and stories in building disaster resilience as the main 
source of primary data. At the same time, the results of the household surveys are the different 
type of data that will be collected to supports these qualitative findings. 
The integration issues are crucial in the mixed-methods approach. According to Creswell 
(2014), integration is the process to combine the qualitative and quantitative results in the 
mixed-methods research. In this research, the integration of the qualitative and quantitative 
results is applied in the research design, data collection, empirical analysis, discussion, and 
interpretation of results. This type of integration allows the researcher to collect data from 
various sources that important for the triangulation purpose in this research  (Fielding 2012). 
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Triangulation plays a significant role in mixed-methods approach (Torrance 2012; Fielding 
2012). Triangulation is “the process of drawing in different sources of perspectives” (Clifford 
et al. 2003). A mixed-methods design allows for four types of triangulation: (1) data 
triangulation, (2) investigator triangulation, (3) methodology triangulation, and (4) theory 
triangulation (Denzin 1973). In this study, triangulation has translated into various strategies. 
First, the data from different primary and secondary sources were gathered with different 
methods of data collection for the data and methods triangulation. Second, survey enumerators 
in the second phases of research were involved in a regular process of discussion and reflection 
of the research process. Third, three main theories (resilience, governance, and collaboration) 
were combined in the analytical framework to achieve theoretical triangulation. Triangulation 
allows an integration of theories and thereby more confidence and explanation of the research 
results (Jick 1979). 
To gather the data, the researcher took nine months fieldwork in Aceh Province. The first phase 
of fieldwork aimed to collect the qualitative data by conducting semi-structures interviews and 
the second quantitative phase was a household survey. Both fieldworks allowed the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches that include a range of data collection 
such as interviews, observations, and surveys (Marshall 2015).  This multi-phase design 
fieldwork allows the integration of the qualitative and quantitative methods through data 
collection, data analysis and triangulation
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Figure 6 Exploratory sequential mixed-methods design 
Source: own 
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3.4 Methods of data collection  
Mixed methods approaches were chosen to collect and manage the primary data for this 
research through nine months of fieldwork three case study areas in Aceh Province. The 
informal conversation, semi-structured interviews, and observations were the main methods of 
data collection employed in the qualitative phase. The household survey was the main method 
of data collection in the quantitative phase. The secondary data was collected from the literature 
review of reliable sources relevant to this study. The integration of the two phases occurred 
during the data collection, analysis, and discussion of the results to answer the research 
questions. Table 4 shows a summary of the data collection methods and data analysis. The data 
collection methods employed in this research will be explained in the following sub-sections.  
 
Table 4 Summary of research sub-question, data collection methods, and data analysis 
Research sub-
questions 
Objectives Data 
collection 
Data 
analysis 
Information 
collected 
How do different local 
actors define and 
conceptualize disaster 
resilience for the 
Province of Aceh?  
 
What are key 
characteristics of 
building disaster 
resilience at the 
provincial and local 
level? 
to explore in-depth 
knowledge and 
systematize the 
knowledge about 
how disaster 
resilience concept is 
translated to different 
policies and long-
term development 
plans 
 
Secondary 
literature 
collection 
 
Participant 
observation 
 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
Content 
analysis 
 
 
Coding 
 
Review of the 
disaster resilience 
concept, disaster 
management 
institutions, and 
policies (Chapter 
4 and 5) 
 
What strategies and 
approaches are 
employed and preferred 
by governmental 
institutions and 
community groups to 
build disaster resilience 
after the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami in 2004 in 
Aceh Province?  
 
Which differences exist 
between approaches 
employed? 
to assess how 
different 
stakeholders and 
local actors are 
involved in disaster 
resilience, 
particularly in 
learning and 
implementation of 
specific DRR 
measures to build 
disaster resilience  
 
 
Secondary 
literature 
collection 
 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
 
Content 
analysis 
 
 
Coding 
Identification of 
the strategies and 
approaches by the 
government and 
NGOs in building 
disaster resilience 
(Chapter 5 and 6) 
 
53 
 
How do local actors 
collaborate with each 
other in the development 
and maintenance of 
building resilience to 
disasters? 
 
To gain information 
on the current 
collaborative process 
in building disaster 
resilience 
 
To examine the 
problems in current 
collaboration  
Semi-structure 
dinterview 
 
Participant 
observation 
 
Stakeholders 
analysis 
 
Coding 
Evaluation of the 
local 
collaboration in 
building disaster 
resilience 
(Chapter 7) 
 
What are the remaining 
challenges and problems 
faced by the government 
and the community in 
building disaster 
resilience after the 2004 
Indians Ocean tsunami 
in Aceh Province 
To identify the 
remaining challenges 
in building disaster 
resilience 
 
 
 
 
Household 
survey 
 
 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
 
 
Descriptive 
statistics 
analysis 
 
Coding 
Community 
evaluation of the 
resilience 
building process 
 
Local actor’s 
perceptions on 
challenges in 
building disaster 
resilience 
(Chapter 7 and 8) 
Source: own 
3.4.1 Secondary literature collection and review 
One of the critical stages in data collection is to choose the most relevant, up-to-date and 
reliable literature as secondary data source (Healey 2003). In this research, the secondary data 
is collected from various sources such as government project reports, policy document, and 
papers on vulnerability, hazards and disaster risk from Aceh government and national offices, 
such as BPS (Central Statistic Office), BPBA (Aceh Disaster Management Agency), BRR 
(Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency) and Bappeda (Regional Development 
Planning Agency). The process of literature collection and reviews started one year before the 
fieldwork to develop a robust proposal and research design. The analysis of key scientific 
literature (e.g. The newest IPCC Report on Extreme Events, Sendai Framework, and UNISDR 
publications) and policy documents aims to provide a sound theoretical and conceptual 
framework for the PhD thesis. For example, different meanings and definitions of the term 
disaster resilience are examined and discussed from these secondary data (see chapter 4). 
Most of secondary data was collected from the web in both English and Bahasa Indonesia from 
Germany. Acehnese online newspapers such as “Serambi Indonesia” are one of the relevant 
sources to browse the up-to-date issues related to disaster resilience at the regional scale. Most 
reports from the local government and NGOs are accessible online. Many books about the 
Tsunami in 2004 are available from local the publishers. They can be found in the local 
bookstore and public libraries in Banda Aceh. After the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, many 
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books were published to document the event and their implications to the Aceh society. In 
addition, the undergraduate and postgraduate theses, particularly from disaster management 
postgraduate program in Syiah Kuala University provide reliable references that fit well with 
this topic. These new sources of reference were very important to broaden and refine the 
research questions, identify the gaps, and improve the understanding of the case study areas.   
3.4.2 Observation 
Observation is defined as being a data collection method in qualitative research. It is about 
observing people and place in order to gather information (Creswell 2002). Observation is a 
comprehensive fieldwork strategy. It  besides the process of observing,  also  a literature review, 
interviews, and  introspection (Denzin 1973). Observation is directly  connected with the 
research object (Laurier 2003).  In this research, observation is employed in both stages of 
fieldwork to gather information and triangulate other data collection methods.  
The purpose of observation is to understand the state of the art of the tsunami resilience building 
process, including the local actor collaboration and their contribution after the reconstruction 
and rehabilitation stages ended. Data was recorded in form of field notes, photographs for the 
participants, and activity descriptions. These data were transcribed and analyzed. The data from 
the observations, informal conversations, and discussions were very valuable as a comparison 
with the results from the semi-structured interviews.  
Two forms of observation are part of this research. First, local disaster management-related 
events in Banda Aceh such as conference, seminar, meeting, and ceremony were observed. 
Some events were open for public, others only for invited participants. To participate in these 
events, the researcher needed permission from the respective agencies. Usually, with the 
research permit letter, the authorities allowed the researcher to take part at the event. In these 
events, the local actors from the governmental and non-governmental organizations interact 
and engage together. It was important to observe their behavior as local actors meeting and 
networking.  
The second form of observation was carried out at the local disaster management offices in the 
three case study areas. It was meant to reveal activities and the government officers. As an 
observer, the researcher capitalizes on the informal conversations of local disaster management 
agency authorities from high level until the local level. During the observations, the observer 
is meant to notice the pattern of communication and interaction, the characteristics of the actors, 
and decision making process (Mertens 2014). These events open opportunities for the 
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researcher to connect with the disaster management practitioners and have informal discussions 
with experts.  
Public events such as the tsunami commemoration which takes place once a year were also 
opportunities for observation. The Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 commemoration at December 
26th, 2013 and 2014 were big celebrations for the achievement and reflection of reconstruction 
and thereby provided important insights. The exhibition of international organizations working 
in rehabilitation and reconstruction on December 26th-28th, 2014 in Banda Aceh was a 
particularly important event to be observed and discussed with the key actors of the 
rehabilitation Aceh (picture 4).  
 
Picture 4 The international exhibition on ten years of the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 
Source: own 
 
In this event, the Aceh government invited these organizations to exhibit their activities and 
projects after the Tsunami. The discussions were conducted with several organizations 
reflected their opinions about the changes which took place in Aceh during the last ten years. 
In general, the experts thought that development of the infrastructure is successful but lack of 
achievement in economic and livelihood activities for the society. These public ceremonies 
were important events to understand how people try to keep the memory of tsunami risk alive 
and to understand which lessons they derived from the disaster in terms of resilience building. 
3.4.3 Semi-structured expert interview and selection of research participants 
The semi-structured interviews were meant to understand the actual condition of the tsunami 
resilience building process in Banda Aceh after the reconstruction and rehabilitation stages 
finished. The aim of interview was to elicit this information from a wider range of perspectives, 
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including the views of local experts and practitioners. A semi-structured interview is a flexible 
method which helps exploring relevant issues according to an interview protocol prepared by 
the interviewer (Longhurst 2003).  
The interview protocol was developed in order to investigate and discuss the main issues 
around  disaster resilience building. Dunn (2010) suggests to prepare fully worded and 
“content-focused” questions relevant to the research questions, but which are flexible in terms 
of the order of questions. In this research, the formulation of the interview guidelines followed 
the resilience focused collaboration analysis framework. It was discussed with PhD colleagues 
and the supervisor prior to the fieldwork. The types of guidelines included a combination of 
questions to gather the details of events, people, places, and experiences and questions to ask 
about opinions in terms of disaster resilience.  
After the acquisition of an official letter for a research permit from the Aceh government, the 
pilot testing started with a random selection of experts who were willing to get involved. These 
interviews served as pre-tests. After these interviews, the interviewees were asked to comment 
on the guidelines. This review was very useful to prepare a final interview guide for the 
remaining interviews. The pre-tests revealed that several questions were difficult to understand, 
needed long explanation, or redirected the conversations. The timing and order of questions 
have shown to be appropriate. This final interview protocol can be found in appendix 10.1.  
Thereafter, the process of selecting and contacting interviewees started. First, governmental 
and non-governmental organizations were contacted who work in resilience building and 
tsunami risk reduction in Aceh province. These interviewees were chosen based on their roles 
and experiences in working in disaster management or teams during and after the 2004 tsunami. 
The selected respondents are government officials from different agencies and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  
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Picture 5 semi-structured interviews with key informants 
Source: own 
 
The selection of interviewees followed a purposeful sampling process according to preselected 
criteria and theoretical saturation of the research questions (Mack et al. 2005; Patton 2005). 
This purposive sampling strategy was applied because the interviewee must be selected from 
the institutions or organizations that have prior experiences or currently involve in disaster 
resilience building. For example, this sampling strategy was used for the interviewee from the 
government agencies. The mechanism to select the interviewee has been based on the 
introduction of the topic to specific governmental officers. Based on this introduction of the 
research topic, the governmental agencies and governmental staff decided whether they would 
be willing to give the interview. In most cases a connection to the officials and governmental 
employees helped to motivate respective persons to accept being interviewed. 
Snowballing sampling was another strategy to recruit new respondents. With the help and 
reference of  one interviewee it is possible to recruit another interview (Clifford et al. 2003). 
This sampling strategy aims to identify the interviewee that have the similar characteristics and 
interests to the research topic (Palinkas et al. 2013). In this research, snowball or chain sampling 
was mostly employed in case of the NGOs and civil society organizations. In these cases, trust 
and networks are important for being able to recruit respondents. A reference from a person 
who is well-known in the local disaster management community facilitated successfully 
recruiting another interviewee.  
Most of the interviews were conducted at the organizations’ offices. Several local NGOs and 
the civil society representatives were interviewed in coffee shops to ensure neutrality and 
available time reasons. The interviewee sometimes came with their colleagues who were 
58 
 
anticipated to be able to add valuable information to the topic. The interviews lasted between 
45 minutes and one hour.  
A list of 75 semi-structured interviews conducted in the three case study areas can be found in 
the appendix 10.2. The theoretical saturation was achieved after 75 interviews in four months 
of fieldwork. All the interviews were audio recorded and noted. The transcription was done 
simultaneously with the revision of the field note files to prepare for the next step of data 
analysis (coding transcripts). The sample of transcript from the government officer, NGOs, and 
community organizations that have translated from Bahasa Indonesia into English can be found 
in appendix 10.3, 10.4, and 10.5. 
3.4.4 Household survey and selection of research participants 
The purpose of this household survey was to support the qualitative findings of this research, 
as a quantitative phase in an exploratory sequential design for the mixed-methods approach. 
The quantitative phase is meant to complement the qualitative data generalize findings with a 
larger sample size (Creswell 2014). Household survey is one of methods to “approach a sample 
of persons who have been exposed to a set of events or experiences and interviews them with 
respect to these experiences” (Denzin 1973). The analysis of the qualitative data was conducted 
before the second fieldwork to design the questionnaire for the quantitative data collection. 
Mertens (2014) defines a simple descriptive approach which has also been chosen for this 
research as “a one-shot survey for the purpose of describing the characteristics of a sample at 
one point in time”.  In this research, the purpose of the simple descriptive approach is to provide 
information of the household members’ perception and evaluation toward resilience building 
process. 
The survey began with designing and pilot-testing of the questionnaire, then the best strategies 
of implementation were chosen  and survey participants were selected and recruited 
(McLafferty 2003). Building on qualitative data for designing quantitative methods and 
complementing the respective other data set, is part of a mixed-methods approach aiming as 
described above in section. The survey questions were close-ended, in Bahasa Indonesia and 
were content-wise based on the analysis of the semi-structured interviews. The survey was 
conducted in form of face-to-face interviews. The questions that were difficult to for household 
members to answer were revised during the pre-test of the survey. In the end, 20 households 
were sampled in this pre-test phase.  
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The sample size was predetermined under consideration of availability of resources, including 
budgetary and time constraints (Kumar, Phrommathed 2005; McLafferty 2003). The number 
of selected households reflected size of the chosen municipalities, tsunami impact in 2004, 
urban and rural areas, and different governance approaches for tsunami resilience building (see 
table 3). The household survey conducted in all sub-districts and almost all villages in three 
case study areas with the non-probability sampling, specifically the incidental sampling 
strategy. This incidental sampling strategy suits well with the disaster research because this 
strategy offers  high adaptability in data collection that important in disaster research (Phillips 
2014). At the same time, this method allows the researcher to recruit community members who 
agree to be the survey samples when the researchers come to their village on the survey time. 
The household survey started in Banda Aceh in November 2014. 130 households were 
surveyed in Banda Aceh. Following the field work in Banda Aceh, the survey was conducted 
in the municipality of Sabang. The researcher completed 30 households survey in Sabang. The 
last field research area was Aceh Jaya. Here, the survey comprised 50 households. The total 
number of households being surveyed was 210 over the course of three months (see figure 5). 
This number of households are not representative of the population but adequate to understand 
the community perceptions and evaluation on the disaster resilience building in Aceh Province.  
 
 
Picture 6 Household survey in Aceh Jaya 
Source: own 
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Two research enumerators were recruited to assist the researcher with the household survey. 
All of enumerators were able to speak the local language and finishing their undergraduate 
study from geophysics department in Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh. A week of training 
to introduce them to the research method and household survey was conducted before the pre-
test survey for the research instruments. Before continuing to other field areas, the researcher 
obtained permission and acquired an official letter for a research permit from the head of the 
municipality and regency. Throughout the process the researcher undertook regular reviews 
and evaluations of the data collection process to build on lessons learned. On average, the 
interviews ranged from 45 until 60 minutes in length.  
3.5 Data analysis 
Data analysis is a processs to manage, organize, and make sense of the data that have been 
collected from the qualitatitave and quantitative methods (Bloomberg, Volpe 2015). The 
primary data in this research are from semi-structured interview and household survey that 
have organized and prepared for data analysis. These raw data need to analyze and transform 
into empirical evidents and meaningful information. The secondary data include policy 
documents, reports, newspaper, and field notes from observations will analysed qualitatively 
through content analysis technique. The process of qualitative and quantitative data analyses is 
described in the following sub-sections.  
3.5.1 Qualitative data analysis 
An analysis of the first findings of the semi-structured interviews was envisaged in order to 
inform the further data collection, particularly, the household surveys in the three case study 
areas. The process of editing data started with transcribing the audio recording from the semi-
structured interviews into text. The data was then combined with field notes from the 
observations. The next step was to prepare the data for coding by re-reading and examining the 
data. Subsequently, the text-based materials were coded to get the participant quotations and 
summarize the key findings before the findings are analyzed, synthesized, and interpreted. To 
perform these analyses, a computer software - MAXQDA11 - which assists the qualitative data 
analysis of semi-structured interviews and participant observations was used. The purpose of 
working with a qualitative data analysis software was to promote efficiency and flexibility in 
storing, organizing, and retrieving the data (Peace, Hoven 2010).   
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Coding is the process of organizing and evaluating the qualitative data by identifying categories 
and patterns in order to understand the meanings of a text (Cope 2003; Corbin, Strauss 2014). 
A code is “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-
capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldaña 
2009). In this research, the connection between descriptive and analytical codes was important 
to develop themes and form patterns. While descriptive codes provides labels, the analytic 
codes reflect interesting themes from the qualitative data (Cope 2010). Both codes were derived 
from the analytical framework in this research.  
Content analysis procedure was used for the secondary data collection (documents, reports, and 
policies). This data collection was analyzed following the same coding that applied for the 
trascriptions of semi-structured interviews. According to Bowen (2009), document analysis is 
“a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents both printed and electronic 
(computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material.” This content analysis procedure 
considers as a qualitative data analysis.  
The next qualitative data analysis technique is to perform stakeholder analysis. Stakeholders 
analysis refers to “an approach, a tool or set of tools for generating knowledge about actors – 
individuals and organizations – so as to understand their behaviour, intentions, interrelations 
and interests; and for assessing the influence and resources they bring to bear on decision-
making or implementation processes  is used to identify and reveal the interest, roles, 
responsibilities, and relationships of the local actors” (Varvasovszky, Brugha 2000). 
Stakeholders analysis is applied for the qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews, 
particularly to analyze the interests and roles of key informants in building disaster resilience.  
3.5.2 Quantitative data analysis 
The quantitative data from the survey was processed using the Statistical Package for the Social 
Scientist (SPSS). SPSS is a software package to assists the researcher to work and manage 
numerical datasets (McKendrick 2003).  The steps in analyzing the data were coding, data 
entry, editing, imputation, weighting, and sampling variance estimation (Groves et al. 2011).  
Simple statistics methods were employed to enhance data interpretation and comparison 
(Dorling 2003). In this research, the quantitative data was analyzed with descriptive statistics 
analysis to compare with the results from the qualitative methods. The results of statistical 
analyses were presented in texts, tables, and charts.  
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3.6 Challenges in field research and limitations 
The first challenge in field research in Aceh Province was to obtain the official permit from the 
provincial authority. The formal procedure of conducting fieldwork in Aceh Province requires 
a research permit from the province and municipality or regency governments, particularly 
official letter from Dinas Kesbanglinmas. At the same time, the local custom such as how to 
enter a village and introduce the research to the community should be follow carefully. The 
other significant considerations are the Sharia Islam law and history of local political conflict 
in Aceh which need to understand in the context of asking questions and behavior in conducting 
the interview and household survey.  
During the household survey, most of the experts and community members were reluctant to 
talk to outsiders. One reason for this is the long history of political conflicts between GAM and 
the government of Indonesia (TNI) for more than 30 years. At that time, free of speaks was no 
longer existent. One of the case study areas, Aceh Jaya was affected heavily by this conflict. 
At this case study area, the researcher needed more time to introduce the research and develop 
trust to the respondents. The researcher was accompanied by two male research assistants 
during the fieldwork in order to able to talk to the male interviewee and survey participants. 
This is part of the local custom in Aceh Province. 
A fundamental challenge in conducting the household surveys in Aceh was that the content 
and duration of the questionnaire provided an initial barrier to participation. Many people 
refused to participate because, firstly, they could not see how they would directly benefit from 
the study. The researcher did not pay for their participation but gave a souvenir at the end to 
show the researcher’s gratitude and help overcome this barrier. Secondly, the duration of the 
survey was 30 to 45 minutes which some people thought was too long for their busy schedules. 
Finally, people were reluctant to participate because they did not want to remember their 
experience related to the traumatic events of the 2004 tsunami.  
The next challenge was the workload linked to the research in different cities. The pre-test 
survey and first household surveys were started in Banda Aceh. When the work in Banda Aceh 
was completed, the rainy season had started. This made access to the households in the 
mountainous areas particularly difficult. In Aceh Jaya, landslides occurred and challenged 
conducting the household survey.  
During the fieldworks, most of the key informants that took part in the semi-structured 
interviews demand the researcher to share the importance findings from this research. This is 
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also the main challenge to discuss the findings, particularly to choose the best sharing 
mechanism and making practical recommendation based on the emergent findings. As 
Torrance (2012) suggests the importance of  involving the key actors in the research process to 
achieve more useful results. However, this sharing process with the communities under 
investigation should plan carefully as part of knowledge sharing from the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami 2004 in Aceh Province. For example, the recommendation (see sub chapter 9.2) in 
this thesis is specifically prepared for the practitioners and decision makers that can promote 
changes in disaster resilience building process. 
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4 The institutional architecture for building disaster resilience in Indonesia 
One of the remarkable changes in the disaster management setting following the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami 2004 was the establishment of disaster risk management institutions and laws at the 
national, sub-national and local levels in Indonesia. Knowledge of the laws and disaster risk 
reduction at the national level, especially the institutional architecture of resilience building is 
an essential element of the empirical analysis and to answer the research questions in this study.  
In this regard, a review of the changes in policy and institutional landscapes is an important 
part of learning to promote building disaster resilience (Miller 2010). In order to understand 
the policies and institutional changes, there is a need to examine  (1) the strengths and gaps in 
the current disaster resilience approaches and strategies (2) the priority areas of the national 
and local regulations and plans (3) multi-stakeholder participation in the development of the 
existing legal framework and policy documents (IFRC and UNDP 2015).   
This chapter aims to provide an analysis of the existing legal framework for building disaster 
resilience by answering three sub-research questions: (1) how disaster resilience is defined and 
conceptualized, (2) what the key characteristics of building disaster resilience are, and (3) what 
strategies and approaches are employed and preferred by government to build disaster 
resilience. The elaboration and discussion in this chapter were derived from the Indonesian 
government planning documents and reports that apply to the national and local government to 
govern the process of building resilience. Furthermore, the analysis examines various 
approaches and strategies in integrating and implementing disaster resilience plans and policies 
into the development agenda.  
This chapter provides the basis of analysis for Chapter 5 which presents the empirical findings 
for the government political commitment and current gaps in translating tsunami resilience 
(e.g. The common understanding of the term of disaster resilience of the governmental and 
non-governmental organizations). This chapter also connects to Chapter 6 to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the governance of resilience building, particularly the 
government strategies and approaches that apply at the local level (e.g. To introduce various 
key actors and their roles relating to the disaster resilience governance at the local level). This 
chapter is useful to discuss the current collaboration to promote disaster resilience (e.g. 
Explanation of the actor networks that collaborate in multi-stakeholder forums at the local 
level). 
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4.1 Building disaster resilience in Indonesia 
The following section will analyze the process of building disaster resilience at the national 
level after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. In particular, this section will demonstrate how 
disaster resilience is defined and conceptualized by the Indonesian Government. The aim of 
the analysis in this section is to understand the changes in disaster risk management policies 
and the institutional architecture of disaster resilience at the national level providing context 
for changes at the local level. This analysis is important because the institutional architecture 
of disaster risk management in Indonesia is designed by the national government.  
According the conceptual framework for this study, the governance of disaster resilience 
requires a clear concept, functions, roles, and responsibilities of various actors from different 
levels of government (see section 2.3). The national framework is the main reference for the 
local government to plan, coordinate, finance, and integrate disaster resilience into the 
development agenda. In the context of disaster governance, the national government has a 
significant role in establishing the national systems and the means through which actors from 
different levels of government, NGOs, and civil society can interact. It is through these 
interactions between the various actors, particularly in planning, developing policies and 
mainstreaming disaster resilience that the process of change and learning occurs. (Lal et al. 
2012).  
The government of Indonesia started to define and conceptualize disaster resilience after the 
national disaster management law was enacted in 2007. For the first time, the concept of 
disaster resilience is presented as the responsibility of the government to protect the society 
from disaster: 
“That Unitary State of The Republic of Indonesia shall bear responsibility to protect the entire 
nation of Indonesia as well as the whole homeland with the aim of providing protection for the 
life and livelihood, including protection against disasters, in order to attain public welfare 
based on Pancasila Ideology, as mandated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia.” (The President of the Republic of Indonesia 2007) 
 
The conceptualization of disaster resilience is very important because the goals and strategies 
for building disaster resilience will refer to the government’s working definition of this 
concept. This working definition of disaster resilience is officially introduced in a policy 
guideline on building disaster resilience in Indonesia titled “Building resilience country 
through disaster risk reduction”. The concept of disaster resilience is embedded, for the first 
time, into a disaster management terminology list in this guideline published by Bappenas in 
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April 2014. Bappenas adopted this resilience definition from the UNISDR definition of 
resilience,  
Disaster resilience is the ability of the system and/or the community exposed to hazard to 
prevent, adapt, and recover from the hazardous impact efficiently and effectively. The ability 
of the system and/or the community to spring back from shock is determined by the availability 
of resources and the capability of systematic action before and after the shock. (Bappenas, 
2014, p. 7)   
 
Whilst, the terminology of “disaster resilience” is similar to a variety of words in the Indonesia 
language (Bahasa). The general meanings of resilience are ‘tougher’ (ketangguhan), 
‘endurance’ (ketahanan), and ‘self-reliance’ (kemandirian). These three words have been 
adopted from different conceptualizations of disaster resilience in the existing policy document 
but are now part of the broader perspective of disaster resilience.  
These common translated words of disaster resilience in Bahasa are used by different actors 
for a different purpose in their documents. For example, the government tends to describe 
disaster resilience as toughness (ketangguhan) and endurance (ketahanan). On the other hand, 
NGOs and community-based organizations define resilience as self-reliance (kemandirian). 
This self-reliance word refers to “the resilience community” which has become a key term for 
most of their projects on disaster risk reduction.  
The introduction of the disaster resilience term in various policy documents have changed the 
point of view of most actors working together in disaster risk management. The actors realize 
that building community resilience is not solely the government´s responsibility, but the 
community members have significant roles to play in promoting disaster resilience. Change 
and learning can be considered as occurring through the involvement of the community in the 
interpretation of the disaster resilience concept. For example, different actors have defined 
disaster resilience based on their own perspectives and commitment to building disaster 
resilience. The different understanding depends on their experiences and contributions in 
involving in various programs and activities in disaster management.  
Although the concept of disaster resilience was introduced after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
2004, this concept is emerging as an important notion in development and planning in 
Indonesia as a whole. The importance of the disaster resilience concept is influenced by the 
international development process on disaster risk reduction, particularly the Hyogo 
Framework for Action and attention to mega-disasters like the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. 
Based on the concept of disaster resilience, the institutional architecture has been shaped by 
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how the term resilience has been translated in the existing regulations and planning documents. 
This varies depending on the actors involved, with different actors employing different 
approaches and strategies to integrate this concept into different policies and regulations. For 
example, the government tend to interpret resilience more in line with the Hyogo framework. 
4.2 Key characteristics in building disaster resilience 
This section focuses on the key characteristics in building disaster resilience as stated by the 
Indonesian government in various existing policy documents. It examines and discusses the 
prominent aspects that should be included and integrated into the process of building disaster 
resilience. The central question focuses on what the key characteristics of building disaster 
resilience are in Indonesia after the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. The analysis is primarily 
based on the government disaster management policy documents and reports. 
According to the conceptual framework for this dissertation, the key characteristics to build 
disaster resilience comprise of learning, self-organizations, institutional capacity, 
infrastructures and collaboration (see section 2.2.1, section 2.2.2 and section 2.2.3). Koslowski, 
Longstaff (2015) consider learning to be a key component and strong evidence that resilience 
has been integrated into a system. In addition, Cutter (2016) suggested that  learning from the 
past is one of main factors that should be present to be considered as part of resilience (see 
section 2.2). Learning in the context of building resilience is related to the capacity to learn 
from emergency situations, preparedness, and recovery after disaster. 
In the context of building disaster resilience in Indonesia, learning, as a key characteristic of 
resilience, is evidenced by the establishment of a comprehensive institutional framework for 
disaster management in Indonesia following the experiences of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 
2004. Furthermore, the Indonesian government has a strong commitment to learn from the 
recovery process and, as such, learning features as a key element in the vision to maintain long-
term disaster resilience. In this regard, the government has highlighted three important lessons 
which contribute to building disaster resilience, enshrined in Law number 24 of 2007: 
A new dimension in Disaster Management law include: (1) Disaster management is a 
comprehensive and proactive effort include disaster risk reduction, emergency phase, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction, (2) Disaster management involve various stakeholders with 
different roles and functions to work together, (3) Disaster resilience is part of the development 
process to build disaster resilience (BNPB 2014b) 
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Integrating these new dimensions, Law 24 from 2007 provides a new and strong institutional 
basis for resilience building going forward.  To establish a comprehensive disaster management 
approach, the government has integrated disaster resilience into the development plan. The 
integration of the disaster resilience concept into the development process another example of 
the learning process of Indonesian government (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2013) and the 
Indonesia government now perceives the integration of disaster resilience in development 
agenda is a must.  
The next prominent characteristic building disaster resilience in Indonesia is collaboration. In 
the process of conceptualizing of disaster resilience in policy documents, the government 
recognizes that to be “a resilient country”, community members need to be involved and to 
work together.  Community members should be a subject not only an object in building disaster 
resilience. As a subject, the community should understand the goals of building disaster 
resilience and contribute their knowledge and experiences to maintain long term disaster 
resilience. The incorporation of community knowledge and experiences as part of the learning 
process in building disaster resilience has been initiated by the government,  
BNPB and DRR stakeholders have initiated activities to collect local experiences and 
traditional knowledge that have developed in many hazard-prone areas of the country. These 
knowledge and experiences have helped build community’s resilience to disaster. Efforts to 
integrate them into the local, sub-national and national DRR plans and activities in a 
meaningful way, however, have not been done in a systematic manner. The government needs 
to enhance further such an initiative. (BNPB 2014a) 
 
The identification and invitation of stakeholders to collaborate in building disaster resilience 
has been one of the main tasks undertaken by the government (BNPB 2014b). In this, it has 
been crucial to invite the participation of grass root level organizations that have considerable 
experience of working with the community, such as local NGOs, community-based 
organizations, religious institutions, important civil societies and associations. The national and 
local governments both have responsibilities for connecting and cooperating with these 
institutions in building disaster resilience.  
In terms of the institutional capacity, the conceptualization of disaster resilience and 
collaboration depends on the capacity of the disaster management agency to promote disaster 
resilience. The Indonesian National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) has been 
established by the Disater Managemant Law in 2007 to coordinate disaster management 
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activities with all stakeholders and community.  To fulfil this mandate, BNPB has created 
various scenarios and plans to build disaster resilience, 
The vision statement of disaster management in Indonesia is to be “a resilient country to 
disaster”. (BNPB 2014b) 
 
This means that Indonesia is committed to building disaster resilience to face future disaster 
risks. At this point, the Indonesian government is aware that becoming a resilient country 
requires comprehensive plans, strategies, budget, programs, and activities. Therefore, at the 
beginning, the Indonesian government implemented the Hyogo Framework for action (2005-
2015) to systematize the approach to building disaster resilience. The Indonesian government 
follows the five priorities of action in HFA framework and reports the progress openly. 
However, in the National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for 
Action (2013-2015), the Indonesian Government outlines key challenges in building disaster 
resilience, 
The remaining challenge constitutes that the national strategy, albeit been drafted for some 
time, has yet to be implemented with sufficient funding support. The monitoring and evaluation 
of the process and outcome have also been limited. Lack of coordination; weak knowledge 
management; and poor communication strategy have also become obstacles in advancing 
public awareness to nurture a culture of resilience. (BNPB 2014a) 
 
Together, these challenges show the Indonesian government has problems with stakeholder 
coordination, financial resources, learning and involvement of the community to build disaster 
resilience. In other word, self-organization, as one the key components in building disaster 
resilience is still missing. The government plays a significant role in organizing and controlling 
the disaster resilience programs and activities.  
Despite the lack of self-organization, there is strong evidence of other aspects of resilience 
building being implemented at the national policy level. The next step is to nurture “a culture 
of resilience” which requires a longer time and greater effort to become one of the key 
characteristics in building disaster resilience in Indonesia. 
4.3 The strategies and approaches in building disaster resilience at the national level 
In order to explore the strategies and approaches that are employed and preferred by 
government institutions to build disaster resilience, the following section examines different 
strategies of various actors at different administrative levels. Overall, the analysis aims to 
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examine how resilience strategies and approaches have been designed and implemented by the 
national and local governments. 
The commitment of a government to build disaster resilience is important and should be 
documented and implemented in appropriate strategies and approaches (see section 2.3.2). 
Governing disaster resilience requires strategies and actions of both governmental and non-
governmental actors (Tierney 2012). The strategies in building disaster resilience include the 
establishment of disaster management structures and infrastructure (see section 2.2.2) as well 
as sufficient information and communication to the community (Cutter 2016). 
Although the strategies and approaches are designed at the national level, the goal is to protect 
the most vulnerable communities in the rural areas, 
A comprehensive strategy for awareness building for disaster preparedness has long been put 
in place by the government. Many awareness building drives, however, have mostly involved 
communities in rural areas. Guidelines and information about DRR have also been made 
available for grassroots communities particularly in hazard prone areas. (BNPB 2014a) 
 
The government aims to empower local communities and increase their capacity in disaster 
resilience by developing a comprehensive strategies for disaster risk reduction (BNPB 2014b).   
The Indonesian government has developed different strategies for national disaster 
management, resilience building, and tsunami resilience building (see table 5). Table 5 shows 
three main policy documents that describe Indonesian government strategies in building 
disaster resilience. 
Table 5 The government strategies towards the disaster resilience building 
National disaster 
management strategy 
(RPJMN 2015-2019) 
Resilience strategy (RPJMN 
2015- 2019) 
Tsunami resilience 
building strategy (2012) 
 
Strengthening the regulatory 
framework  
 
Mainstreaming the disaster 
management into 
development agenda 
 
Increasing the effectiveness 
of disaster management 
 
 
Development of local 
government capacity, risk 
assessment, and integration of 
DRR into development plan 
 
Encouraging the central and 
local government to develop 
disaster management policy 
 
Strengthening coordination and 
harmonization of cross sector 
 
Strengthening the early 
system chain 
 
Establishment and 
enhancement of 
temporary evacuation 
shelter 
 
Strengthening 
preparedness and disaster 
risk reduction capacities 
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Optimisation of community 
participation in disaster 
management 
 
Increasing the multi-
stakeholder collaboration 
 
Increasing the effectiveness 
of prevention and mitigation 
 
Increasing the preparedness 
for emergency response 
policies to support central and 
local disaster management 
 
Strengthening the disaster 
preparedness and provision of 
early warning system in the 
high-risk area 
 
Exposure and vulnerability 
reduction in the high-risk area 
 
Development of community 
disaster awareness through 
sensitization, education, and 
training  
Establishment of self-
supporting industries of 
disaster-related 
instruments 
Source: (BNPB 2014b; BAPPENAS 2014; BNPB 2012) 
The national strategies for disaster management can be found in the national development plan 
and BNPB policy documents such as the national disaster management plan, master plan, and 
strategic plan. The disaster resilience strategies refer to disaster management national plans 
prepared by BNPB for five years since 2010. These plans highlight the national priorities for 
the strategies and approaches in disaster management. The most important aspect, detailed 
preparedness programs and activities to manage the situation before, during, and after the 
disaster is translated from these strategies. These strategies will provide the direction to achieve 
the Indonesian vision and mission statements in this policy documents. 
In addition, the resilience building strategies prepared by Bappenas provide a clear guideline 
to integrate the disaster management strategies into the medium and long-term development 
plans. Both BNPB and Bappenas are responsible for ensuring that the sub-national and local 
governments are synchronized with the national disaster management strategies (BAPPENAS 
2014).  Furthermore, this document includes the guidelines to translate these strategies into a 
wide range of programs and activities in the context of building disaster resilience at the sub-
national and local government levels.  
In terms of learning from the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and 8.5 Richter scale Earthquakes 
in Banda Aceh in April 2012, BNPB developed a master plan to build Tsunami resilience in 
Indonesia. This master plan included specific strategies that developed from the evaluation of 
the government’s response to the April Earthquakes in Banda Aceh (BNPB 2012). The 
evaluation reveals that that the government needs to strengthen the Tsunami Early Warning 
System (TEWS) and community response to the early warning to evacuate. From this 
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evaluation, the government developed national strategies in building Tsunami resilience (see 
table 5).  
A key challenge identified in the analysis is the fact that various strategies and approaches are 
often not sufficiently linked and harmonization with each other that means some programmes 
and strategies of different actors might even compete against each other in terms of the logic 
and notion of building resilience. From the evaluation of the national disaster management 
strategy 2010-2014, the main challenge is the integration of disaster resilience strategies into 
various programs and activities in development agenda (BNPB 2014b). Most of these national 
strategies were not implemented at the local levels due to different development priorities and 
capacity of the local government (Pemerintah Aceh 2017). 
At the national level, the strategy of building disaster resilience is more comprehensive to 
facilitate different characteristics of disaster risks in Indonesia. The current insights in building 
disaster resilience suggest that the implementation of the strategies needs time, commitment 
and hard work especially from BNPB and Bappenas to coordinate and synchronize programs 
and activities to build resilience at the national and local levels. The next measure is to 
collaborate with and involve the governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations and 
the community in harmonizing strategies and translating strategies into effective disaster 
resilience programs and activities.  
As the changes and learning continue, the local government should be involved in developing 
national strategies to build resilience. The local government will have a significant role to play 
in evaluating the implementation of the national strategies and approaches at the local level.  
At the same time, local governments have a degree of flexibility to develop these strategies 
into programs and activities that fit with the local needs and budget allocation. This also opens 
opportunities for the local government to engage the community at the grass root level to create 
resilient communities through a bottom up approach.  
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5 Tracing the concept:  resilience oriented-approach to disaster management policy in 
Aceh 
Chapter 5 is the first empirical chapter followed by chapter 6 and 7 which also represent 
empirical findings of the research. This chapter examines how the government of Aceh has 
developed organizational and political capacities to become „a resilient province“ and how the 
concept of resilience has been translated into disaster risk management agendas. Chapter 6 and 
7 explore the disaster governance and collaborative efforts to build disaster resilience in Aceh 
Province. 
The findings of the chapter underscore that there is a strong structure of disaster management 
organizations and policies in Aceh province. However, the integration of the reslience concept 
into local development programs is lacking, particularly due to the fact that the local 
governments did not develop comprehensive strategies. The process of building disaster 
management structure can be traced from the key documents such as Aceh special law and 
regulations, government regulations and decrees for development planning and spatial 
planning, legal documents, and the local disaster resilience frameworks. This document 
analysis is helpful to detect the presence of disaster resilience in Aceh Province after the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction stages that ended in 2009 (see chapter 2.2).  
Building and maintaining disaster resilience require capacity, capability, and competence of 
the actors to recover after a disaster (see chapter 2.2). Against this background the empirical 
analysis examines different capacities of local governments in Aceh to conceptualize and 
translate disaster resilience into various approaches and development strategies. 
The chapter is structured into three sections. The first section argues that the Aceh government 
has developed strong regulations through a legal framework, planning, and development 
documents that assist the local government in integrating disaster risk reduction in the 
development agenda. This section aims to answer the research questions on how Aceh local 
government defines and conceptualize disaster resilience for the province of Aceh. The first 
section encompasses an in-depth analysis of key documents from the Qanun (Aceh special law 
and regulation), to government regulations and decrees for development planning and spatial 
planning. Most of the documents were prepared in collaboration between the Aceh 
government, the national government and international organizations working in Aceh in the 
recovery phase after the tsunami. These initiatives were to designed ensure that the Aceh 
government would have a strong structure of disaster management in place when the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction process has ended. The document analysis shows that the 
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concept of tsunami resilience in the province of Aceh is unique, meaning that this concept is 
developed from the experience of the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 and at the same time the 
Indonesian government build the national disaster management structure based on this learning 
process. 
The second section aims to answer the research questions regarding key characteristics of 
building disaster resilience at the provincial and local level. This section substantiates the 
argument that the local government has learned how to build disaster resilience by providing 
evidence of the challenges encountered in translating the resilience concept. This suggests that 
a lack of political commitment from the government to integrate the resilience concept into the 
development agenda at the local level.  The analysis is based on expert interviews conducted 
with people from different government agencies who are responsible for the implementation 
of disaster management through specific programs and activities related to tsunami resilience. 
The third section examines strategies and approaches employed by governmental institutions 
and community groups to build disaster resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 in 
Aceh Province. This section shows that the resilience concept has been translated and 
implemented into various strategies at the provincial level for example in terms of specific 
programs and activities. In addition, the section also examines how different NGOs evaluate 
the performance of building disaster resilience by governmental institutions. As such, the 
analysis is based on the expert interviews conducted with governmental experts.  
5.1 Conceptualization of the disaster resilience in the province of Aceh 
Based on the theoretical-concptetual discussion of disaster resilience, this chapter will examine 
three important criteria that affect the process of building resilience after disaster, (1) capacity 
to learn and improve after crises, (2) ability to self-organize after crises, and (3) ability to 
recover from crises (see in detail chapter 2.2). In this context, the common understanding of 
disaster resilience is important in order to develop a shared vision in building disaster 
resilience.However, it is also evident that it takes time and resources for the local actors to 
build knowledge, act, communicate and reflect, learning and self-organization are important 
components to achieve resilience (Berkes, Turner 2006; Lebel et al. 2006; Tschakert, Dietrich 
2010). In this regard, the study here is in the position to focus on a longer time frame since the 
tsunami has hit Aceh. Consequently, the analysis can also explore whether and how these 
resources have been developed. In the first place, this chapter focuses on how disaster resilience 
as a capacity of Aceh government to learn and improve after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 
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has been conceptualized. It is argued that the efforts of the government to conceptualize and 
implement disaster resilience in important policy documents is an important step as well as the 
communication about the concept to local stakeholders and community groups shows capacity 
building and learning activities after the mega disaster.  
The concept of disaster resilience for the first time was introduced by the Indonesian 
government in an important policy document, five months after the Indian Ocean Tsunami. 
This document called “The master plan for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the regions 
and communities” (Republic of Indonesia 2005). This master plan was the first reference 
developed by the national government to conduct the recovery process for five years (2005-
2009) in Aceh and Nias. The next important decision following the introduction of the disaster 
resilience concept was the estabishment of BRR as a special national government agency that 
responsible to implement this master plan:  
„In Indonesia’s case, the central government established a new agency because the tsunami 
had debilitated the local government – killing one-third of local civil servants and destroying 
government records and buildings – Indonesia lacked a suitable central government institution 
that could coordinate such a massive rehabilitation and reconstruction effort without 
undermining its existing responsibilities elsewhere in the country. Also, in Aceh, there was a 
longstanding resentment of the central government stemming, in part, from decades of 
secessionist insurgency, making it difficult for any existing central government agency to 
operate effectively in Aceh on a short notice.” (BRR, 2009, p.13) 
 
It can be argued that after the tsunami mega disaster, resilience became a new concept 
approached from the viewpoint of human security.  The Indonesian government decided to take 
the opportunity to create a community resilient not only towards mega disasters but also 
resident to the political conflict that has created vulnerable communities in Aceh Province. The 
rehabilitation and reconstruction policies are designed to enhance security, law and order, and 
political stabilization in order to facilitate a recovery from both mega disasters and conflict 
situations:   
“Reconstruction of community by restoring the aspects of religious and social-cultural life, 
and community resilience, including education, health, science, legal sectors and religions as 
well as traditional institutions.” ( (Republic of Indonesia 2005) 
 
This master plan introduced “community resilience” as one of the important concepts that 
should be included in the BRR strategies and activities. In the plan, a resilient community can 
be achieved by rebuilding the basic socio-cultural, health, religious institutions that were 
devastated by the tsunami in 2004. Because of the prolong period of conflict, the peace building 
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process was an important part of resilience building in Aceh province. To address resilience 
problems, the government identified the post-disaster community problems as (1) the 
vulnerable conditions of the community, (2) limited role of community institutions, (3) 
relatively high intensity of threats and disturbances of security and order, (4) seriously damaged 
facilities and infrastructure for law and order institutions as well as causalities on the part of 
Indonesian national armed forces and police (TNI/POLRI) (Republic of Indonesia 2005). 
At that time, the Aceh government collapsed due to the impact of the mega disaster. The central 
government took a human security approach to integrating the resilience concept in the master 
plan. Before the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the Government of Indonesia experienced a 
long-standing conflict with the separatist Free Aceh Movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM), that caused human rights problems in Aceh for over 30 years. This historical 
background was also a human tragedy. The number of victims were killed is approximately 
between 10.000 to 30.000 people, particularly during military operations in 1989-2004 
(Amnesty International 2015). It is one of the reasons the Aceh government takes the peace 
agreement as a starting point for building resilience in the province: 
“The consolidation of peace in Aceh rests ultimately with the structural reform of society 
towards predictable, fair, and transparent rules, mechanisms, and procedures for the 
legitimate conduct for all levels of government, business, and civil society. The tenets of 
democratic decentralization, good governance and economic justice entrenched within the 
LoGA offer unprecedented opportunities in Aceh for peace, prosperity and progress. That 
constructive dialogue continues on key tenets of MOU implementation in the broader context 
of active efforts for recovery in Aceh bodes well for sustainable peace and development.” 
(Pemerintah Aceh 2008) 
 
In addition, this peace agreement presents an opportunity to strengthen the political 
commitment of Aceh government to build disaster resilience. This makes building disaster 
resilience as one of the development priorities after the resolution of Aceh political conflicts 
and Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. Building disaster resilience is one of the important aspirations 
from the peace agreement between Indonesia government and GAM, 
“Disaster can destroy social life and governance in Aceh, physically and non physically, so 
that we need to prevent or reduce the disaster impact and protect the society, to achieve the 
aspiration of Memorandum of Understanding in Helsinki, August, 15, 2005.” (Gubernur Aceh 
2010) 
 
Following the peace agreement with Indonesian government in 2005, the Aceh government 
granted a special degree of autonomy by Law number 11 year 2006 (Presiden Republik 
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Indonesia 2006). This special autonomy enables the Aceh government to include disaster 
resilience as an important aspect in the development plan and to require that this must be 
accounted for amongst the various stakeholders, including the governmental agencies and non-
governmental organizations. This special autonomy also means that the Aceh government 
should invite and actively engage with Aceh traditional and costumary institutions, to promote 
different strategies at the village level to build disaster resilience (Husin, Alvisyahrin 2014). 
According to Qanun Aceh number 10 year 2008, there are thirteen costumary institutions that 
have been established in Aceh province since the era of Aceh kingdom that rules different 
public affairs in Aceh community, particularly include political and religious institutions. 
These informal institutions are important actors at the grass root level. The Aceh government 
has involved these costumary institutions to promote disaster management programs and 
activities, especially at the village level. For example, informal leader at the district and village 
levels and the informal leader for environmental affairs (e.g. Keujreun blang and Peutua 
Seunebok for agriculture affair, Panglima Laot for fisheries affair, and Pawang Glee for 
forestry affair) (Gubernur Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 2008). Most of these institutions are 
invited to contribute actively in building long-term disaster resilience since they have authority 
in managing environmental affairs traditionally (Soelaiman 2011). 
In term of learning after disaster, Aceh costumary and local institutions are important actors 
that have local knowledge and that might be able to develop and sustain a long-term vision for 
building disaster resilience. A dedicated special law for engagement and collaboration with 
local stakeholders is Qanun Aceh number 5-year 2010. In this special law (qanun), local 
stakehaloders are encouraged to promote and participate in activities to build disaster resilience 
(Gubernur Aceh 2008). Currently, not all these institutions do exist in all districts and villages. 
Often the existence of these institutions at district or village level also depends on the interest 
of the respective administrative institutions to preserve and account for traditional and 
indigenous knowledge often linked to issues of cultural heritage. On the other hand, the 
minority groups in Aceh, e.g. Christian or Chinese community are acknowledged by these 
traditional institutions. These minority groups are in often involved in various activities as part 
of their responsibility as community members in a village. 
The Aceh government, with its special autonomy, has defined Islamic teaching as a key activity 
and reference point in developing the local disaster management. The government assumes that 
the integration of Islamic teaching in a local regulation for DRR can persuade more 
stakeholders to participate and contribute in resilience building. The main involvement strategy 
78 
 
is by involving ulama (muslim scholars) to promote disaster resilience. Ulama has a significant 
capacity to promote community participation in building disaster resilience. Although the Aceh 
government did not define the role of ulama in resilience building precisely, ulama has the 
power to activate the islamic community to actively engage in various disaster resilience 
building activities and programs. The Aceh government encourage ulama to preach that a 
strong connection between building disaster resilience and the Islamic teaching is positive and 
needs to be enforced. In addition, to the integration of disaster preparedness in Islamic teaching 
also by developing  a special training module about roles of the Islamic leader in promoting 
disaster management (TDMRC 2011). 
The experience of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 directs the Aceh government to focus on 
the future risk of tsunamis during the transitional period. Aceh government prepared an Aceh 
Recovery Framework (ARF 2008-2011) as a transitional framework from the BRR era to the 
local government initiatives. The recovery framework aimed at providing a solid foundation to 
continue the process of maintaining disaster resilience. The ARF is an Aceh government multi-
year transition framework. It was prepared by the Aceh government and donors as the roadmap 
for the transition from Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) to the 
Aceh government for the management of the continued recovery process. It represents as a 
proof of the strong commitment of the Aceh Government to promote disaster risk reduction as 
one of the seven development priorities of which DRR is presented as a cross-cutting issue. In 
this framework, the Aceh government described their future strategies on how to incorporate 
disaster risk reduction into the development agenda: 
“Further steps should be taken by the government and civil society to assist the community to 
prepare action plans for DRR, to establish mechanisms for incorporating DRR into the 
government planning and budgeting process for development programs, and to design 
regulatory and policy instruments. Since the community should play a central role in the 
process, particular emphasis should be placed on engaging women and more vulnerable 
groups in the decision process.” (Pemerintah Aceh 2008) 
 
BRR and other organizations that worked in emergency response and recovery had begun to 
promote the concept of resilience through the concept of building back better.  In five years 
(2006-2009), the BRR provided not only infrastructure but also a strong foundation for the 
development of policies related to tsunami resilience. A core aspects of the building back better 
framework is the goal to improve community resilience to future disasters:  
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“Prepare the community for future disasters. Given the geological conditions surrounding 
Aceh, the possibility of another tsunami strike on the province seems more likely a matter of 
when rather than if. It is thus important that the reconstruction took some measures to improve 
the preparedness of the community.” (BRR 2009).  
 
The next important element of the disaster management structure in Aceh is the retrification 
from the international guidelines and global frameworks for disaster risk reduction, particularly 
the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in 2005. HFA is the most important framework that 
affects the disaster management structure in Aceh after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004,   
The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and 
Communities to Disasters provides guidance for a strategic and systematic approach to 
reducing vulnerabilitiesand risks to hazards. To this end, the Hyogo Framework makes DRR a 
priority at the national and local levels to provide a strong institutional basis for 
implementation.”(Pemerintah Aceh 2008) 
 
After the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the Government of Aceh has learnt to cooperate with 
and engage various stakeholders to strengthen disaster resilience. These experiences can 
potentially enhance the advancement of the development of a disaster management structure 
with high organizational and political capacities. However, all the regulation and planning 
documents were prepared by the Aceh government with the assistance of the international 
organizations that retained a presence after the reconstruction had finished. Consequently, it is 
still very relevant to examine whether these activities and structures continued after these 
institutions have left Aceh. 
One of the prominent assistances is to resolve the lack capacity and funding of Aceh 
Government to finalize various local regulations drafts and prepare its implementing strategies. 
This assistance was provided by UNDP and Multi Donor Fund (MDF). UNDP and MDF 
supported Aceh government for the preparation of policy documents and local regulations in 
building disaster resilience, through the project, “Making Aceh Safer through Disaster Risk 
Reduction in Development (DRR-A)”. DRR-A is a project that involves cooperation of 
international NGOs, local NGOs, national and local governments for the development of local 
disaster management policies and institutions, 
“The design of the DRR-A project was consistent with efforts to support the implementation of 
national policies and priorities that respond to the urgent need for the Aceh Provincial 
Government to establish better arrangements and environments for disaster management to be 
operative in Aceh. The project’s relevance was also enhanced by the flexibility of its design, 
allowing it to respond to changing priorities and need.” (UNDP Indonesia 2012)  
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Table 6 shows the regulations that have been enacted by Aceh government with the support of 
the DRR-A project: 
Table 6  Regulations that have been conducted with the support of the DRR-A project 
Law Regulations Goals Charactheristics 
Qanun 
No.5/2010 
Disaster management in 
Aceh 
to implement disaster 
management in Aceh 
This law shall come 
into effect as of the 
date of its 
promulgation 
Qanun 
No.6/2010 
 
Establishment of 
organizational structure 
„Aceh Disaster 
Management Agency “  
to provide legal basis 
for establishment of 
Aceh Disaster 
Management Agency 
This law shall come 
into effect as of the 
date of its 
promulgation 
Governor Reg. 
No.43/2010 
 
SOPSs for TEWS  
 
to equip government 
with urgent standard 
mechanism for disaster 
preparedness 
 
This regulation is 
valid until the 
revision of SOPs 
and TEWS 
regulation is 
necessary 
Governor Reg. 
No.51/2011 
 
Provincial disaster 
management plan for 
2012-2017 
to provide strategic plan 
for disaster 
management in Aceh 
This regulation shall 
come into effect 
only for five years 
Governor Reg. 
No.48/2012 
 
Local action plan for 
DRR 2010-2012 
 
to provide a 
comprehensive  
approach to DRR in 
Aceh 
This regulation shall 
come into effect 
only for five years 
 
Governor Decree 
No.360/6a/ 
2011 
Establishment of DRR 
forum 
to serve as platform for 
all stakeholders 
concerned with DRR in 
Aceh 
This decree shall 
come into effect 
only for the 
establishment of 
DRR Forum at that 
year 
Source: own  
To strengthen the disaster management policy at the regional and local level, the Aceh 
government has enacted regulations (Qanun and Governor Decree) related to disaster 
management to show the government commitments to mainstreaming disaster management 
into the development pathways. Qanun Aceh is a provincial law or regulation governing the 
conduct of government and social life in Aceh (Presiden Republik Indonesia 2006). In general, 
qanun is a local regulation that enacted by the house of representative and provincial and local 
government in Aceh. The qanun enables special consideration of the local needs not otherwise 
regulated by the national policy. 
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The Aceh government has enacted two local regulations, first is Qanun No.5/2010 derived 
from the Indonesian management law (Law No.24/2007) (see table 6). This qanun decrees the 
responsibility and authority of the Aceh government in disaster management: 
 „Disaster management is the responsibility of the government, Aceh government, and the 
municipality governments implemented through the plan, coordinated, professional and 
comprehensive.” (Gubernur Aceh 2010) 
 
There are three levels of government that work together at the local level, the central 
government, provincial government and local government, however the main actor is the local 
government at the municipalities. The central and provincial governments have the 
coordinating line, but it is the authority of the local government over disaster management to 
plan, implement, and evaluate disaster management at the local level. To fulfill this 
responsibility, the Aceh government enacted Qanun No. 6/ 2010 (see table 6) on the 
establishment and organizational structure of the disaster management agency at Aceh 
Province (Gubernur Aceh 2010). 
Both laws were the main reference to governing tsunami resilience in Aceh Province. These 
two qanun are followed by two planning documents, first is “Rencana Aksi Daerah 
Pengurangan Risiko Bencana Aceh tahun 2010-2012” (local action plan for DRR) enacted by 
Aceh Governor regulation no 48 in 2010 (see table 6), 
“Aceh is among the few provinces to have initiated the development of its own action plan, in 
line with the Hyogo Framework. Once completed, the plan can serve as a reference for other 
regions facing similar risks and can inform the National Action Plan (NAP-DRR) Framework.” 
(Pemerintah Aceh 2008) 
 
The disaster management planning needs to apply considerable efforts to collect and 
synchronise data, however, without support from the non-governmental organizations, this can 
not be sufficiently achieved.  The assistance from international organizations to produce the 
disaster management plan has also been important in order to ensure that this planning process 
has been seen as a top priority including its integration in development planning. The plan 
functions as an important stimulus to ensure that other governmental plans and programmes 
consider DRR and allocate a respective budget for it. This action plan is the first policy 
document that conceptualizes disaster resilience for the Aceh government. The Aceh 
government has defined resilience as the following:  
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“Disaster resilience is to understand the existing disaster risk, eager to act based on self 
capacity and ability to take an active role in disaster management to achieve  prospereous and 
justice in Aceh” (Pemerintah Aceh, BPBA 2012)  
 
The second planning document, Aceh disaster management plan 2012-2017 (Rencana 
Penanggulangan Bencana Aceh 2012-2017) elaborates the disaster management and the 
resilience building process for a five-year period.  The government of Aceh defines that 
resilience building concept and strategy in Aceh Province as: 
“Our intention for Aceh to become a sustainable and disaster resilient province is to change 
the paradigm of the disaster management, from emergency response to a culture of disaster 
preparedness. Resilience is understanding the risk, being eager to act based on personal 
capacity and  being able to play an active role in disaster management in order to achieve a 
prosperous and fair Aceh.” (Pemerintah Aceh, BPBA 2012) 
 
Both plans also outline clear responsibilities in terms of “who plans what” and “who does 
what“. Consequently, the plans provide clear guidance for various stakeholders in the field of 
disaster management in Aceh. The intended function of this planning document is firstly, as a 
guideline for disaster management stakeholders, secondly, to create development plans for 
disaster risk reduction, thirdly, to synchronize the development programs for the local 
governments in Aceh, and finally, to support the implementation of disaster management in 
Aceh (Pemerintah Aceh, BPBA 2012). 
The preparation of these planning documents involved the government agency and NGOs from 
the provincial and municipality levels. Its aim is to provide comprehensive strategies and 
hence, avoid the overlaps and ineffectivene structures. These comprehensive strategies mean 
that the local government is in charge of resilience builidng in Aceh Province. These plans are 
from the stakeholders and to the stakeholders: 
“The planning mechanism is coordinated and in developed in accordance with the local 
government planning principle, starting from the village, district, municipalities and provincial 
levels. The planning is based on the priority scale and municipality or provincial budget 
availability and the regulation about the authority of the central, provincial, and local 
government, the national and international organizations, and the community participation.”  
(Pemerintah Aceh 2009) 
 
Ultimately, the government hopes that the local stakeholders including the governmental and 
non-governmental agencies will have a sense of ownership of these plans and participate as 
engaged participants. In managing disaster resilience, the Aceh government’s role is only to 
facilitate the process of participation and collaboration from the beginning and to promote 
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bottom up approaches in the planning process: 
“Further steps should be taken by the government and civil society to assist the community in 
preparing action plans for DRR, to establish mechanisms for incorporating DRR into the 
government planning and budgeting process for development programmes, and to design 
regulatory and policy instruments.” (Pemerintah Aceh 2008) 
 
The local disaster management plan and local action plan for DRR provides an important 
reference point for the mid-term development plan (RPJM) at the provincial and municipality 
levels. The policy statement for disaster management is implicitly integrated in the 
municipality’s mid-term development plan and spatial plan (RTRW) prepared by the local 
government as the guidelines for the five-year period of development. RPJM helps the local 
government to plan programs, activities, and to allocate a budget for disaster management 
based on the government’s political commitment and priorities. These two documents are 
associated with the commitment of the Aceh government to integrate disaster management in 
the development agenda.  
During the five-year planning period, the governmental agencies should translate and define 
the strategies related to their programs and activities every year in order to respond to current 
disaster management problems in building resilience. At the local level, Bappeda as a local 
planning agency, and BPBD, as the local disaster management agency, work together to 
integrate the disaster management plan into the development plan: 
 “This disaster management plan is an inseparable document from the Aceh mid-term 
development plan (RPJMA) that contains the implementation of disaster management in Aceh” 
(Pemerintah Aceh, BPBA 2012)  
 
The mid-term plan is a political statement of the governor; as a result, different governors have 
different levels of commitment towards disaster risk reduction. The RPJM must provide 
measurable indicators for the development and implementation of the plan in terms of targets 
and budget allocation. At the provincial level, the RPJM is called the Aceh Mid-term 
Development Plan (RPJMA). This planning documents are a reference for various government 
agencies in order to demonstrate their activities in integrating disaster resilience into their 
development programs.  
The first RPJMA after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 was prepared by the governor and 
presented as the new regime’s vision and mission. This is a remarkable transformation in the 
development plan that the Aceh governor for the first time began to mainstream disaster 
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management as one of the development priorities.  The governor elected for a five-year period 
(2007-2012) was Irwandi Yusuf that has a strong commitment to implement the disaster 
management as one of his key goals in development agenda, particularly on collaboration to 
build disaster management:  
 “Disaster risk reduction is responsibility of Aceh government, community, and community-
based organizations, working together, with the principal of partnership and equality, so we 
need good policies in building disaster resilience.” (Pemerintah Aceh 2007) 
 
Five years after RPJMA 2007-2012 had been implemented, the elected governor for 2012-
2017, Zaini Abdullah, combined disaster risk reduction strategies with environmental 
management. After the reconstruction, the local government traced the source of disaster back 
to a lack of environmental protection. In this regard, the governor had defined the problems of 
disaster management in Aceh as follows: 
We understand that Aceh´s geographical, geological, hydrological and demographic 
conditions require a comprehensive framework for disaster management, both during a 
disaster, after a disaster, and for future disaster risk. That effort is an Aceh governmental 
responsibility to protect people lives and livelihood, including the protection of disaster victims 
(Pemerintah Aceh 2012). 
 
Contratry to the expectations, ten years after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, disaster 
management is not a key subject in the Aceh development plan (RPJMA 2012-2017).  Disaster 
management is part of environmental management and therewith primarily seen as an 
environmental problem.  Illegal logging and illegal mining are identified as factors that might 
trigger more frequent floods and landslides in Aceh Province. This shows that tsunamis and 
earthquakes are not seen as the top concern and key issues for disaster risk management and 
adaptation in Aceh.  
These findings show that resilience concept has been introduced into local disaster 
management plans and mid-term development plans. This is particularly the fact, since the 
Aceh government wants to communicate the meaning and importance of disaster resilience to 
local governmental agencies. Through mid-term development plans, the government translated 
the resilience concept into more comprehensive planning approaches. In this context, the 
government of Aceh also defined the involvement of various stakeholders as a priority in the 
development agenda and thus also for building disaster resilience.  
In summary, this section shows – based on the document analysis –that the conceptualization 
of tsunami resilience by Aceh government in the aftermath of the 2004 mega disaster began 
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during the reconstruction process with the principles of “building back better” and “resilient 
nations” from the Hyogo Framework for Actions. In the transitional period, the Aceh 
government prepared the Aceh Recovery Framework to continue building resilience and take 
over full responsibility for this after the reconstruction phase is finished. The Aceh government, 
with its special autonomy, has defined resilience as an important aspect in development plan 
and thus, promoted its consideration among various stakeholders, including the governmental 
agencies and non-governmental organizations. These activities and achievements discussed 
before (legal framework, integration of resilience into planning documents, etc.) are a clear 
sign that the Aceh government has been able to recover from the disaster and was able to build 
capacities to enhance resilience even after such a mega-disaster.However, the shift from focus 
on tsunamis towards different environmental issues (e.g. landslides, floods, and forest 
management) are depend on the new governor political interests and commitments during 
election campaign that have to translate into RPJMA. This is a key problem in maintaining 
long-term disaster resilience in Aceh. 
5.2 Translating the concept of disaster resilience into practice  
This section aims to answer the question on how the Aceh government translates the concept 
of disaster resilience into practice and to discuss the translation of this concept into various 
programs and activities to build disaster resilience. After reviewing Aceh disaster management 
documents in chapter 5.1, the analysis in this section is based on the semi-structured expert 
interview with members of local government agencies and non-governmental organizations 
that involved in disaster risk reduction and tsunami resilience building.  
As explained by Freeman (2009), policy translation means the implementation of policy into 
practice in a reflexive, conscious and critical manners. In the context of translating the concept 
of disaster resilience into practice, Aceh government should have not only the capacity to 
implement the disaster resilience strategies, but also the capacity to reflect critically in the 
implementation of these strategies. The Aceh government capacity to reflect on the process of 
translating the concept oof disaster resilience is one of the learning components from the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami experience.  
After BRR finished their mission in Aceh, the local government struggled to continue the 
“building back better” concept in the development agenda. When the donor returned to their 
home countries, the efforts to build and maintain disaster resilience in the medium-run were 
quite a challenge. Key informants explained that when the donor organization’s missions 
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finished, the government appeared to slow down their pace of acitivities significantly:  
After the UNDP Project (DRR-A) finished (in 2012), the government did not 
really care about the disaster mitigation. Even though Tsunamis are a mega 
disaster and Aceh is a Tsunami high risk area. When the donor left Aceh, we 
could see that the government was not really serious about continuing with 
the disaster mitigation sensitization activities. (11-NGO-BNA) 
At the same time, several stakeholders began to shift to other development goals (e.g. 
education, public health management, and poverty alleviation) that were seen as more urgent 
because then years after the tsunami had been passed and thus the relevance of the resilience 
concept for local government officers and, in particular for local NGOs, was decreasing: 
In the past, we could work actively because the UNDP supported us with 
funding, but when they left, we found ourselves struggling. However, (at the 
present) the disaster management issue is not sexy anymore. (11-NGO-BNA) 
In this regard, it is important to note that there was mechanism in place for the knowledge 
management transfer among actors in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. The Aceh 
government did not invite the stakeholders to be involved in conceptualizing tsunami resilience 
and to think about the new goal after the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases. According 
to one respondent, the Aceh government is still trying to define the concept and thus does not 
have the clear regulations to support the policy:  
In my opinion, what happened now in Aceh, we still try to find the concept. 
We should have a moment to meet our common interest in Aceh. Our current 
problem is not our (relationship) problem between us and Jakarta (the 
central government). We know that the follow up of law number 11 (Aceh 
special autonomy law) is not finished yet, there are also several regulations 
that have not yet been enacted and the Aceh government authorities are not 
clear on their roles and responsibilities yet. But, the most important thing is 
that Aceh has a big goal that (the government and people in Aceh) want to 
achieve. We have an internal contradiction. We need a momentum to create 
a big common goal that all of us understand well. But I think we don’t have 
it yet. (51-NGO-BNA) 
One of the government interests in translating the concept is to concentrate more on the 
emergency response side and to help the victims in local disaster events, rather than focusing 
on comprehensive prevention strategies. This policy is also shown in the current RPJMA that 
focus on the emergency response (see sub-chapter 5.1). On the other hand, this policy is not 
reflecting the Aceh resilience concept that aims to address resilience more comprehensively 
for example in the entire disaster management cycle, including mitigation, prevention, and 
preparation for future disaster risk. The Aceh government struggles to shift the focus from the 
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emergency response into disaster preparedness as a key-informant reveals: 
At the moment, the resilience building concept is like the rice and instant 
noodle concept (analogy). It means that (the government) only prioritized the 
emergency response. The disaster resilience building already became part of 
development plans and the budget comes from the province and local 
government budget (APBA and APBD). On the other hand, both the 
legislative body and government authorities, the politicians and bureaucrats 
lack disaster resilience awareness. They only make the plans, but they never 
evaluate these plans. They allocate the budget for thembut they never have 
an intention to integrate the disaster resilience issues into the development 
policy. (18-NGO-BNA) 
According to the key actor interview (18-NGO-BNA), the local government did not evaluate 
the effectiveness of the disaster resilience plans in term of the implementations and its progress 
in building disaster resilience. Mostly the evaluation focused only on a balanced budget and 
the time of respective programs and activities. Consequently, the local government had limited 
capacities and perhaps also limited interest to evaluate and reflect critically on the process of 
translating disaster resilience into other planning programmes. Various stakeholders 
interviewed recognize the lack of dedication to plan, integrate and evaluate activities regarding 
disaster resilience appropriately and mindfully. There is no real evaluation of past activities 
related to the resilience building programs and activities, even though resilience itself 
underscores the importance to learn from past experience. The stakeholders have questioned 
the government’s commitment and are aware of the criticisms that are frequently addressed 
towards the government policy:   
I am not sure about the government (commitment), but the government has 
received many critiques. For example, the false tsunami alarm in 2007 
increased the lack of public trust in the government. The government still has 
a lot of homework that they should work it on, especially, the government 
authorities and agencies. (10-NGO-BNA) 
The government appears to have a substantial amount of unfinished business relating to 
preparedness and mitigation activities in the past. One of the remaining problems is for example 
the limited capacity of the government to operate the early warning system effectively. This is 
a major issue because the false alarm in 2007 could happen again in the future if the government 
does not demonstrate their commitment to learning from past experiences.  This commitment 
is dependent on the political will of key government actor. It seems to be difficult to align 
political will with the need to build resilience, with significant consequences that can 
sometimes be opposite with the different political agenda:      
The resilience building process is dependent upon the governmen’st political 
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will. Whether the government pro people or pro their group? But the most 
important thing is to ensure that the economic machines is still working. (06-
NGO-BNA) 
The unclear political position providess the community with a negative perception and lack of 
faith in the government policy.  It is difficult to invite the community to be involved when the 
government cannot show their sincere interests in building resilience. In terms of the 
government’s accountability, the informants think that there is a lack of trust which prevents 
the community from being involved and working with the government. The community’s lack 
of trust in the government has a negative effect on the process of building resilience:  
The community’s lack of capacities, (is because) the community works alone, 
and the government works alone. The community’s level of confidence in the 
government is low, so they just give up (on the government). (53-NGO-BNA) 
On the other hand, the Aceh government has launched the concept that is written in the planning 
document to explain the goal of the resilience building in Aceh. However, it seems that this 
official concept statement did not reach the stakeholders and public. The policy has 
implications are the stakeholders will have different perspectives towards the government 
policy. The process to promote the official concept becomes is complicated because the 
regulations and planning document are not enough to guide the local government in translating 
the concept into the development agenda: 
In the past, we used the community resilience concept in our programs, but 
now we want to be clearer about what the meaning of community resilience 
and how we identify different indicators to achieve community resilience. 
Although people will used different indicators, but I think it is not a problem, 
as long as the goals is to achieve community resilience. We (our 
organizations) haven’t started it yet but in the future, we will initiate the idea 
to have our own community resilience indicators. (24-NGO-BNA)  
The integration of the resilience concept into development programs remains weak, meaning 
that not all of the concept can be utilized as a learning outcome from the disaster experience. 
One of the important practices from the NGOs during rehabilitation and reconstruction was to 
involve and approach the targeted community by asking what the community needs and wants. 
This learning practice is missing from the disaster resilience programs and activities that not 
specifically design base on the need of the targeted areas or communities.  It is particularly 
because most of the programs and activities are planned and designed by the local government 
agencies without public consultation. 
Findings from the semi-structured interviews show different perspectives and understandings 
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of the implementation of Aceh government’s tsunami resilience concept. The translation 
process is based on the local government’s experience, resource and capacities to interpret the 
central and local government policies. The process of translating and integrating the concept 
into the development agenda faces challenges because the foundations and understanding of 
the concept are not clear from the outset.  
The main attempt to implement the resilience concept is toward the tsunami resilience principle 
in spatial planning. The spatial plan allows the government to include the resilience concept in 
the development agenda: 
Before the tsunami we never thought that a mega-disaster would happen. 
After the tsunami, we started to design and think forward about all of the 
tsunami impacts, spatial planning, and community livelihood. (41-GO-SBG) 
However, the idea to integrate the resilience concept into the spatial plan was not new. Before 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the initiative to plan a safer city from flood, fire and storm 
had already been highlighted in the Banda Aceh spatial plan: 
Before the tsunami, we had already integrated flood, fire, and storms as 
disaster risks into the Banda Aceh Spatial plan. We have prepared for these 
kinds of disasters, but after the tsunami we began to consider extending the 
preparedness measures to include tsunami risk. (07-GO-BNA) 
After the tsunami, the BRR prepared a master plan to “build back better” where the tsunami 
had been particularly devastating.  In general, the BRR focused on the relocation of the people 
and located housing aid to the safer zone based on the master plan. However, the arrangement 
ultimately failed to relocate people or set up the city based on the new master plan. This was 
because most of the local government and community members were reluctant to relocate their 
dwellings and business centre to the safer place suggested by the master plan:  
We have nothing in Aceh Jaya. Then BRR has proposed a spatial plan for 
Aceh Jaya, named Aceh Jaya Metro City but we never referred to that plan. 
In the rehabilitation and reconstruction stage, we also had a master plan 
related to relocation, but nothing worked. Now, we make a new spatial plan 
based on the government agency proposal. It is not detailed; it is instead very 
general. (64-GO-CLG) 
Furthermore, the interviewee (64-GO-CLG) revealed that housing relocation was particularly 
conducted for people who lost their houses and plots of land due to various reasons. For 
example, for Tsunami victims that lived  in the rented housing or the land of their houses have 
washed away (Matsumaru et al. 2012).  In some cases, they can rebuild their houses in the 
previous location but, it in many cases the rebuiliding of the house in very exposed zone was 
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prohibited after the disaster. Most of the relocation areas (including for the governmental 
agencies offices) were far from the (previous) city center and difficult to access because the 
supporting infrastructures were not sufficient or provided yet, such as proper roads, schools, 
and public transportations. As a result, only 40 percents of the houses are occupied in the 
relocation settlement in Aceh Jaya (Arif 2014). The rest of the residents went back to their 
villages in the coastal areas. 
Although the rehabilitation and reconstruction failed to follow the master plan, the local 
government has prepared another spatial plan to fulfil the central government regulations. The 
central government obliges the local government to follow the spatial plan in development. 
However, the local government’s spatial plan is not better compared to the BRR master plan. 
It is a starting point to reflect on the importance of having a good spatial plan. This time, the 
local government understands that the spatial plan can be used to guide the development agenda 
inline with the concept of resilience: 
Before the tsunami, we had a city plan based on disaster risk reduction, but 
it was not obligatory and there was no detailed plan for its implementation. 
At that moment, we only thought about landslides and storms. Tsunami’s are 
a new thing in Aceh and people were really shocked when they experienced 
it. If it was a matter of coastal disaster, we only thought about abrasion. (39-
GO-SBG) 
The next attempt to utilise the resilience concept in the development agenda was by 
incorporating the concept into the development plan. The regional development and planning 
agency (Bappeda) integrated the tsunami resilience concept into the mid-term development 
program and coordinated with the government authorities to ensure that the agency follows the 
guidelines:   
From the planning mechanism, we have included disaster risk reduction as 
a strategic program for RPJMA (mid-term development planning) 2012-
2014. (07-GO-BNA) 
Although the definition of the resilience concept is still not explicit in the development plan, 
the action plans and strategies support the concept. According to the interviews, the goal of 
achieving tsunami resilience is more important than the agreement on an exact definition of the 
concept. The awareness to translate the concept into the development plan is the result of the 
learning process and reflection after the mega disaster: 
The most fundamental thing is the concept (resilient city). If we prepare plans 
for disaster mitigation, it means we will have policies and plans (related to 
it). If we focus on disaster mitigation, our aim is to have strategies.  We will 
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have various strategies, including a strategy to provide infrastructure, 
tsunami evacuation shelters, spatial planning, and budgets to fund the 
activities. (25-GO-BNA)               
The interviewee (25-GO-BNA) indicates that the Banda Aceh local government is committed 
to using tsunami resilience as a foundation for the development plan after the reconstruction 
phase has finished. To support this strong commitment, the government started to provide the 
infrastructure and facilities to build disaster resilience, for example, open new evacuation 
routes and build more vertical evacuation shelters. These strategies are one of the translations 
of the disaster resilience concept and the realization of the commitment to be “a resilient 
province”. Consequently, the budget systems have also changed to accommodate the new 
disaster risk reduction programs and activities in the development plan: 
We have changed our budget system through RPJMA (mid-term development 
planning). We have modified our spatial planning base on the resilient city 
and Madani (civil society) city concepts. (07-GO-BNA)  
In translating the concept, one of the local government strategies is to juxtapose the local 
concept that related to the resilience in order to simplify and understand the concept. Although 
the “madani” concept is also abstract and difficult to understand, and the government did not 
provide a clear definition, the community interprets “madani” as a good civil society with 
strong law enforcement. This means that resilience is a good concept the same as the “madani” 
concept.   
There is a difference between the preceding and present condition. From the 
perspective of spatial patterns, in the past, we had a grey area. But now, we 
have dedicated the coastal area to green open space by reducing the 
residential area. We have a clear regulation for spatial planning and the law 
enforcement for the plan. (25-GO-BNA) 
The Banda Aceh local government has used “madani” and “resilience” for the city’s branding. 
It indicates that the concept of tsunami resilience has been transformed into a wider concept. 
When the concept was translated into the local context, it had to be consistent with the local 
values, norms, laws, faiths, science, and technology. After the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, the 
concept of “madani” includes building disaster resilience as one of the important components 
in city development.  This new city branding is one of the results from the learning process and 
reflection after the mega disaster.  
In contrast, although Aceh Jaya was severely affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the local 
government did not have a clear idea of tsunami resilience. Prior to the tsunami, resilience was 
not recognized as a critical part of the development agenda for the local government. This 
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changed following the reconstruction of Aceh Jaya. The local government prefers to focus on 
build back the livelihood sectors such as fisheries and tourism:  
Here in Aceh Jaya, we do not focus on disaster mitigation, but we want to 
develop Aceh Jaya as a region based on fisheries and marine sectors for 
community livelihood from the fish processed industry and marine tourism. 
(64-GO-CLG). 
On the other hand, the local government has a lot of work to do to deal with the annual flooding 
that affects the livelihoods and communities in most areas of Aceh Jaya. The medium-term 
development programs accommodate flood risk in only a few villages in Aceh Jaya under 
disaster mitigation efforts. As such, the concept of disaster resilience is focused only on floods 
that are certain to occur every year but not tsunamis that happened in the past but cannot be 
predicted.  
A different concept of tsunami resilience is presented by Sabang local government. Although, 
the community had not thought that tsunamis were a disaster risk that they faced, Bappeda, the 
local government planning authority, placed great emphasis on building a tsunami resilience. 
Disaster risk reduction is the main planning concept for development before and after the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami: 
Before the tsunami, we had city planning based on disaster risk reduction, 
but it was not an obligation and there was no detailed plan for it. At that 
moment, we only knew about landslides and storms. Tsunami is a new thing 
in Aceh and people really shocked when they experienced it. If it related to 
coastal disaster, we only know about abrasion. (39-GO-SBG) 
As a small Island, Sabang local government realizes that their areas are vulnerable to coastal 
risk. Although Sabang was not severely impacted by the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the 
mega-disaster was a tipping point for the government to start to prepare also for tsunami risk 
and to promote tsunami resilience. With support from the central government and non-
governmental organizations, the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 offered possibilities for the 
government to enhance and improve their capacity for disaster risk reduction. In contrast, 
various public institutions and local communities in Sabang did not perceive tsunamis as a risk. 
More specifically, they conclude from their experience of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, 
that Sabang is a safe area: 
We never experienced a Tsunami here. If an earthquake occurs, people will 
not evacuate in panic. It is not like in Banda Aceh when people run 
desperately. Here in Sabang, we are calm and confident when an earthquake 
strike. (43-NGO-SBG). 
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The perception of the respondent reveals that people think that tsunami resilience is already 
present in Sabang because the recovery time was very short, and people returned to their normal 
life right after the disaster. Furthermore, people from Sabang even helped the tsunami victims 
in Banda Aceh.  The tsunami risk is acknowledged as a risk factor, but from past experiences 
they are confident that they are able to manage risk and raise awareness. Consequently, they 
assume that they have already learned how to deal with mega-risks. 
The empirical analysis shows that integrating the concept of resilience into spatial and 
development plans is challenging. Significant gaps between the planning documents and the 
concept and operationalization of resilience were revealed and are a major challenge when 
aiming to sustain long-term resilience particularly at the local level. According to the Aceh 
government survey on the progress of the implementation of the Hyogo Framework (Action 
21) municipalities in Aceh, on average, have been active in applying the respective indicators, 
but only reached level two in the overall implementation. Level 2 means “minor progress 
achieved in disaster risk reduction, with no systematic commitment” (UN/ISDR, 2008, p. 40). 
This progress survey was part of the disaster management plan in 2012 and the progress 
assessment is called the “Indeks Ketahanan Aceh” (Aceh Resilience Index).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
According to the expert interviews, the Aceh government has prepared a complete disaster 
management planning document, but the document has become a piece of paper rather than a 
living document that holds significance in efforts to build resilience. It is difficult for the 
government to introduce the plan to the stakeholders and community because the government 
lacks commitment and capacity to implement the document.  The government has never 
achieved an effective planning document due to a lack of synchronization between planning 
and development:     
We have prepared the action plan for disaster risk reduction for Aceh 
Province in 2010. After three years, there has been no follow up for that plan. 
Then we made a disaster management plan for Aceh Province (2012-2017). 
These documents are the companion documents for RPJMA (the long-term 
development plan). But there is no guarantee that the government will use 
the action plan and disaster management to support the development plan. 
The problem is that no one is responsible for integrating these plans into the 
development plan. They make the plans, but they will not implement them. 
(26-NGO-BNA) 
According to the respondents, the planning document is not used as a main reference in the 
current development. This is because there is no mechanism to ensure that development will 
comply with the development plan. Consequently, the limited effectiveness of development 
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planning itself hampers also the implementation of resilience building through such 
instruments and measures. The only obligation is that municipalities have this document at 
hand, but whether development follows the guidelines in the document is often a very different 
question. The Aceh government’s efforts to provide the document are not based on a deep 
understanding of the importance of the planning document but rather simply to comply with 
the central government regulations.  
 Aceh has a comprehensive planning document, but we should check it fits  
with our needs. The challenge is that when those planning documents are 
prepared, and then the authority stores them in the cabinet, where the 
document will be on display so that if the central government authority asks 
about the document, they can show it to them. But we never know; has the 
government made the community aware of that document? That is the big 
question; do the community members know about that document? If the 
community is not aware, they need to be informed that document is available. 
(24-NGO-BNA)  
According to one respondent, the local government’s lack of informing the community is a 
bargaining position in the decision-making process. It means that the opportunity for the 
community members that affected or targeted to comment or discuss the planning document is 
very limited. This is one of the government strategies to accelerate the decision-making process 
without having the obligations to answers the comments. The intention to involve the 
community in the process fails because the community’s opinion is not listened to by the 
government: 
We try to participate in the spatial planning process; we give many inputs 
and suggestions to the government, but we often face problems. We cannot 
begin the discussion until the plan reaches the legislative level. We open 
dialogues with the government authorities. We try to open the space for 
public discussion, with many stakeholders, with the press. Then we have 
problems because we have no power to follow up our input. We cannot 
advocate this until the decision maker level of government. No stakeholders 
can back up our efforts to give the government some input. That is our 
weakness. (16-NGO-BNA)   
Indeed, civil society rarely provides input to the government because the 
decision-making process related to the input is a long process and there is 
no guarantee that government will accept it. There is a general option for the 
community to comment and discuss plans developed by the local 
goverrnment, but wheter the comments and critiques is taken into 
considerations remains unclear. (20-NGO-BNA) 
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There is a lack of evidence that the government will follow up on the advice that is given from 
the stakeholders and community: 
We try to give our input to the government, but our ability to advocate the 
suggestion is weak. We are not able to guard it and to push our concerns in 
their discussions. (20-NGO-BNA) 
It seemed that the implementation of a bottom-up approach was difficult to conduct. The 
evidence of successful bottom-up approaches for participation is limited.  The local 
government often prefers to take a “top-down” approach based on the common procedures. 
The respondents are aware that their efforts to contribute in the process will be fruitless: 
 The government still applies a top-down approach to planning. As a result, 
the planning at village level is never recognized in the government’s 
development agenda. (06-NGO-BNA) 
In summary, the interviews reveal that in terms of conceptualizing resilience at the local level, 
there is a lack of common understanding in translating the policies into various programs and 
activities. The government has a lack of capacity and political commitment to translating the 
resilience concept into the spatial and development plans. The significant gaps in translating 
the concepts evolve around the capacity of government to invite the disaster management 
stakeholders and community to contribute to the process of the translating the resilience 
concept. The government prefers, instead, to implement a top-down policy in decision making 
and the lack of the attention to the community voice in governing current disaster management 
in Aceh Province results. 
5.3 Evidence of resilience building process  
This section focuses on examples and the evidence based for buiding disaster resilience in Aceh 
after the mega-diaster. According to Davies (2015), community involvement and stakeholders 
partnerships are key in order to maximize the affectivenss and to ensure benefits in the 
implementation for various stakeholders. The findings show that the disaster resilience concept 
has been translated into different strategies and approaches to govern the disaster resilience at 
the local level, however, various approaches lack comprehensive community involvement and 
comprehensive approaches that connect different actors and capacities effectively. 
Consequently, various approaches examined fall short in enhancing coordination and 
collaboration.  Most of the governmental organizations have integrated their programs as part 
of their obligation to mainstream disaster risk reduction into development planning. On the 
other hand, NGOs worked together with the grass root level community groups and introduced 
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new strategies that in some cases provided approaches for better connecting different 
stakeholders. However, these approaches often were dependent on additional funding of 
specific donors. In this regard, this section will also examine the differences betweeen 
approaches employed by governmental agencies and NGOs.   
Table 7 shows the current programs, activities, and legislations to promote Tsunami resilience 
in Indonesia. These programs and activities were the translation and interpretation of the 
concept of Tsunami resilience by BNPB, as indicated in the Tsunami resilience master plan 
(BNPB 2012).  This Tsunami master plan is a main reference for the local governments to 
design and implement programs to achieve Tsunami resilience particularly in high Tsunami 
risk provinces and municipalities. 
Table 7 National Tsunami Resilience Programs and Activities  
Programs/Activities/Exercises Regulation/Guidelines/SOP 
Evacuation route map  
 
Evacuation route maps and evacuation 
steps/stairs  
 
Evacuation signboards and warning boards  
 
Sensitization and dissemination of temporary 
evacuation shelter  
 
Resilient villages  
 
Volunteer groups and strengthening 
volunteers' capacity  
 
Emergency response logistics and equipment 
 
Emergency operation center 
 
Sirens warning with modest technology 
 
Shelter or tsunami evacuation shelter 
 
Formulation of disaster management planning 
and contingency planning at local level 
 
Table top Tsunami evacuation exercise 
 
Community self-evacuation 
 
Planning evacuation route and evacuation 
sign board 
 
Development of tsunami risk map at 
district/city level 
 
Management of tsunami evacuation 
shelter 
 
Community-based preparedness to 
anticipate earthquake and tsunami 
 
Planning for the installation of sirens and 
community based EWS 
 
Tsunami drill 
 
Integration of DRR into spatial planning  
 
Temporary evacuation shelter 
 
Review of Tsunami master plan  
 
Standard operating system for decision 
making on evacuation at local level 
 
The preparedness capacity building 
Source: (BNPB 2012, 2014b) 
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As the concept of resilience has been translated into different programs and activities by 
different stakeholders (e.g. Government, NGOs, academia, and community), the approaches, 
and the targets vary (BPBA 2012; UNDP Indonesia 2012). In general, the target groups include 
school communities, persons with disabilities, women, and communities in tsunami risk areas. 
The different stakeholders have a particular target group that they aim to work with to promote 
resilience. The governmental organizations prefer to work with the formal institution such as 
school communities or at the village level government, whereas, the NGOs work in their 
community-based practices with more detailed programs and clear objectives. But, most of the 
strategies have been translated into disaster mitigation programs and activities: 
If we focus on disaster mitigation, our aim is to have strategies.  We will have 
various strategies, including strategy to provide infrastructure, tsunami 
evacuation shelter, spatial planning, and budget. That is the difference 
between the previous and present-day conditions. (25-GO-BNA) 
According to the tsunami master plan, the Indonesian government has three core strategies to 
build tsunami resilience, (1) strengthening the early warning system chain, (2) establishment 
and enhancement of temporary evacuation shelter, and (3) strengthening preparedness and 
disaster risk reduction capacities (BNPB 2012). From these three strategies, different programs 
and activities were derived by governmentals and non-governmental actors (NGOs). Table 8 
provides an overview of key strategies of governmental and non-governmental organization 
and actors to promote resilience building.  
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Table 8 Stakeholders strategies, programs and activities for building tsunami resilience  
Strategies     Programs/activities/projects Stakeholders 
Governmental 
Agencies 
NGOs 
Strengthening the 
early warning 
system chain 
Warning and communication 
system 
BMKG, BPBD RAPI 
Establishment and 
enhancement of 
temporary  
evacuation shelter 
Evacuation areas BPBD, Dinas 
PU, Bappeda 
 
 
Strengthening 
preparedness and 
disaster risk 
reduction 
capacities 
Scientific research related 
tsunami  
 
 
Local hazard mitigation 
planning  
 
Civil volunteer organization 
 
 
Evacuation routes and signs 
 
Educational program 
 
 
Public awareness programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tsunami safety drill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dinas Sosial 
 
 
Dinas 
Perhubungan 
Dinas 
Pendidikan, SMP 
Negeri 1, SAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BPBD 
Aceh Institute, 
ICAIOS 
Karst, Walhi 
 
SIBAT, PMI, 
Tagana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YRBI, PMI, 
American Red 
Cross, 
Solidaritas 
Perempuan, 
IOM, WCS, FFI, 
Informal leader, 
Professional 
association 
Source: own from the semi-structured interviews 
The experts semi-structured interviews revealed that the programs and activities in building 
disaster resilience in Aceh follow three core strategies that are mentioned and outlined in the 
Tsunami master plan (see table 4). Most of these projects were part of the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction efforts (2005-2009). The number of projects reduced significantly after the 
rehabilitation stages ended in 2010. This finding shows that non-governmental actors 
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signficinalty reduced their activities after a while and in many cases the question is whether or 
not governmental agencies are willing and able to continue respective efforts and to insert such 
strategies and measures into their regular development budget.  
5.3.1 Strengthening the early warning system and evacuation 
The Tsunami Early Warning System (TEWS) is the main strategy to promote tsunami 
resilience in Aceh Province. TEWS is one example of the collaboration between international 
organizations, different levels of governmental organizations, and community groups to reduce 
future tsunami risk. Key actors involved in the TEWS such as BMKG, BNPB, LIPI and local 
governments have clear roles and responsibilities related to awareness raising and the 
preparation of potentially affected communities (BMKG 2010).  At the local level, the local 
authority’s capabilities and preparedness are main factors that decide about the effectiveness 
of the early warning system, even though the warning itself comes from the national level. The 
local regulations, technical capabilities, awareness, coordination and collaboration are 
important elements that need to be strengthend by actors at the local level, particularly 
governmental actors. On the other hand, NGOs are expected to evaluate the performance of 
TEWS, especially after a big earthquake occurs. 
This research found that the regular maintenance and testing of Tsunami sirens at the local 
level are rarely conducted. For example, the false Tsunami alarm on 4 June 2007 was happened 
when the Tsunami warning sirens were activated without BMKG official warnings (BNPB 
2012; Oktari et al. 2014). On the other hand, the evaluation of the Tsunami warnings activation 
at 12 April 2012 found that the Aceh government did not activate the alarm after BMKG issued 
the first Tsunami warning. At that time, the warning operational centre was locked and there 
was no governmental official that ready to inseminate the warnings from BMKG (Tim Kaji 
Cepat 2012). After these warning cases, people questioned the commitment of the Aceh 
government to participate actively in the insemination of TEWS. 
In addition, the effectiveness of the early warning system is also hampered by the fact that 
various local stakeholders and communities lack knowledge on how to respond to the warnings. 
After the earthquake and warning dissemination many people went to the street and showed a 
panic reaction that also caused chaos and traffic jams (Goto et al. 2012). Evacuation is difficult 
in such chaotic conditions: 
 
100 
 
At this present, we do not have a good (early warning) system, especially, in 
Banda Aceh. If we want to evacuate, the traffic jams are everywhere. (17-
NGO-BNA) 
and 
When the earthquake occurred, the electricity was shut down which made the 
tsunami alarm inactive. Later when the power returned, the alarm was 
automatically activated, but people didn’t care about the warning, they 
didn’t trust the early warning system anymore. (52-NGO-BNA)   
TEWS is the responsibility of both the BMKG and local government but many local 
governments seem to be reluctant to play their significant part and be directly involved in the 
management of TEWS. The local regulations to support the system have led back to the local 
regulations, evacuation plans and a contingency plan for local stakeholders. However, as the 
main actors responsible for sustaining the early warning system, the local government still fails 
to take a position of leadership to strengthen the early warning chain. The political commitment 
from the local government leader is missing: 
We have a SOP (Standard Operating System) for early warning system, but 
we do not know if the government implemented the SOP and do the 
government authorities that have a significant role in that process, realize 
that they have this role? For example, we have a new governor and new chef 
of agency; but do they know that they have a significant role in the early 
warning system? We need an update for this process. We should anticipate, 
that we are wasting our SOP. This is currently a big problem, and it is 
because our institutional ego still strong. (10-NGO-BNA)  
The interview result indicates that the governance of the early warning system in Aceh needs 
significant improvement. It shows that the question whether the roles of the institutions in the 
early warning chain are clearly defined is an open question and not sufficiently clarified. Many 
local government stakeholders have not realized that they have key responsibilities and duties 
in TEWS. Also changes in staff and limited TEWS infrastructures maintenance hampers the 
system effectivity. In addition, the non-governmental sector and non-governmental actors were 
not sufficiently invited to engage in the TEWS and the preparedness activities of communities 
to respond to early warnings. The findings of this survey reveal that the community is not 
properly aware of the TEWS system and in some cases has also only very limited trust in the 
system and respective institutions. This is also due to the fact that communities have 
experienced false alarms and delays in warnings being issued. This affects the community’s 
perceptions of the effectiveness of TEWS:  
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I am not sure that Banda Aceh has a SOP (Standard Operating System) for 
an early warning system, I am not sure whether they (the government) have 
raised awareness about the procedures or perhaps, they will not raise 
awareness because they struggle to understand the system (24-NGO-BNA). 
The local government has various programs and activities to support the warning and 
communication system. The evacuation of residents after the warning has been issued or 
released is the next challenge that the local authorities face. One of the programs aims to 
provide sufficient evacuation infrastructure and the establishment of the effective escape routes 
in order to ensure anticipated responses. Local authorities often have established these system 
and strategies for evacuation based on the experience and studies of evacuation behaviour after 
big earthquakes occurred (e.g. 8.5 on the Ricther Scale earthquake in 11 April 2012). This 
program aims to extend the road and provide alternative routes for the community: 
We have established escape routes. In the past the road was narrow and now 
we have wide road for evacuation. After the tsunami, we started the road-
widening projects and enacted the name of the roads that used as the 
evacuation routes.  We planned the north ring roads (in Banda Aceh) as the 
buffer for the evacuation routes. We also started the road-widening projects 
to Ulee Lheue and plan to widen the road to Syiah Kuala and the street 
villages in that area. This plan has established the BRR blue print concept 
and now we have adopted it into the Banda Aceh spatial plan. (25-GO-BNA) 
The local authorities have collaborated with many stakeholders to respond to the challenges 
linked to the providing of safe evacuation routs. In this regard, suitable evacuation routes and 
signs, widening of roads, and awareness raising activities for safe evacuation routs were 
important activities. After the tsunami, the local authorities evaluate the rehabilitation blue 
print that was prepared by BRR and modify it with the current spatial plan. It has been argued 
that the local governments are keen to learn and adapt based on their experiences of managing 
evacuation. Furthermore, the local authorities plan to conduct traffic simulations to consider 
the behaviour of people evacuating by personal automobiles:  
We have planned to make a traffic simulation for tsunami evacuation. The 
(Banda Aceh) Mayor has instructed to make it. We will have a responsible 
officer in every evacuation point that has to manage the evacuation traffic. 
For example, from the police officer and army that have their offices are 
located near the evacuation routes (02-GO-BNA) 
The interview result indicates that the governance of the early warning system in Aceh needs 
significant improvement. It shows that the question whether the roles of the institutions in the 
early warning chain are clearly defined is an open question and not sufficiently clarified. Many 
local government stakeholders have not realized that they have key responsibilities and duties 
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in TEWS. Also changes in staff and limited TEWS infrastructures maintenance hampers the 
system effectivity. In addition, the non-governmental sector and non-governmental actors were 
not sufficiently invited to engage in the TEWS and the preparedness activities of communities 
to respond to early warnings. The findings of this survey reveal that the community is not 
properly aware of the TEWS system and in some cases has also only very limited trust in the 
system and respective institutions.  This is also due to the fact that communities have 
experienced false alarms and delays in warnings being issued. This affects the community’s 
perceptions of the effectiveness of TEWS:  
I am not sure that Banda Aceh has a SOP (Standard Operating System) for 
an early warning system, I am not sure whether they (the government) have 
raised awareness about the procedures or perhaps, they will not raise 
awareness because they struggle to understand the system (24-NGO-BNA). 
The collaboration to enhance the capacity of local actors to strengthen the early warning system 
and resident evacuation is needed. Many of local actors are highly motivated to be involved in 
the governance of the TEWS. These local actors have gained own experience with the TEWS 
and developed high expectation towards the effectiveness of TEWS. The development of early 
warning systems was not completed when the infrastructure and technical system were 
established. 
 
 
Picture 7 The control room for the earthquake events in BMKG office Mata Ie 
source: own 
 
According to the interviews conducted, the most important thing is to fill the gap between good 
technical systems and infrastructures and to raise local stakeholder’s awareness of the need to 
sustain the early warning system. The challenge is to identify the type of collaboration that can 
103 
 
best engage the local actors to share and exchange their experiences related to TEWS. 
5.3.2 Establishment and enhancement of vertical evacuation shelter 
Banda Aceh has three vertical shelters or escape buildings (in Alue Deah Tengoh, Deah 
Glumpang and Lambung in Meuraxa Districts) that were constructed during the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction phase by BRR and contributions from international organizations. One of 
the escape buildings is in Ulee Lhee and manage by TDRMC (Tsunami Disaster Research 
Mitigation Centre) which conducts research related to tsunamis. People from Banda Aceh city 
centre also can evacuate to the Museum Tsunami. The escape building in Aceh Jaya is even 
used as the BPBD office.  
 
 
Picture 8 Aceh Jaya BPBD office 
Source: own 
 
The tsunami evacuation shelter is an important asset for managing tsunami resilience. The 
construction of the building is a valuable asset that should preserved as one of the lessons 
learned from a mega disaster. At the local level, the escape buildings are maintained by the 
local government. BPBD’s role is to promote and establish the local regulations related to the 
function of shelters as the evacuation building. Dinas PU (Public Work Agency) is responsible 
for maintaining and managing the physical structure of the escape buildings to ensure that they 
are able to resist the earthquake and tsunami impact. Bappeda manages the capacity of the local 
government to integrate the escape buildings into the spatial plan and to ensure that BPBD has 
sufficient programs and activities to maintain the function of the vertical shelters.  
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Picture 9 Tsunami evacuation map in a village in Aceh Jaya 
Source: own 
 
 
 
These facilities need special management (for example: structure of the building, accessibility, 
drinkable water access, phone, lights, and emergency kits) due to their functions to provide 
protection from tsunami inundation. However, under the local government management, the 
effectiveness of the escape building as the main evacuation place is still low. The community 
who live near the shelters rarely use the building for evacuation: 
I have seen the vertical shelter for tsunami evacuation, but I think if the 
tsunami comes again, people will not use that building for evacuation. 
Anyone that has experienced the tsunami (in 2004), they know the height of 
a tsunami wave. So, if they decide to evacuate there, I am sure they will feel 
insecure and wonder if the building is strong enough to withstand the tsunami 
wave. They will evacuate as far as possible and I am sure people will never 
want to use these buildings for evacuation. (16-NGO-BNA)   
The community lacks trust in the capacity of the evacuation buildings to protect them from a 
tsunami inundation. One of the reasons is because the location of those evacuation facilities is 
also not seen or perceived as appropriate based on the tsunami inundation area in 2004. The 
traumatic experience of many people in that area that were hit by the Indian Ocean tsunami 
combined with the lack of capabilities to ensure that communities evacuate to the facilities in 
the case of an emergency limits the value and effectiveness of the evacuation shelters. It appears 
that during large earthquake events, and following the Indian Ocean Tsunami, people would 
prefer to evacuate overland by car. The community has learned from past experience that the 
height of a tsunami wave can be higher than the evacuation building, and hence they are afraid 
that the building may collapse or not be sufficiently high for providing a safe place. These 
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comments and findings are based on interviews conducted with NGOs that were invited to 
discuss the effectiveness of the existing escape buildings as part of their projects (16-NGO-
BNA).  
In addition, the location and and the design of the vertical shelters does not match the needs of 
the local community’s needs, particularly for the elderly and disabled people: 
(Evacuation) infrastructure is not used optimally by people. People do not 
evacuate to the vertical shelter for tsunami evacuation. For example, in 
Lambada (name of one village near Banda Aceh), the staircase to evacuate 
to the hill is too steep (19-NGO-BNA)   
The local actors should maintain tsunami evacuation as a structural mitigation effort to support 
the evacuation plan and other regulations that are related to the management of these shelters. 
The local government ignored the comments related the community perception of the escape 
building capacity.  The results underscore that the local actors lack of capacity to promote these 
escape buildings as a safe evacuation shelter. The community needs more sensitization about 
the structure of the building and more supporting system to improve the effectiveness of these 
structural mitigation structures: 
I think people in Banda Aceh do not want to use the (vertical shelter 
evacuation) building because they also want to save their property too. The 
information about where to evacuate, the condition of the evacuation 
building, and other information related to that, at this moment has not yet 
become a critical discussion point for organizations that have worked in 
Banda Aceh (24-NGO-BNA) 
The interviews reveal that BPBD, Dinas PU and Bappeda have collaborated to manage the 
escape building. However, it is equally important to invite the participation of the non-
governmental sectors and communities to increase the effectiveness of the escape building. The 
building authorities allows the community to use these buildings as a community center, but 
the maintenance of these buildings is remaining unclear. The establishment and enhancement 
of temporary evacuation shelters is dependent upon the government strategies that rely on 
collaboration with local actors. This collaboration should encompass also activities to sustain 
preparedness and the evacuation shelters and therefore additional stakeholders are invited not 
only for using but also for regular maintaining these facilities.  
5.3.3 Strengthening preparedness and disaster risk reduction capacities 
The strategy to strengthen the preparedness and disaster risk reduction capacities has been 
translated into various programs and activities from different organizations that worked during 
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and after the rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh Province. The findings of this research 
and particularly the interviews underscore, that a variety of different measures and strategies 
has been developed and conducted to build resilience, however, their effectiveness, acceptence, 
and implementation is still not sufficient and the analysis hints towards areas that need more 
attention, such as the acceptance and maintainance of the evacuation shelters.  
In term of strengthening preparedness and disaster risk reduction capacities, the planning 
programs and activities include important activities, such as awareness rising, knowledge 
management, and procedures for evacuation. However, the document analysis also revealed 
that community training is a common method to promote public awareness. The training targets 
the community members that live in the high tsunami risk areas and trains them on how to react 
to a tsunami. More targeted training was conducted for the women who were identified as 
having a low capacity and need special assistance for being better prepared for disasters:  
We organised disaster risk reduction and first aid training. This training saw 
five hundred women participate from the grass roots level, from 19 women’s 
groups in 19 villages in Aceh. (04-NGO-BNA) 
The training primarily aims to prepare women to evacuate and can help other victims as well. 
This is based on the data of victims from the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 that more than 80 % 
women and children died in some villages (Frankenberg et al. 2011).  This specific program is 
a common NGO activity designed to carefully target particular participants and special 
vulnerable groups. The NGOs have examined the backgrounds of the target group and mapped 
out their needs. This strategy improves the effectiveness of the training because it is specifically 
designed to fit the needs of the target group.  
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Picture 10 Disaster management training for the village leaders in BPBD Banda Aceh 
Source: own 
 
On the other hand, to maintain and increase the effectiveness of the training, the organizations 
have to build informal relationships with the target groups and design follow up activities. 
These follow-up programs intend to maximize the training benefit and to empower the 
participants to act as volunteers with sufficient disaster management knowledge: 
BASARNAS conducted training for the people in the municipalities based on 
the disaster risk in their area. This volunteer is a community member that 
received the training from the Basarnas (09-GO-BNA) 
Public safety education is conducted at school to improve the knowledge of children on how 
to behave correctly in emergency situations, particularly if an earthquake or tsunami striks the 
community. BPBD encourages schools to establish school-based disaster preparedness 
activities (sekolah siaga bencana): 
After the Tsunami (in 2004), we wanted to establish sekolah siaga bencana. 
The student of this school will learn how to react in case of a tsunami (02-
GO-BNA) 
The concept of sekolah siaga bencana depends on the project or organizations understanding 
on how to prepare school communities to evacuate safely in disaster events. This program 
targets schools that were affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. However, the numbers 
of schools and organizations that have organized this program remains unclear in Aceh 
Province. Interviewee 02-GO-BNA hopes that the local government and communities can 
support schools and participate in this program, however, a systematic overview is missing. 
It is noteworthy, that the concept of school-based disaster preparedness is not prepared by the 
education agency. The initiative and intention to include tsunami preparedness in the school a 
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curriculum is discussed often rapidly between different local stakeholders, however, the 
implementation in Aceh is still not sufficient according to the interview results:   
The education agency did not have a special program (for disaster 
preparedness) that were integrated into the school curriculum or local-
content curriculum even though Aceh is an earthquake high risk. (13-NGO-
BNA) 
Even though the implementation of tsunami preparedness is not a legal requirement in schools, 
many schools integrated disaster preparedness into their school curricula and initiated activities 
to strengthen tsunami knowledge of school children and teachers.  Various schools encouraged 
teachers to discuss the tsunami and individual preparation activities with the students: 
We have integrated (the disaster preparedness) course as part of the 
geography, biology, Bahasa Indonesia courses in schools (03-GO-BNA) 
During the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, the establishment of school-based disaster 
preparedness were part of the main strategy of various NGOs to build disaster resilience. The 
challenge is to sustain and support the schools that participate in this program after the NGOs 
projects have been finished and financial support has run out. In some cases, several schools 
have continued to develop programs and activities by their own funding because they realized 
that this program is useful and important for their students. They try to continue these activities 
with their own initiatives:  
We have conducted tsunami drills and self-evacuation training five times 
since 2009 (in our school). Self-evacuate training is a training for the 
students to be able to evacuate in the case of a tsunami with their friends and 
with no need to wait for the school committee. It is school policy to conduct 
this training annually. We often invite expert (disaster management expert), 
for example the red cross organization (for trainee). (03-GO-BNA) 
The coordination between NGOs and local government still needs to be improved in order to 
create more synergies between governmental and non-governmental organizations and their 
activities and training programmes: 
Basarnas has conducted program „SAR goes to school “. This program is a 
sensitization program for SD (primary school), SMP (junior high school) and 
SMA (high school) students. This program raises awareness of what to do in 
the case of a disaster and provides training for evacuation (09-GO-BNA) 
Although many schools participated in school-based disaster preparedness in Aceh Province, 
the effectiveness of the implementation is still not sufficiently evaluated by these schools and 
other stakeholders. On the other hand, sekolah siaga bencana is not only developed in Aceh, 
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but BNPB has replicated this educational program in other provinces, for example in 
Yogjakarta and Jakarta. To support BNPB in conceptualization of sekolah siaga bencana, the 
Indonesia consortium for disaster education has developed the policy document and framework 
to establish more sekolah siaga bencana in Indonesia (Konsorsium Pendidikan Bencana 
Indonesia 2011). This framework is important to encourage the respected stakeholders to 
evaluate this program before developing and replicating it.  
 
 
Picture 11 SMP 1 Banda Aceh as on of the school-based disaster preparedness 
Source: own 
 
Overall, the findings show that various preparedness programs and activities have conducted 
in schools, however, activities to maintain these programmes and the progress made is needed 
in the future. Collaborations may enhance the realization of the remaining programs in the 
future: 
There are many actions that are still not yet done, such as the installation of 
evacuation signs, construction of tsunami escape buildings and raised areas, 
as well as disaster education materials for school children(64-GO-CLG) 
The semi-structured interviews with the experts found that disaster preparedness at the local 
level is dominated by activities related to awareness raising. The results underscore that the 
strategies to promote disaster preparedness through various educational programs aim to 
transfer the tsunami experience and knowledge gained during the emergency response, 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction by learning and reflecting from the existing preparedness 
programs. The legacy of the 2004 tsunami is the main tool to promote public awareness of the 
need to educate the next generation.  
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5.3.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the empirical findings for the conceptualization of tsunami 
resilience and how the local governments translatet he resilience concept into development 
agenda. In the first part, the document analysis revealed that the Aceh government has 
developed a strong structure of disaster management organizations and policies in Aceh 
Province. The local disaster management regulations and policies (see table 6) are in place and 
show the general long-term political commitment to maintain and build disaster resilience in 
Aceh. This formal rule system encompasses governance rules, particularly also issues of 
collaboration to build disaster resilience in Aceh Province. The content of these laws is 
comprehensive and clear that can be used as a main reference in conceptualization and 
translation of disaster resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. The Aceh government 
has capitalized on the post-disaster principle to build back better with assistance from the 
external organizations that worked on the rehabilitation and reconstruction process.  As a result, 
Aceh province has established various local regulations and planning documents (e.g. 
Establishment disaster management, collaboration, DRR action plan, and SOP for TEWS) to 
build a strong foundation for new systems of governance in disaster risk management in Aceh 
Province.   
The analysis in the second section focused on local government efforts to translate the concept 
of tsunami resilience into practice at the local level. The resilience concept has been introduced 
to local governments or applied by local governments through the integration of the concept 
into the spatial and development plan. It is suggested that the integration of the resilience 
concept in development programs is still weak, particularly the set-up of specific strategies and 
measures, such as evacuation routes, location of the vertical evacuation building, and 
maintenance of the existing evacuation facilities. That means that the local government still 
struggles with the implementation of current programs and activities to enhance strategies and 
approaches to maintain long-term disaster resilience in this area. 
The mechanism for translating the concept into practice are still weak. Particularly, the 
incorporation and application of participatory approaches is needed in order to shift from a top-
down to bottom-up approach and to promote self-organization in communities exposed to 
potential tsunami risks. Although the procedural rules to include public participation is 
highlighted in local regulations, local governments struggle to follow up the comments from 
the community related their policies and actions. The consideration of comments by different 
community groups in public planning and public participation procedures is still weak and 
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needs to be improved in order to use the full knowledge within these communities to build 
disaster resilience.      
The analysis of preparedness and awareness raising activities in schools underscored that 
various activities have been conducted and that many schools are still actively promoting 
disaster preparedness in terms of tsunamis. However, the analysis also showed that the 
educational ministry for example has not been a major player in this context and also a 
systematic overview of the activities conducted in schools is still lacking. Consequently, it is 
difficult to evaluate whether the preparedness activities in schools for teacher and students 
cover all schools or only those that were active from the beginning. More systematic 
information and evaluation tools would be needed to improve the knowledge about the 
maintainance of these activities in all schools. 
Overall, the process of translating the resilience concept into practice lacks the integration of 
participatory approaches and principles, since stakeholders and the community cannot directly 
contribute to the development of the strategies and the decision-making process. Therefore, a 
stronger commitment to learn and critically reflect current activities is needed by local 
governments that also involve other local actors in the process in order to maintaining long-
term disaster resilience. This collaboration is not only needed during concrete activities, but 
also within the definition of the specific meaning of the concept of disaster resilience for a 
specific community.  
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6 Tracing the governance: maintaining medium and long-term disaster resilience 
In the previous chapter, the conceptualization and translation of disaster resilience have 
discussed to understand the government strategies and approaches to build resilience after the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. After having analyzed the conceptualization of the tsunami 
resilience in the province of Aceh and the problems in translating the concept of resilience from 
local actors to various development plans and programs, this chapter will highlight the 
governance aspects in managing resilience at the local level.  
This chapter aims to answering one sub-research question: how local actors collaborate with 
each other in the development and maintenance of building resilience to disasters. The 
collaboration that is mentioned in this chapter, refers to informal and formal efforts between 
different stakeholders, particularly their various approaches and strategies (e.g. Establishment 
of local disaster management agency and enactment of local disaster management regulations) 
in building tsunami resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004.  
According to Ostrom (2009), the regulations, laws, and rules that have established to maintain 
long-term disaster resilience consider as the key component in disaster resilience governance 
system. In this chapter, disaster resilience governance system considers as the important 
components in managing disaster resilience at the local level. The analysis of these important 
components focuses on learning and self-organization in the governance process of stakeholder 
collaboration to maintain long-term disaster resilience following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 
Aceh province.  
This chapter argues that the disaster resilience governance is weak in stimulating or organizing 
the room for self-organization and learning in managing disaster resilience and that this has 
affected the effectiveness of the collaboration. This is problematic since self-organization and 
learning were defined as important characteristics of resilience building in social-ecological 
systems, like coastal communities (Birkmann et al. 2016a). Self-organization and learning refer 
to the ability of the actors to capitalize on the mega disaster experience to enhance their ability 
to manage disaster resilience.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section presents three important features of 
governance; the initiation of collaboration to manage resilience, the range and plurality of 
stakeholders and the various strategies that have been translated into programs and activities 
for managing disaster resilience. As such, the analysis will discuss self-organization and 
learning that direct the integration of the resilience concept into governance practice at the local 
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level. The second section substantiates this argument by giving the analysis on the 
stakeholder’s roles and participation in building disaster resilience. The third section discuss 
the changes in the roles of NGOs, particularly after NGOs contribution in the recovery efforts. 
The fourth section provides a brief overview of the establishment of the “Forum Pengurangan 
Risiko Bencana”, a local multi stakeholder forum at the provincial and municipality levels 
under a government strategy to invite various stakeholders to be involved in building disaster 
resilience. The report’s findings from the interviews carried out with local actors that are 
currently engaged in the collaboration. Some of the informants have been involved in setting 
up the multi-stakeholder forum from the outset. The last section is concluded what appeared as 
the key findings from this chapter. 
6.1 Governing disaster resilience at the local level 
This section evaluates the governance process in managing disaster resilience through the 
governmental and non-governmental perspectives. The analysis of household surveys is also 
presented to provide an evaluation from respondents at the community level that look at the 
governance of disaster resilience in Aceh Province during and after the recovery process ended 
in 2010. Bevir (2011) defines governance as “the complex processes and interactions that 
constitute patterns of rule.”  In this chapter, governing disaster resilience refers to the process 
of government, NGOs, and community manage the specific interactions and processes of 
building disaster resilience.  
The involvement of the governmental authorities, NGOs, and community in resilience building 
is one of the Indonesian government’s recent strategies to implement the national disaster 
management law that was enacted in 2007 (BNPB 2012). This disaster management policy 
entrusts the local government with collaborating with the governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders in resilience building. It could be argued that the collaboration between the 
government and NGOs in building resilience at the local level was intended to enhance the 
effectiveness of managing resilience through the engagement of different actors that have 
experienced and learned from the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 in Aceh Province.  
The process of sharing power with different stakeholders and creating networks began 
immediately after the emergency phase. At that time, the local government was only a spectator 
and the community were still suffering from the disaster impacts. However, the attributes of 
governance that can be translated into good governance began to be promoted by the non-
governmental and international organizations that worked in Aceh. Part of their mission was 
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to hand over the reconstruction and learning process to the local government. The process was 
not simple given the pre-existing lack of trust between the local government and the NGO 
organizations, particularly the need to promote collaboration in maintaining long-term disaster 
resilience.  
After the emergency response was completed in 2005, the BRR was the only government 
authority that was able to collaborate with the non-governmental organizations. The BRR 
coordinated with many organizations and developed networks during the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase. On the other hand, the BRR invited a small number of government 
agencies to engage in the rehabilitation and reconstruction effort. At the local level, the 
government authority’s role was to support and coordinate with the BRR. During the transition 
period, the NGOs wanted to hand over the reconstruction lessons learned before they had 
completed their mission in Aceh Province.  
According to Linden (2002) collaboration can benefit the organizational and individual 
learning. The results underscore that the local actors learned about and introduced disaster 
management during the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase but the ability to transfer the 
lessons learned to the community was particularly low. The local actors realized that their 
ability to learn from their experience decreased over time and without further concerted efforts, 
it was difficult to maintain the knowledge: 
“After the tsunami we received much assistance and learned from the NGOs 
and volunteers, but we never wanted to reflect upon and take care of all the 
that what we received.  This shows that we are not wise because we are not 
learning lessons from what we experienced.  We have already forgotten what 
we had learned from the Indian Ocean Tsunami “(71-GO-CLG) 
Collaboration is one strategy to sustain the knowledge and continue the learning process 
between local actors. One means to implement this strategy is by requiring the NGOs that 
worked in Aceh to report their activities to the government and collaborate with the government 
authorities. This continual learning and sharing between key actors is one of the reasons to 
collaborate. On the other hand, the collaboration purpose is difficult to identify. The purpose 
of collaboration currently exists but is not stated formally in the document or formal agreement. 
The local actors rarely discuss their common goals, so the goal is not present in the first place:  
“I think we don’t have a good system to manage disaster. The government, 
community, and stakeholders didn’t have a common purpose to manage 
disasters. When the community wants to engage in disaster management 
disaster, the government and the stakeholders should provide the opportunity 
for participation and when the government invites the community and 
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stakeholders to collaborate, they should accept the invitation.” (11-NGO-
BNA) 
The understanding of the purpose is needed to motivate and increasing interest to participate 
and improve the collaboration process. Collaboration occurs to create better disaster 
management by inviting local actors from the non-governmental organizations, private sectors, 
and community to be involved in managing disaster resilience. The local government realizes 
that their current capacities to manage resilience are not sufficient to achieve their goals in 
disaster management: 
“We have managed the disaster, but it is not sufficient because we have many 
other problems, not just how to manage disasters. For example, poverty, 
moral degradation, urban dynamics in Banda Aceh, and the heterogenic 
society becoming a plural society. But if the earthquake suddenly struck 
again, then people will remember about disaster management“(07-GO-
BNA) 
On the other hand, disaster management competes with other issues that appear more urgent 
and important for the government to react to. The focus of the multi-stakeholder collaboration 
is to leverage synergies from existing and different actors that can contribute more and attract 
new resources from other organizations that are interested in managing disaster resilience. Even 
the Aceh government has solid local regulation but to sustain the disaster resilience, requires 
the capacities to implement and improve the quality of regulations: 
“If we want good disaster management, we should have many things, such 
as legislation, regulation, law, planning, budgeting, institutions, and 
capacity development. Aceh has all of those instruments. We only have it in 
terms of the quantity. The quality of those instruments, that´s the next 
problem.” (26-NGO-BNA)      
In other words, the purpose of the collaboration among the local actors is to promote better 
disaster management in Aceh Province. Although Aceh currently has solid local regulations 
and structures to manage disaster resilience, the sustainability of the process needs a common 
purpose to direct the ideas, actors, and strategies. The common purpose is important to fill the 
current gaps between the concept and implementation of good governance in managing disaster 
resilience in Aceh province.  
6.2 Stakeholders roles and participation  
The local government, NGOs, and their networks are found as the key stakeholders that manage 
the process of building disaster resilience. Local stakeholders are the key components 
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responsible for establishing collaboration. In this research, the local refer to the individuals, 
groups or organizations that engage in collaboration for tsunami resilience building 
collaboration through their programs or activities, during the rehabilitation and reconstruction 
phase or in the current situation in Aceh province. The stakeholder’s participation and 
contributions can create the systematic and interactive learnings. These learnings strengthen 
the local governance system (Pretty 1995).  
The range of actors that involve in managing disaster resilience includes the local, provincial 
and national governmental agencies, NGOs, academia, and civil society. Most of these actors 
had experiences of working with different types of organizations during the emergency 
response, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in Aceh Province. At that time, the international 
NGOs searched for local partners and local expertise for collaboration with their organizations.  
The Aceh government capitalized on the post disaster opportunities by inviting many 
stakeholders to collaborate in disaster management. After the establishment of local disaster 
management, the collaborative process between the local stakeholders became the 
responsibility of the BPBD. BPBD is a key actor that requires the invitation of local actors to 
be involved in managing disaster resilience at the local level. BPBD´s role is to develop strategy 
for the collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organizations in disaster 
management: 
Before the BPBD was established in 2011, disaster management was under 
the jurisdication of the Kesbanglinmas (Welfare Agency).  The structural 
organization of Kesbanglinmas is different to BPBD. BPBD recruited new 
staff but they also took on the former Kesbanglinmas staff because the staff 
understood the job. However, there were some changes to their tasks and 
roles in BPBD. Actually, under Kesbanglinmas, disaster management was 
only a formality, we never actually did anything related to disaster 
management. All of the programs and activities were handled by the social 
agency. We had no role in the emergency response after the tsunami. We also 
did nothing in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. At that time, we 
only had the label of the institution but without activities. (30-GO-BNA) 
The background of the establishment of BPBD was to provide the local government with an 
agency that would can manage disaster resilience at the local level. BPBD has a primary 
responsibility and role to develop good approaches and strategies for managing disaster 
resilience: 
We hope we can build a disaster resilient community in Sabang. We will have 
resilient villages and communities as the output of our programs and 
activities in the end. (36-GO-SBG). 
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The approach of the BPBD for building resilience is not only through their programs and 
projects but also to promote their institution, as the main agency that facilitates collaboration 
for tsunami resilience building. Their approaches and strategies to introduce their identities to 
all stakeholders become crucial because they should show that they are open for all 
collaboration and at the same time, they must learn to collaborate with various stakeholders. 
In terms of the governance process at the local level, the research considered how the BPBD 
has promoted their agency as the main institution for disaster management:  
BPBD is responsible for coordination with the governmental and non-
governmental organizations that work in disaster management. 
Coordination is an important aspect of disaster management. After the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, we didn’t experience another mega disaster, 
so BPBD has no experience in managing the disaster emergency response. I 
think that the most important thing is coordination and collaboration and 
that we should control our organization’s ego when we are working together. 
We should remember that our goal is to help the community (29-GO-BNA) 
The main approaches of BPBD in managing resilience include promoting their institution as 
the main agency concerned with and responsible for tsunami resilience building. BPBD might 
therefore consider their role as an important but new player in managing disaster resilience. 
This research found that after five years since its establishment, 61 % of the households 
surveyed had heard about the local disaster management agency as a governmental authority 
that works in disaster management. 31 % of survey participant were not aware of the 
establishment of this local disaster management agency in Banda Aceh, Sabang, and Aceh 
Jaya.  
 
Picture 12 BPBD office in Sabang 
Source: own 
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It is equally important for BPBD to have leadership and capabilities to develop and maintain 
disaster management at the local level. This agency has coordination functions but their 
position as a local agency obliges them to govern disaster management through the Sekretaris 
Daerah (Secretary of the Municipality). The Sekretaris Daerah has to approve any action 
related the emergency response and disaster management. BPBD has to utilize its power of 
coordinating with other agencies because Sekretaris Daerah holds the highest position in the 
structural organization of the local government and all of the local agencies have to obey the 
Sekretaris Daerah’s command:  
“We meet and talk to the Sekretaris Daerah almost every day and discuss 
our problems and anything that we need related to disaster management. We 
follow whatever the Sekretaris Daerah tells us to do. Our Sekretaris Daerah 
is very proactive. If the Sekretaris daerah doesn’t support us we have 
difficulty coordinating with the other agencies, because the head of BPBD is 
echelon IIb and Sekretaris daerah is the higher echelon, IIa. So, it will be 
easier for Sekretaris daerah to commad anything to the agencies.   The 
approval of Sekretaris daerah is our key strategy to in ensuring collaboration 
from the other agencies because Sekretaris daerah has the power to require 
the other agencies to coordinate with BPBD” (56-GO-CLG) 
It appears that the bureaucratic constraint affects the ability of the BPBD to act autonomously 
without the intervention of Sekretaris Daerah. This bureaucratic constraint refers to the legal 
procedures to make decisions or actions that must follow the hierarchy between institutions or 
people working and representing institutions. In the case of BPBD, this bureaucracy takes time 
and complicated, so they have to follow the procedures and wait for Sekretaris Daerah to make 
a decision. At the same time, as the local disaster management agency, particularly in an 
emergency situation, they have no time to follow this procedure. 
BPBD acknowledges that their leadership capacity is limited to govern the collaborative 
process among the stakeholders. BPBD collaborates with Bappeda (the development and 
planning agency) regarding the target and budget allocation for disaster management programs 
and activities each year. The initiatives to integrate disaster risk reduction into the agency´s 
program should consult with Bappeda. Bappeda is, therefore, a key actor that helps BPBD and 
other governmental agencies to create their programs, budget planning, and share 
responsibilities each year. Bappeda is, therefore, BPBD’s consultation partner to develop 
annual activities and programs: 
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We plan our program for five-year periods then we prepare an annual action 
plan. We work before the disaster and our activities include sensitization, 
training, evacuation signs and community-based disaster management in 
three villages in Banda Aceh. (02-GO-BNA)  
The mechanism of planning programs starts within each division in BPBD. BPBD is mandated 
to design and propose disaster management programs and to budget for every year. The 
mechanism to design the program is through the staff who are required to submit the programs. 
After all the programs are collected, the BPBD will have a meeting to decide and choose 
programs that BPBD will propose for one year. BPBD will then send their programs proposal 
to Bappeda and the local people´s representative council at the municipality or regency level 
(DPRK). Bappeda will check the suitability of the programs against the development plan and 
DPRK will verify and decide on the programs that fit with the local community needs and 
budget allocation. 
According to the expert interviews, a main problem regarding efficiency and implement ability 
of the local strategies and programs is the limited budget available for BPBD. That is not only 
a problem for this specific strategy, but for the entire institutions or DPRK. The budget problem 
related to different priority or commitment that DPRK decided to the number of budgets that 
can manage by BPBD. On the other hand, the people´s representative council of Aceh (DPRA) 
at the provincial level claimed that they have passed 330 Billion Rupiah in 2015 and 333 Billion 
Rupiah in 2017 for disaster management programs and activities in Aceh Province (Abda 
12/24/2018). This massive budget deal is increased every year, to show legislative authority´s 
commitment in maintaining long-term disaster resilience in Aceh Province. However, the 
number of budgets allocated for BPBD is limited, particularly for the non-infrastructure 
programs and activities, such as sensitization and training (57-GO-CLG).  
The DPRK budget cuts decrease the quality of the programs and the number of outcomes that 
can be fulfilled. As a coordinating agency, sometimes it is challenging for the BPBD to 
negotiate with the DPRK to increase their budget allocation for disaster management programs 
and activities. This may be related to difficulties in establishing communication channels 
between DPRK and BPBD. The local disaster management officer stated that BPBD has 
problems with obtaining clarification as to why their proposed programs have been rejected by 
DPRK: 
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“We have proposed one program to maintenance tsunami evacuation routes, 
but it was not approved by DPRK. At the beginning, when we had meetings 
with the DPRK, they said, they would accept it but at the final decision, this 
program was missing. I think they should just say no from the beginning. We 
tried to get the confirmation about the refusal but had no response from them. 
They said that the budget allocation is limited, and they will consider this 
program again for the next year.” (61-GO-CLG) 
The local government are not aware that BPBD demands more support to manage disaster 
resilience, particularly to increase their agency capacity to lobby budget allocation. The 
execution of the strategy to manage resilience relies on budget allocation and the agreement of 
legislation bodies to accept the proposed programs and activities. The commitment of the local 
government to support BPBD will affect the capacity of BPBD to perform better and take their 
responsibility to manage disasters: 
“We have the same programs from last year because we cannot cover all of 
the targets. The budget was not sufficient. We decided to propose the same 
programs again with the bigger budget and we planned this program for a 
five-year period instead.” (57-GO-CLG) 
In most cases, BPBD give up the programs that cannot be implemented due to insufficient 
budget allocation for this agency. It is challenging for BPBD to propose new programs because 
the local government needs to guarantee that the programs will be successful. This indicates 
the limited space to create and propose new programs and activities. On the other hand, the 
BPBD capability, creativity and innovation to design good programs that can be accepted by 
the legislation body is low. Consequently, most of the programs are the same every year and it 
be the continuity of programs and modification of different targets and areas.  
All the programs and their implementation are monitored or evaluated by Bappeda, particularly 
by requiring budget and development progress reports. At the same time, the impacts and 
benefits of the programs and activities are difficult to evaluate. It is because of the evaluation 
indicators and mechanisms for programs are not clear from the planning process. In this regard, 
the learning procedures to have better programs and their implementation for next development 
year are not included in the local government practice.  
In terms of the local disaster management roles and responsibilities, the household survey 
found three main roles of BPBD that were considered by the community as the main tasks of 
BPBD More than 70% of respondents recognized that the BPBD roles and responsibilities are 
to perform emergency response (78 %), 19 % recognized BPBD’s role in disaster preparedness, 
and a minority recognized that BPBD is responsible for coordinating the local disaster 
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management stakeholders (3%). It shows that the BPBD performs well in emergency response 
evacuation, however, the disaster preparedness programs and activities, including training, 
disaster education at school, and sensitization were not effectively achieved. This is due to the 
fact that the BPBD programs and activities related to the disaster preparedness are constrained 
by bureaucracy and budget issues, as outline above. The respondents struggled to identify the 
roles of BPBD to coordinate and collaborate with different institutions and community. As 
such, it appears that the evidence of good coordination and collaboration was quite low.  
This household survey reveals that BPBD should promote their role as the coordinating agency 
and invite the local actors to collaborate. Their approaches and strategies should include 
strategies to raise awareness of their role among the stakeholders. This becomes crucial to show 
that they open for all collaboration with various stakeholders. The local government agencies 
have significant roles to support BPBD. The local agencies have high tacit power that BPBD 
should empower these agencies to work together. 
The stakeholder analysis has been conducted to identify the stakeholders that involve in 
managing disaster resilience at the local level. The summary of their roles, main contributions 
and the current state in the disaster resilience governance are shown in table 9.  
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Table 9 Roles and contribution of governmental agencies in managing disaster 
resilience 
Stakeholders Roles  Main contribution to 
disaster resilience 
governance 
Current state and 
challenges regarding 
integrated and 
effective disaster 
resilience governance 
Badan 
Penanggulangan 
Bencana Daerah 
(BPBD) Local 
Disaster Management 
Agency 
Responsible for 
disaster management 
at the local level 
(before, during, and 
after the disaster) 
Coordinating agency 
and main hub for 
multi-stakeholder 
collaboration to 
manage disaster 
resilience 
Lack of capacity and 
trust to manage 
stakeholders 
collaboration 
Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan 
Daerah (Bappeda) 
Local development 
and planning agency 
Responsible to 
ensure BPBD has 
appropriate programs 
that in line with mid-
term the development 
plan 
Supports BPBD to 
coordinate and 
collaborate with other 
local agencies 
through controlling 
the programs and 
budget allocation for 
disaster management 
Assist and support 
BPBD to have a good 
disaster management 
programs and 
activities 
Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah 
(DPRK) 
Local people´s 
representative 
council 
Responsible to 
control and evaluate 
the performance of 
BPBD through the 
programs and budget 
allocation 
Political commitment 
to support the 
activities of BPBD  
Lack of the support 
and attention to 
prioritizes BPBD 
programs and 
activities 
National, provincial 
and local government 
agencies (Social 
Affair agency, health 
agency, education 
agency, SAR, 
BMKG etc) 
Responsible to 
support BPBD as the 
technical and 
implementing agency 
for BPBD programs 
and activities 
Coordinate and 
collaborate with 
BPBD to manage 
disaster resilience 
Lack of motivation 
and support to 
develop strong 
coordination and 
collaboration with 
BPBD 
Source: own based on stakeholder analysis from the informant semi-structured interview 
2014   
 
From the research findings, various local actors have been involved disaster resilience 
governance after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. The planning and development agency 
(Bappeda), social affairs agency, search and rescue (SAR), health agency, education agency, 
public works agency, transportation and tourism agency all contribute to disaster resilience in 
accordance with their roles and responsibility.  Most of the government technical agencies have 
roles as consultancy bodies, working partners, or coordinating partners for resilience building. 
Those agencies also play an important role as the institutional basis for the implementation of 
123 
 
programs and activities related to tsunami resilience. As summarized in table 8, these agencies 
play important roles in managing disaster resilience.  
The analysis indicates that BPBD has collaborated with various agencies from different levels 
of government as well as NGOs. The local government agencies are obliged to support the 
BPBD in disaster management. BPBD acknowledges their main partners and maintains the 
formal relationships with these agencies:  
Our main partners are the Bina Marga (infrastructure) division in the public 
works agency, the disaster management division in the health agency, the 
social assistance division (Tagana) in the social agency, TNI (the Indonesian 
Army), PMI (the Indonesian Red Cross) and SAR (search and rescue). We 
don’t have problems in coordinating with partners, we can work together. 
(56-GO-CLG) 
 
BPBD’s main partners are the local actors that are involved in emergency response. The 
partners are important in supporting BPBD with emergency response. Without the contribution 
of various partners, BPBD is unable to respond and manage catastrophes effectively. BPBD 
has formed the Tim Respon Cepat (TRC) or fast response team that aims to help local disaster 
management agencies in emergency response. The establishment of this team based on the 
regulation of the head of BNPB No.9/2008 about SOP for the Fast Response Team of 
Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management 
BPBD collaborates with TRC or fast response team for emergency response. 
The members of this team are TNI (the Indonesian Army), POLRI (the 
Indonesian Police), RAPI (Radio community), PU (Public work agency), 
Dinas Sosial (Social affair agency), and Tagana (volunteer). The members 
will receive rewards. We have established this team for one year. They 
always stand by in our office. They also have special meetings for emergency 
response and disaster logistics. (02-GO-BNA) 
The TRC members are from different organizations that have skills to help the disaster victims. 
The key tasks which these team members should perform in disaster response are to perform 
rapid assessment and identification of a disaster situation, the number of disaster victims, loss 
and damage to the critical infrastructure. Most of the members have certificates as disaster 
management volunteers who have competencies in emergency response: 
The members of TRC are competent in disaster management. They are the 
certified (emergency response) volunteer. (29-GO-BNA) 
Experiences show that BPBD lack the capacity to coordinate and organize emergency 
responses effectively. BPBD knows its weakness but does not learn from their mistakes to 
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improve their management skills. One interviewee thinks that the BPBD should reform the 
long disaster management bureaucracy in emergency response and build BPBD capacity to 
organize and coordinate the response team members: 
Why can’t we just help people in the emergency situation and then after that 
we can make the report. We always wait for the report before we can help 
people. BPBD cannot solve that problem. How can they manage the 
stakeholders? They even do not have skill to manage their own organization. 
They should know their weakness, I think they know, but they don’t want to 
improve their capacities. For example, when we went to Takengon for the 
emergency response, they did not provide the car for us because it was their 
task to provide the transportation for the emergency response team. The 
money that they spend on the emergency response is also from the society. I 
think, the BPBD capacity to take care of disaster management is low. We 
need more capacity building for the government authorities and 
communities. (20-NGO-BNA) 
BPBD is concerned about their capacity to coordinate the emergency response.  This 
fundamental concern arose because BPBD has received many open critiques from other 
stakeholders and communities: 
Actually, the government had installed the evacuation signs and conducted 
the tsunami drill once a while before. We also get evacuation sensitization 
from the government, but this was not detailed, such as where to gather and 
where to evacuate to. BPBD is in charge, but we are not sure if BPBD can 
handle such a huge tsunami like what happened in 2004 without the support 
of others (44-NGO-SBG) 
It is always a difficult task for BPBD to show their capabilities in coordinating and 
collaborating with the other partners in emergency response. From BPBD’s perspective, as a 
coordinating agency they have already made significant efforts to show their best performance:  
“When disasters happen, we should help the community, but when they are 
not satisfied with our service, they will get angry. It is okay for us; the most 
important thing is what more we can contribute to help the community.  When 
disasters happen, the communities should receive relief, but we don’t have 
enough logistics for disaster relief.  The head of BPBD has to come to the 
disaster location. If the head of BPBD isn’t present, the community will 
blame him because they think that the he did nothing and stayed at the office. 
The Seketaris Daerah will be angry too. On the other hand, I have to 
coordinate and communicate with the other organizations from our office. 
This means that BPBD is always in trouble.” (56-GO-CL)  
Disaster management, particularly at the local level, should do more than perform emergency 
responses during the disaster event. The before and after disaster situations call for programs 
that frequently involve many governmental agencies. Most of the governmental agencies have 
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one or two programs related to tsunami risk reduction as their programs in each development 
year. BPBD has principal responsibility for coordinating and collaborating with these agencies. 
The aims of coordination and collaboration are to maximize the contribution of their programs 
in managing disaster resilience. For example, social agency has the responsibility to help 
people with financial aid, distribute food and provide shelter for victims during an emergency 
until panic period over. The coordination between BPBD and social agency is important to 
increase the effectiveness of this post disaster assistance.  
The provincial government and central government are important disaster management 
stakeholders at local level. The central and provincial disaster management agencies provide 
support with the infrastructure and expertise that the local government cannot afford to provide 
themselves. For example, BMKG has a special mandate from the central government to 
monitor tsunami risk and BMKG is responsible for managing the Tsunami Early Warning 
System (TEWS) in Aceh Province: 
Before the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, we didn’t have the Tsunami Early 
Warning System. Since we established the TEWS, we always coordinate with 
the central, provincial and local government. We have a good coordination 
system, technical support, and clear bureaucratic systems that give the local 
government the authority for decision making in a disaster event. (75-GO-
BNA) 
The contribution of the governmental agency to disaster resilience governance is dependent 
upon their policies to integrate disaster risk reduction into their programs and activities. 
Although the general guidance to incorporate the disaster resilience concept as the main 
consideration stated in the mid-term development plan, but the agency needs more flexibility 
to contribute to managing disaster resilience. The problem is the synchronization of the 
development planning across sectors and levels of government to integrate disaster risk into 
the development plan: 
There is no synchronization between planning at the municipalities and 
provincial levels. And we didn’t have the planning for disaster risk reduction. 
(53-NGO-BNA)  
Bappeda’s contribution is to prepare the development plan that will accommodate resilience 
building as a comprehensive action. Bappeda is a supportive partner in disaster management 
and resilience because, as the development and planning agency, Bappeda has a good 
understanding of the resilience concept and a strong commitment to incorporating disaster 
resilience into the development plan:     
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For Bappeda, the tsunami (resilience) related issue is familiar, but for other 
government agencies, is it so difficult to establish the same perspective, (of 
preparation) because one day tsunami will have struck again. Are we well 
prepared? If at that time only an earthquake were to strike, would the 
community evacuate successfully? Do we have a proper (evacuation) 
infrastructure? Because during our last evacuation experience (April 12, 
2012 earthquake 8.6 SR in Banda Aceh), many people evacuated by cars and 
thus, at that time, there were many car accidents. (07-GO-BNA) 
The governance of disaster resilience at the local level invites the non-governmental sectors to 
engage and contribute in managing the resilience process. Although the non-governmental 
organizations have learned and gained a lot of experience during the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase, the connection with the governmental authorities are not properly 
developed. Following the establishment of BPBD, there has been more pressure to collaborate 
with non-governmental stakeholders.  The non-governmental organizations that are involved 
in the current collaboration include local, national, and international NGOs. The second group 
is civil society that participates with different types of organizations community members, such 
as an informal leader, the self-employee consultant, association, volunteer, independent forum, 
and community-based organizations. The last group comprises academic experts which are 
established under the local university in Aceh, Syiah Kuala University and Ar-Raniry Islamic 
University. Further description of these relevant organizations and their objectives will be 
presented in the stakeholder’s analysis. The summaries of the roles of the different groups of 
NGOs are shown in table 10. 
Before the tsunami, many local NGOs had been working on human rights and conflict 
resolution issues. Aceh has a long history of conflict and invited many organizations to be 
involved in building peace and mediating between the Aceh free movement (GAM) and 
government of Indonesia. The NGOs have strong ability to influence and maintain contact with 
vulnerable groups; promote volunteering and help communities to become organized. The 
following section will introduce different local actors from NGOs and individual community 
members that are involved in managing disaster resilience in Aceh Province.  
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
Table 10: contributions of non-governmental actors to maintain disaster resilience 
Stakeholders Main contribution to 
maintain disaster resilience 
10 years after the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami 2004  
Local, national, and 
International NGOs  
Experience, knowledge, 
human resources, funding  
Limited new projects and 
partnership related to disaster 
resilience 
Civil Society (local leaders, 
consultant, volunteer groups, 
professional groups, 
journalist groups, 
community-based 
organizations 
Self-organization and 
learning process at the 
community level to promote 
disaster resilience 
Lack of funding and 
coordination with the 
governmental authority to 
engage in various activities 
related to disaster resilience 
Academia (University, 
research institute) 
Research to support the 
stakeholders in managing 
disaster resilience 
Progressive movement to 
promote local student and 
researcher to actively engage 
in enhancing disaster 
resilience 
Source: own based on stakeholder analysis from the informant semi-structured interview 
2014   
 
The local, national and international NGOs have gained much experience when working in 
Aceh during the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. These organizations have a strong 
desire and motivation to collaborate with the local government. The NGOs try to find donors 
to fund various projects related to disaster risk reduction in Aceh Province. These programs 
and activities often target specific aspects related to DRR such as women needs, environmental 
protection or humanitarian aid. The connection with these long-standing issues helps to 
maintain DRR efforts in the long-term. For example, Women Solidarity for human rights 
(Solidaritas Perempuan) and The Indonesian Planned Parenthood (PKBI) are NGOs that still 
promote various activities on disaster risk reduction, particularly building women’s capacities 
for disaster prevention and mitigation. The Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) is one of the key 
organizations that has a very good reputation for work on humanitarian aid. PMI also has a 
neutral political position as their work is simply to rescue and help people with no hidden 
agenda. PMI has also worked during the local conflict to rescue victims from dangerous areas. 
Both GAM and the Indonesian Army has shown respect to the PMI for their mandate on 
humanitarian aid.  
The non-governmental sectors are heavily involved in managing disaster resilience at the local 
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level. This research reveals that after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, Aceh Province saw 
the establishment of various stakeholders as groups or individuals with learning and self-
organization experience stemming from the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. These 
local actors have a unique and tacit capacity to collaborate with the governmental authority. As 
such governance of the disaster resilience should maximize the involvement of the wide range 
of stakeholders in managing disaster resilience. 
This research has considered how the community evaluates the contribution of the 
governmental and non-governmental contributions to disaster resilience governance in Aceh 
Province. The performance of the government and NGOs during and after the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction were completed. This result shows a comparison between the roles of 
government and non-governmental organizations in managing disaster resilience. Most of 
respondents (64%) stated that NGOs are the most important institutions that have significant 
role in managing disaster resilience compare to the government (36%). This highlights the 
value of community level activity in contributing to disaster resilience. 
The result from the community evaluation towards two different groups of stakeholders that 
contribute various strategies, approaches, programs and activities. Although most of the NGOs 
had completed their mission in Aceh in 2009, most of the respondents (81%) agree that the 
NGOs performed well in their contribution. However only 19% of respondents stated the 
government has performed well in managing disaster resilience.   
The results underscore that the community has better impressions of the performance of the 
NGOs during the emergency response, rehabilitation and reconstruction than the government 
agencies. The current performance of the local government was evaluated as quite low 
compared to the past performance of the NGOs in Aceh. The capacity of local government to 
promote their achievements and intentions to sustain disaster resilience in Aceh is not well 
recognized at the community level.  
6.3 NGOs contribution  
Prior studies that have noted the importance of the participation of NGOs in governing disaster 
resilience to support the local government and to achieve effectiveness in disaster management 
(Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff 2002; Young 2010). NGOs not only support in term of completion 
of their project but also how NGOs shows different activities, standards and how they perform 
their roles. NGOs involve and serve their beneficiaries from the beginning of the projects and 
map their needs and aspirations. In general, NGOs approach their beneficiaries personally to 
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accelerate their project progress. These were new practice that never been done in Aceh in the 
last thirty years of conflict periods. The citizen participation considers in the government 
development process. It is somewhat surprising that the community perceived that the NGOs 
have better contributions in recovery, even after many years of NGOs operations. This good 
impression showed by the better evaluation of assistance and service provided by the NGOs 
compare to the government contribution. 
It is important to note that the number of NGOs were decreasing significantly in the last few 
years in Aceh. Therefore, the decreasing number such NGOs has affected the number of 
disaster resilience building projects and activities organized by those NGOs (e.g disaster 
preparedness and disaster education projects that involved the grass root community). The 
contributions of NGOs in resilience building in Aceh were significant. Although the duration 
of their mission was relatively short but in general many NGOs had clear ideas about what they 
wanted to achieve in this process. During emergency response and reconstruction (2005-2009) 
at least 300-500 agencies responded and concentrated in Aceh (Masyrafah, McKeon 2008; 
Canny 2005). At the beginning, the NGOs focused their primary mission on humanitarian relief 
as emergency response, technical and political supports during recovery process.  
However, the contribution of NGOs in resilience building decrease significantly after the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction periods ended in 2009. The number of international and 
national NGOs that provide resources and services decrease significantly ten years after the 
Indian Tsunami to be less than twenty local and international NGOs.  The main reason that 
NGOs leaved Aceh because they have completed their projects, but several did not have 
funding to continue their projects. Disaster management activities or in the bigger efforts to 
build disaster resilience gradually become unpopular topic for the donor. On the other hand, 
several International NGOs works for long term and expand their projects creatively, for 
example IOC committed to work fifteen years in Aceh. With the strict timeline, most of the 
NGOs completed their project on time and follow by various methods of project evaluation. In 
some case, NGOs backed to Aceh to conduct a long-term evaluation for their beneficiaries to 
replicate their project. 
The expert semi-structured interview reveals that many strategies that implement by the local 
NGOs to survive with limited funding to have small scale projects and activities. For example, 
the local NGOs must show their existence by promoting their own projects and activities. The 
active local NGOs need to prove that they have a small project, partner with national NGOs, 
and members of NGOs networks. By being active as a local NGOs, the local government will 
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invite these NGOs into various meetings, seminars, and discussion that related to their NGOs 
working areas.  These survival strategies were born through networking that initiated and 
manage during the rehabilitation and reconstruction periods, including barter resources and 
technical skills in implementing their projects.  
 The other strategies are to form a small coalition of several local NGOs with the same focus, 
for example, women NGOs (Solidaritas Perempuan) or environmental NGOs (Walhi), human 
right NGOs (Koalisi HAM Aceh) to apply for grants to sustain their activities. This coalition 
also has many benefits for their members in term of efficiency and effectiveness of programs 
and the mechanism to provide funding and human resources to survive. Therefore, many local 
NGOs that empowered by partnership and networking during recovery phases start to take the 
important roles as important local stakeholders that intent to continue NGOs contribution in 
resilience building process.   
6.4 The local multi-stakeholder approach  
According to Comfort (1994), the process of self-organization can be stimulate by providing 
space to exchange information, learning, and working together. Local actor’s collaboration 
involves learning, sharing information, and networking, in exchange to characterize the process 
of self-organization. In this forum, the local actor supposes to learn together and create 
networks as part of the self-organization process. In this section, the analysis base on the expert 
interviews and local newspaper articles to examine the current progress in the development of 
local multi-stakeholder forum. 
The governmental and non-governmental collaboration exists among local actors that are 
involved in disaster management governance in Aceh Province. The direct involvement of the 
local government authorities and NGOs can be traced through their contribution to the 
development agenda and collaboration with the local disaster management agency in managing 
disaster resilience. Local disaster risk reduction multi-stakeholder platform (DRR Forum) is 
one example of a formal collaborative initiatives between governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. This forum is a platform for stakeholders to collaborate and support disaster risk 
reduction programs and activities at a local level (province or municipality).  
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Picture 13 Banda Aceh multi-stakeholder forum meeting 
Source: own 
 
The Aceh multi-stakeholder collaboration initiatives began after the BRR completed their 
mission in Aceh in 2009. The Aceh government want to collaborate with the NGOs that 
continued their projects in Aceh. One of international NGOs revealed the history of the early 
process of NGOs and governmental agencies collaboration at that time: 
 At the provincial level, (our collaboration) with the government (governor), 
was facilitated by Biro Kesra (the division of welfare), now the department 
have changed their name to Biro Keistimewaan (Aceh special autonomy 
division) at the Aceh governor office. But we suggested building 
collaboration with Bappeda, because at that time, several NGOs that have 
worked in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase had established an 
NGO forum in collaboration with Bappeda. We often coordinated with 
Bappeda. Bappeda invited us to the meetings. (74-NGO-BNA) 
Bappeda as a development and planning agency was the authority responsible for facilitating 
this collaboration at the time. The NGO forum was established at the provincial levels to 
facilitate the informal collaboration between the governmental agencies and NGOs after the 
BRR finished.  The problem is that the governmental partners and the mechanism for 
collaboration was not clear. The NGOs have to choose their governmental partner based on a 
fit with their activities: 
“We coordinate with the social agency for the tsunami orphans project. We 
coordinate with the education agency, if we have issues with education. We 
coordinate with the public health agency if we want to consult on our health 
projects, and children protection agency. At the Kecamatan (sub-district), we 
have a strong collaboration with the head of the sub-districts because they 
always helped us with our program” (74-NGO-BNA) 
The need to establish the platform for multi-stakeholder collaboration came from the lack of 
132 
 
government transparency in the development process. For example, the government and the 
NGOs had no trust to each other to work together. One of the reasons for this was because 
information has not been shared properly and the public were excluded from of the 
development process: 
“The problem is that we did not communicate with the public, about what we 
are working on and what our problems are. The only mechanism was 
Musrenbang (The development communication forum), but Musrenbang is 
the forum to share our vision in the future, and not a forum where we can 
evaluate what we have done in the past. So, our evaluation and monitoring 
mechanism is very weak, we can even say we don’t have it at all. We don’t 
have good development. Our development is not good. We have a bad 
evaluation mechanism, so we don’t know what our needs are, and we develop 
what we actually don’t need. We don’t have a comprehensive planning 
mechanism, but fragmented planning.” (28-NGO-BNA) 
The platform for the public to discuss issues related to disaster risk reduction and their 
contribution to building resilience is needed. Disaster Risk Reduction multi-stakeholder forums 
are a platform for disaster management stakeholders to work together and discuss building 
resilience building at the local level. The establishment of this forum, facilitated by NGOs and 
invites government organizations, NGOs, research institute, and private sectors, is to share 
ideas and make joint activities to activate this new forum. The main NGOs supports in 
establishing this forum were lobbying and consolidating the local actors so they agree to be the 
members of this forum. However, the establishment of this forum is the main responsibility of 
the local disaster management agency (BPBA and BPBD).  
One of the reformation strategies to invite many stakeholders to be involved in the resilience 
building process is through the establishment of the Forum Pengurangan Risiko Bencana, 
(disaster risk reduction multi-stakeholder forum) at the province level through the Governor 
Decree No.360/6a/2011. With this special force, the government authority was able to begin 
their collaboration in the resilience building process. This forum should serve as platform for 
all stakeholders concerned with DRR in Aceh: 
“The public has joined the disaster risk reduction multi-stakeholder forum. 
This forum is a platform for collaboration with different stakeholders from 
the private and business sector, BUMN (state own enterprise), banking, and 
the university.” (02-GO-BNA)   
The establishment of the disaster risk reduction multi-stakeholder forum is a new appoach to 
promote collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organizations. The formal 
collaboration between government and NGOs is crucial to sustain the resilience building 
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process. It indicates that the government should support local NGOs and community 
organizations to fund their strategies. Without permission from the local government, the 
NGOs cannot work with the community. On the other hand, the contribution of NGOs with 
their projects and activities in disaster risk reduction will support government capacities to 
work at the grass roots level. 
“We always have problem with coordination in the field. We can see in the 
emergency response, groups or institutions egos are not controlled.  If we 
are on a field mission, we should know our positions and coordinate with the 
incident commander.” (73-GO-BNA)  
After the establishment of the multi-stakeholder forum at the provincial level, the government 
established a forum at the municipality levels. The establishment of the multi-stakeholder 
forum at the municipality level comprises a collaboration between BPBD and IOM. IOM is 
currently conducting a disaster risk reduction project in Aceh province. The aims of this project 
are to build local government and community capacity in disaster management and resilience 
building. IOM has identified the gap between the central government expectations and the local 
government capacity to build resilience: 
“We work to strengthen the local government capacity at the policy level. We 
have a capacity gap between the national and local government. We started 
to develop the disaster management system at the national level, while at the 
provincial and municipality level, the capacity remains weak. So, we need a 
good regulation that will help the government and community as a legal 
framework to build disaster management.” (27-NGO-BNA)   
It is clear that one of the goals of the establishment of the multi-stakeholder forum is to build 
the capacity of the local actors in maintaining long-term disaster resilience by learning together. 
In this regard, without a collaboration initiative, the local actor will miss the opportunity to 
reflect on past disaster experience and evaluate their contributions to the resilience building 
process. 
The story behind the establishment of the multi-stakeholder forum is different in every 
municipality. In general, the IOM and BPBD have a significant role to play in preparing the 
legal framework and organizational structure for the forum. The coordinator of the Banda Aceh 
multi-stakeholder forum illustrated the process of the establishment of the forum in October 
2013: 
“We established the multi-stakeholder forum in Banda Aceh. This is one 
mechanism of BPBD to encourage the community to become involved in 
building resilience. Before we established the forum, there was no 
collaboration platform for the government and NGOs. We started the process 
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on June 2013, facilitated by IOM, before the earthquake hit Central Aceh. 
We had ten meetings before we agreed to establish a multi-stakeholder forum 
in Banda Aceh. Then we formed the committee that prepared the legal 
framework for the forum and which included the BPBD, Hibeuna (the student 
association of magister of disaster management in Syiah Kuala University), 
IOM, RPUK (Disaster management NGO), and Walhi (Environmental 
NGO).  We had our first meeting in BPBD´s auditorium but the organizer 
was IOM. All of the preparation and the requirement to establish the forum 
were provided by IOM. We also had several informal meetings in the coffee 
shops and the head of BPBD’s office. We need a “motor” to initiate the 
establishment of this forum. We had a really simple process because this was 
our first step.” (15-NGO-BNA)       
The explanation about the establishment of the multi-stakeholder forum in Banda Aceh hints 
at how hard the process to initiate a collaboration, but they claimed it was a simple process. 
IOM organized many informal meetings to persuade the local actors to contribute in the process 
of the establishment. The IOM needed to lobby the BPBD to accelerate the paperwork process, 
particularly to prepare the decree that enactment by the Major. On the other hand, BPBD as the 
leading agency failed to be a main “motor” in this process that able to take their responsibility 
to invite the stakeholders. BPBD still need assistance from the NGOs, particularly to approach 
the stakeholders that never engage in this forum. These stakeholders are from the private 
sectors, such as banks, insurance companies, and other private sectors that have identified can 
have significant roles and contributes in this forum. 
The initiation of the establishment started in 2013, when Banda Aceh has established the forum. 
In 2014, Aceh Jaya launched the forum and invited the disaster management stakeholders to 
become a member of this forum. The vice Mayor of Aceh Jaya has inaugurated the multi-
stakeholder forum in Aceh Jaya on October 2014, in his speech he hoped that this forum would 
solve the collaboration problems between the government and the public: 
“The multi-stakeholder forum should develop a good collaboration mechanism in accordance 
with the government collaboration regulation. We hope the stakeholder’s involvement will be 
an effective strategy to enhance our disaster risk reduction effort in the future” (Serambi 
Indonesia 10/4/2014) 
 
On the other hand, the process to establish the disaster risk reduction multi-stakeholder forum 
was more challenging in Sabang.  It took two years to consolidate the local stakeholders that 
would work together in this forum. The head of Aceh disaster risk reduction multi-stakeholder 
forum (forum PRB), Cut Faisal said in the local newspaper:  
“The establishment of Forum PRB in Sabang had been initiated since 2013. But in this year 
(2015) we finally have established it.” (Serambi Indonesia 8/22/2015). 
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Sabang is a small municipality that has limited actors that worked or interested in disaster 
resilience activities. The consolidation process included the initiatives to ensure more 
stakeholders that not directly related to the disaster management will realize that they can 
contribute in disaster resilience building by participating in this forum. They decided to have 
more organizations engage in this local multi-stakeholder forum, so it takes two years to invite 
new members.  
The establishment of this forum is evidence of the collaboration between the local government 
and NGOs. In general, the stakeholder attitudes to participate in the resilience building process 
are very positive because of their experience of tsunami. The NGOs have supported the Aceh 
government to increase their capacity to build tsunami resilience after reconstruction. These 
NGOs were not only providing funding but also involved directly in designing project related 
to development capacity for local government agencies.  
However, the number of INGOs decreased significantly after the reconstruction phase. The 
remaining local NGOs try to survive with limited donor funding. This has a significant effect 
on the government and NGOs, helping them realize that they should work together. It makes 
senses to collaborate if it has direct benefits for most of the members of this forum (local 
NGOs), particularly when the new projects are difficult to have. In this case, to have a join 
program or activities that involve all of the stakeholders contributing as a group can cause the 
high-level interests in collaboration.   
Although the stakeholders understand that collaboration is important for building tsunami 
resilience, it is difficult to make the members contribute more to building strong relationships.  
This forum was expected to be able to solve the collaboration problems between the 
governmental agencies, NGOs, and the communities, particularly to have better 
communication, and have a joint programs and activities: 
We should solve our collaboration problems in the multi-stakeholder forum, 
but the forum is not active in Aceh. We tried to have a common program for 
the members of the forum after the 11th April 2012 earthquake. The 
earthquake at that time was a good moment for all stakeholders to reflect; 
have we done the right thing, and have we achieved good outcomes for the 
tsunami resilience? The big earthquake is an exact test of our current 
strategies. We really wanted to have a monthly meeting for discussion and 
reflection. But only a few members can be actively involved, and I see this 
forum becoming a place to achieve their personal interests. So, it is not 
working well, we don’t have good communication in this forum. (24-NGO-
BNA) 
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They have missed the opportunity to reflect on past disaster experience and evaluate their 
contributions to the resilience building process because they even do not meet regularly. They 
expect that they can bring some knowledge back for their professional capacities and for the 
organizations. Sharing, learning, and knowledge transfer appeared to be an efficient strategy to 
achieve the collaboration goals. These aspects also become a good incentive for members to 
contribute in this forum. The regular meeting for the face to face dialogues rarely happen. The 
members are busy with their own organizations and it is difficult to set a time for regular 
meetings: 
As a multi-stakeholder forum, our current problem is that many of the 
organizations members still difficult to collaborate, because they do not care 
about anything but their own interests. (15-NGO-BNA) 
The forum has become an arena to gain their own benefits and promote other agendas that are 
not related to the original aims of this forum.  
According to the member’s evaluation, the forum faced many challenges to effective 
collaboration. It appears that the establishment of the multi-stakeholder forum cannot solve the 
collaboration problems between the stakeholders. One of the challenges comes from the 
difficulty to have better relationships and trust. This forum has failed to improve the 
coordination between the stakeholders and provide information about the current projects or 
activities that it would be possible to collaborate in: 
Here, we have a Forum Pengurangan Risiko Bencana, we can find the 
governmental agencies and NGOs sitting together. But I don’t know the 
effectiveness of this forum. I mean, do they have frequent discussions? I 
suspect this forum is not performing as well as we expected. This forum 
should be a forum for coordination, for example, we should know what other 
organizations are working on (their project, program, or activity), so there 
is no overlap and it will promote effectiveness and efficiency (in the resilience 
building process). (10-NGO-BNA) 
On the other hand, the forum needs a facilitator who can organize the meetings or other 
activities for the members. It appears that the members would prefer to have a neutral 
facilitating body, free from political or organizational agendas: 
“I think our problems are time and who will facilitate the meeting. It is time 
consuming because all of stakeholders have their own work. So, if there is 
someone facilitating the meeting, the stakeholders will think that the 
facilitator is under qualified. But maybe if the stakeholders believe and have 
the qualifications to facilitate, they will come. Maybe the academics or 
researchers can facilitate this forum, because they are neutral. They prefer 
to come to the scientific discussion rather than a regular meeting.  The 
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members are eager to come because they want to learn something. For 
example, after earthquakes, floods or other disasters, it is better to organize 
a scientific meeting to focus on the study and academic discussion. (10-NGO-
BNA) 
This is a further example that collaboration should has better opportunity for individual and 
organizational learning, such as how to have effective regular meetings that benefits the 
members. The multi-stakeholder failed to provide space to exchange information and learning 
to the members, particularly to increase they scientific knowledge in disaster management. As 
the collaborative efforts get started, these problems are part of the collaboration journey. To 
maintain long-term disaster resilience, the local multi-stakeholder should have strong 
commitment to resolve these collaboration problems. 
In terms of the establishment of the local multi-stakeholder forums at the local level, the 
research found that almost 80% of household survey respondents are unaware of this platform. 
Respondent’s knowledge about this forum is significantly low. This lack of awareness may be 
due to the fact that, at the municipality level, the forum is not established yet, although the 
intention and initiation of this platform began during the establishment of local disaster 
management agency.  
The survey indicates that most respondents (97 %) perceive that the local multi- stakeholder 
forum is an important arrangement to manage disaster resilience. As the collaboration platform, 
the function of this forum to facilitate local actors to communicate, discuss, and learn together. 
Most respondents agree that this forum can enhance the collaborative process among the 
stakeholders. The most important thing is to increase the effectiveness of this forum to transfer 
past experiences and lessons learned from the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004.  
The establishment of this forum is one of the local actor’s achievements in managing disaster 
resilience. However, this research found that this forum struggles to perform its functions. After 
the establishment of the platform, local actors lacked motivation to be involved in this forum. 
In this instance, this forum becomes only a symbol of collaboration and the collaborative 
process does not take place. Over time, the efforts to maximize the functionality of this platform 
at the local level have been part of the self-organization and learning elements in managing 
disaster resilience.  
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter has explored different components of the governance structure of disaster 
management and disaster resilience, including local actor roles, budget allocation, and the 
collaboration process between the state and non-state actors to build disaster resilience in Aceh 
Province. The governance structure in managing disaster resilience is complicated and complex 
in terms of structure and interactions particularly between the various governmental 
institutions, but also in terms of the coordination and cooperation between governmental and 
non-governental organizations in Aceh Province. While the general attitude of many local 
agencies and actors to collaborate with each other is positive, the practical results show that 
various actors have not learned to collaborate and therefore also maintaining a long-term 
collaboration and a shared vision of tsunami resilience are still challenges.  
The respondents are aware of various preparation and mitigation strategies that have been 
promoted by the local government and NGOs following the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. In 
this regard, the contributions of NGOs are recognized as important activities in promoting 
disaster resilience. However, the integration and implementation of the strategies into formal 
tools and measures, such as the current development plan is insufficient. The interviews 
revealed that strategies were often a continuation of previous programs and there was limited 
space for new appraoches, also due to budget problem and the complicated procedures to 
establish new programs. On the other hand, positive changes were identified in relation to the 
establishment of various disaster preparedness and mitigation measures. The findings imply 
that evacuation infrastructure and local government performance in promoting disaster 
resilience has improved since the mega disaster signifcantly. 
The last section analyzed the establishment of multi stakeholder forums to promote 
collaborative governance at the local level. The expert interviews revealed that the members of 
this multi-stakeholder forum struggled to see the concrete benefits of this collaboration. This 
forum has not been able to connect the local actors to learn together and have a joint projects 
or programs as an important collaboration outcome that expected by most of the members of 
the forum. According to the key informants, this local forum does not function properly also 
due to limited trust between the different actors involved.  This multi-stakeholder forum needs 
better leadership and a collaboration framework that encourages wider participation of actors 
and fosters better and more intensive collaboration. 
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7 Tracing the collaboration: strategies and approaches  
After examining the concept of resilience and tracing the governance process of managing 
disaster resilience, this chapter provides an evaluation of various strategies and approaches 
base on the resilience focused collaboration framework that has been described in the theory 
chapter (see sub chapter 2.5). Based on the conceptual discussion of collaboration, the criteria 
about the importance of the local actor capacity to build and communication and collaboration 
will be used for the empirical analysis here. To establish an effective collaboration in 
maintaining long-term disaster resilience, it is critical to evaluate the existing informal and 
formal collaborative efforts to build disaster resilience. The previous chapter found that the 
current local collaboration efforts deal with the complex challenges. The central question in 
this chapter is what are factors that hamper the development and / or the sustainability of multi-
actor strategies to promote disaster resilience at the local and provincial level. To answer this 
question findings from a community-based household surveys and results of interviews with 
key actors were triangulated. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section begins by analysis of the household 
survey that provides insights from the local community perspective towards the perception of 
risk, uncertainty and disaster preparedness. These survey findings demonstrate that 
collaboration between the local actors has improved their preparation and knowledge following 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. It will then go on to the second section that describes the 
challenges of collaboration in managing disaster resilience and provides an overview of the 
challenges that the local actors face in their current collaborations. This research was also 
informed by the theoretical and conceptual chapter (chapter 2). Finally, the last section gives a 
brief summary of the findings. 
7.1 The evaluation of the governmental and non-governmental strategies  
Various strategies related to disaster resilience can be found at the community level. This 
research has examined the level of community knowledge and awareness of government 
actors/institutions and NGO’s to manage disaster resilience. The findings reveal that the 
majority of respondents are aware of different programs and activities that have been conducted 
during the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase as well as present day activities that continue 
to take place at the local and community levels.  
According to 89% of respondents, they are aware and have participated or been involved in 
different strategies, such as the development of evacuation roads, sensitizations, and trainings. 
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Most of the respondents that are aware of evacuation strategies have also visited the evacuation 
shelters, but only a few have evacuated to these shelters in the recent earthquake events, such 
as on April 2012. A relatively low percentage of respondents (11%) is not aware that the 
government and NGOs continue to develop and conduct various strategies related to disaster 
resilience – after the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. For example, although 
respondents were aware that the government has widened many roadways in Banda Aceh, they 
did not notice that these roadways widened projects are for the Tsunami evacuation purposes. 
This indicates that the strategies to manage resilience are not effectively packaged and 
promoted as special programs to manage and enhance resilience. As a result, the communities 
struggle to differentiate between disaster resilience strategies and other development 
programs/strategies.  
Figure 7 shows the levels of knowledge and expectations for sustaining current strategies 
developed by the government organizations and NGOs. The community level of knowledge is 
revealed by their awareness and knowledge about the existing programs and activities. The 
household members asked to evaluate the current preparedness strategy from “have heard about 
the strategy” or “want to sustain the strategy”. The response “have heard about the strategy” 
means that the community members know about the strategies, but they do not have more 
information about the strategies. The response “want to sustain the strategy” means that they 
know about the strategies and see the necessity that these activities are continued because they 
either have informed and consult about these activities or have engaged in these activities in 
their villages. 
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Figure 7 Community knowledge of the preparedness strategy 
 
Source: own analysis based on the household survey 2015 
The first level of community knowledge refers to the awareness regarding existing strategies 
and approaches from governmental and non-governmental agencies that conducted during and 
after the recovery stage. This knowledge or information about the strategies and approaches is 
essential to help raise awareness about the current activities because the community can access 
and benefit from these strategies.  The next level is moving beyond simply identifying the 
strategies and approaches, the respondents understands the importance to sustain these 
strategies in the future. The knowledge and information about the importance and need to 
sustain specific strategies can help respondents to decide to continue or support or even 
terminate own activities to support these strategies. 
Interestingly, the household survey shows that in terms of tsunami preparedness strategies, 
local hazard mitigation planning (39%) and scientific research related to tsunamis (45%) are 
less recognized than the early warning system (89%), evacuation routes and signs (82%), and 
evacuation shelters (73%) at the community level. This is likely to be due to the fact that 
disaster management planning and hazard and risk mapping are prepared by the disaster 
management agency at the municipality level and in constrast evacuation routes and signs are 
visible for the public. On the other hand, it reveals that the awareness of the plans and maps 
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are deficient. Most of the household survey participants were not aware of local hazard 
mitigation planning and mapping for their communities, hence they might miss specific 
knowledge that could help them to improve their own household preparedness. The planning 
and mapping are sometimes carried out by the local government sometimes but there is a lack 
of awareness of these activities at the community level. 
 
 
Picture 14 Information board on Tsunami evacuation procedure in Aceh Jaya 
Source: own 
 
The information related to early warning systems and evacuation are important for safe 
evacuation and individual preparedness. Most of the community members experienced the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and the subsequent earthquake event. Through those 
experiences they have learned how to evacuate and have established their own evacuation 
behaviour. The learning system and evacuation strategies are part of the individual learning 
and self-organizing that require them to seek further information related to those strategies. 
Moreover, recent earthquake events that also triggered a tsunami warning have most likely 
been experienced by all households, while the risk maps are still mainly used by governmental 
agencies. 
In addition, the household survey found that a high percentage of respondents have participated 
in the public awareness programs such as awareness raising and training (68%) and their 
children or family members have also participated in tsunami educational programs (49%). The 
respondents were generally aware of the tsunami safety drill (69%), although the majority of 
the respondents had not actually participated in drill. Similarly, 53% of the respondents were 
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aware of volunteer-led disaster resilience programs, which have been established at the village 
level (Tagana and Sibat). More than 80% of the respondents wanted all of the programs and 
activities to be sustained. The respondents felt that the strategies needed to be sustained to 
manage disaster resilience in the future. Most of the respondents realized that the number of 
programs and activities decreased significantly after the rehabilitation and reconstruction in 
2009. Early warning system and evacuation are important strategies that the local government 
should sustain at the community level.  
 
 
Picture 15 Access to the evacuation hill in Aceh Jaya 
Source: own 
 
Figure 8 shows the evaluation of various programs and activities related to the strategies to 
manage disaster resilience. This survey compared the quality of individual programs with the 
quality of implementation at the community level. The evaluation from the respondents was 
based on their experience of participating in those programs, their knowledge of the programs 
from various sources of information such as newspapers, television, or coffee shops. In general, 
more than 69% of respondents had a positive perception of the programs. However, most 
respondents evaluated the implementation process and outcome of the programs as less 
effective compared to the original goals, strategies and concepts defined in the programs.  
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Figure 8 Evaluation of strategies and approaches to build disaster resilience  
Source: own analysis based on the household survey 2015 
According to the survey, warning and communication systems have the lowest implementation 
rate compared to other strategies. The concept of an early warning system was seen as a good 
strategy by more than 60% of the respondents, while its implementation is seen as less 
advanced and effective. Only 21% of the respondents evaluated the implementation as “good”. 
The community highlights false alarms and delay in warning dissemination as affecting their 
perception of the TEWS.  However, the respondents were aware of the importance of a good 
TEWS, finding the management of the current tsunami warning system in Aceh Province to be 
deficient. That also means that the trust in the current warning system is limited. However, the 
survey revealed the community knowledge of local hazard mitigation and planning is 50%. 
This indicates that the respondents who aware of these strategies know that the Aceh 
government has enacted various local regulations in relation to hazard planning and mapping.    
Although respondents were not aware of the strategies but the evaluation about the 
implementation scientific research related tsunami (63%) is relatively high. The research 
institute, for example, TDMRC and ICAIOS conducted scientific research on Aceh’s 
experience during the emergency response, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. This 
research has been part on a joint international research initiative, including conferences on 
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disaster risks reduction and other related topics on Indian Ocean Tsunami. 
The survey results reveal that there is a significant gap between the concept and the formulation 
of strategies and its implementation in disaster management programs and concrete activities. 
The challenge remains to increase the quality of the implementation process and to design and 
develop programs in line with community needs. It is likely that feedback from the community 
would improve stakeholder capacity to manage disaster resilience. However, the community 
did not receive feedbacks on their comments regarding governmental strategies. Furthermore, 
the findings show that the perceived low performance in implementing for example the tsunami 
warning system might also result in a significant lack of trust in the entire system. The analysis 
and evaluation of changes after the disaster is discussed more in-depth in the following section. 
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Figure 9 Evaluation of the current disaster preparedness and mitigation measures 
 
Source: own analysis based on the household survey 2015 
To better understand how respondents frame the post disaster context, nine years after the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami, respondents were asked to evaluate various changes that they perceive 
in disaster preparedness, mitigation measures and strategies and the disaster resilience 
management governance (Figure 9). The findings reveal that, most of the respondents evaluate 
infrastructure development such as the building code for public buildings, tsunami shelters and 
land use and spatial planning as having improved since the tsunami. These positive results stem 
from preparedness and mitigation measures that were established as a result of the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami, as part of post disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction process. The respondents 
emphasized this as a key difference between Aceh which was severely affected by the tsunami 
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and other Indonesian provinces.  
More than half of the respondents (58 %) think that the evacuation roads in Aceh are in good 
condition and 29% give higher evaluation for this important infrastructure for evacuation. This 
result reflects joint efforts by the local government and NGOs during the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase to open new roads and improve the road conditions for evacuation routes. 
On the other hand, the respondents have provided different impressions of the early warning 
system in Aceh. Although this early warning was not established prior to the Tsunami the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of this system is low. 15 % respondents evaluate the tsunami 
warning system as very poor and 32 % said that the system is in poor condition. This impression 
is due to their experiences during several big earthquakes where the warning system did not 
work properly and produced false alarm.  
At the community and family levels, an important knowledge of how to evacuate and 
communicate during disaster events have learned by most of the interviewee from many 
sources. Many activities for examples, open new evacuation routes in the villages, meetings to 
share new knowledge, and organize activities at the community level. The access to new 
information related to disaster was provided directly by the government and by social media. 
The voluntary groups who provide emergency response have also established and trained. All 
these achievements and progresses showed that the resilience pattern can be traced at the 
community levels. These kind of findings were also found by (Mardhiah 2013) who conducted 
her research on the same case study area in Krueng Sabee district, Aceh Jaya regency and 
(Febriana 2015) in Meuraxa district of Banda Aceh. They indicated the community had 
sufficient knowledge of tsunami preparedness especially how to evacuate and choose the 
evacuation shelters. The similar research also found that knowledge is  related to awareness 
and preparedness for future disaster risk (Sari 2016).  
On the other hand, the evaluation on the Earthquake and Tsunami April 12th, 2012 concluded 
that people in Aceh had problems with evacuation strategies as has been reported that the traffic 
jams were everywhere, and people flocked on the roads. These happened because people did 
not want to evacuate to the vertical evacuation shelters since they could still see the sea from 
these buildings. They did not even believe that these buildings were safe from Tsunami. They 
saw that these building s had not tested yet. Therefore, the community had a negative 
perception and lack of faith of the government policies to evacuate people to these buildings. 
As a results, only a small number of people who run to the escape buildings (Tim Kaji Cepat 
148 
 
2012).  Some people decided not to evacuate because of many reasons, for example, difficulties 
to reach the evacuation shelters and could not confirm that Tsunami will come again  (Goto et 
al. 2012; Seni 2013). It was commonly  assumed from this event that the community 
preparedness and evacuation infrastructure needs regular improvement and evaluation (Abidin 
2013; Fauziah 2014). On the other hand, this research found that the community were less 
motivated to participate these preparedness programs, as, the sensitization or drills were seen 
as repetition, so they did not think these skills were necessary anymore since they already did 
it several times.  
These inconsistencies may be due to many factors such as traumatic experiences in past 
Tsunami events. One possible implication of this is that people choose the spontaneous 
evacuation without any consideration to apply effective evacuation strategies. They choose 
their evacuation route based on their own choice. There are no evacuation maps that introduced 
and promoted by the local government (Arfiya 2015). Another possible implication of this is 
that people experienced difficulties to use alternative evacuation strategies. The evidence from 
this study suggest that people know where to flee but they did not know how to get there safely 
and shortly. In general, the community has lack of confidence of the reliability of the tsunami 
evacuation infrastructures and in maintenances. It is almost certain that these situations could 
be attributed to the fact that most of the evacuation buildings were lack of maintenance and 
damages (Ofiani 2015).   
 It is interesting to note that the respondent’s evaluation of many local government services is 
fair, except the low implementation of the early warning system. For example, participation in 
the development plan (33 %), strategies to manage disaster resilience (39%), public service 
(41%), access to information (35%), and land use and spatial planning (53%). It means that the 
local government has worked to increase the quality of public services slightly.   These results 
show a strong connection between local government and society which has been a result of 
bureaucratic reformation since the Indian Ocean Tsunami. The amandement of the public 
service delivery system was part of the rehabilitation and reconstruction projects (see also 
Australian National University 2012). 
As shown by this figure, various positive changes have arisen following the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami, especially in terms of disaster preparedness and mitigation strategies. Nevertheless, 
the local government and local actors should increase their performance and capacity to sustain 
the current strategies that have been positively evaluated by the respondents. However, this 
would require ongoing learning and collaboration with various stakeholders, the maintenance 
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of good communication with communities and the continuing promotion of good governance 
in managing disaster resilience. 
7.2 Resilience focused collaboration approach 
In this section, the factors that hamper the development and / or the sustainability of multi-
actor strategies to promote disaster resilience are presented base on the resilience focused 
collaboration framework. In this conceptual framework, the barriers of collaborative resilience 
includes (1) increasing the capacity and access of evacuation strategies for the vulnerable, (2) 
perceptions of risk and uncertainty, (3) scales of collaboration, (4) diverging interests, (5) trust 
between collaborators, (6) information sharing, (7) spanning boundaries, (8) Fragmentation, 
inconsistencies, and lack of coordination.The key actors semi-structured interviews revealed 
that the current collaboration in managing disaster resilience in Aceh would face the same 
problems. This section aims to respond to the research questions by detailing the range of 
challenges noted by the informants in the collaborative process between with local actors.  
7.2.1 Capacity and access of the vulnerable groups 
The results from the semi-structured interview suggested that the resilience building process 
should encompass a higher or better gender sensitivity that can increase the capacity and 
participation of women. The research found that various vulnerable groups were invited to 
engage and collaborate in managing disaster resilience. Many NGOs focused on promoting the 
rights of vulnerable groups after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 in Aceh Province. The legal 
protections in disaster management have been initiated by the NGOs concerned with the 
vulnerable groups which had been established through local regulations, but the local 
government had not followed up on the recommendations and requirements: 
 
We should include disabled and the marginalized groups in disaster 
management. We must promote their participation in disaster preparedness 
activities. We must place special attention on these vulnerable groups, such 
as elderly people, pregnant women, women and children. (26-NGO-BNA) 
 
In fact, we never acknowledged the (existence) of vulnerable groups, there 
was no attention on them. They special needs but the government never made 
a policy to fulfill their special needs. (10-NGO-BNA) 
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During the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, many vulnerable groups were involved with 
various organizations related to disaster risk reduction, including disabilities groups, pregnant 
women, children, elderly people, and members of ethnic minorities in Aceh Province. The 
inclusion of these vulnerable groups in collaboration activities depend on the efforts of the 
governmental authorities, NGOs and the communities to acknowledge and specifically include 
these groups as part of the community to be included in a collaboration effort. However, at that 
time, basic data on vulnerable groups did not exist at the community level. This lack of basic 
data contributed to the invisibility of these groups and a subsequent lack of support to fulfill 
their specific needs in disaster management. The findings of the interviews highlighted that 
NGOs have started to collect the data on these vulnerable groups in order to prepare 
recommendations for the local government:    
We focus on and research marginalized communities, such as disabled 
groups, as part of the disaster risk reduction framework. We suggest (the 
stakeholders) involve these vulnerable groups in their programs. (26-NGO-
BNA) 
However, the intention to protect vulnerable groups in disaster events is not implemented 
appropriately. The emergency preparedness and local regulations to protect vulnerable groups 
are not prioritized by the government. The strategies and approaches applied by the vulnerable 
groups to promote their special needs and attention in disaster management differs considerably 
and it depends on the NGOs and community to promote better protection of these groups.  
The women’s NGOs demonstrate progressive efforts to promote female participation in 
managing disaster resilience. Most of the women NGOs were established in Aceh Province 
before Tsunami in 2004. As such, they already had experience in supporting women who were 
affected by the political conflict between the Free Aceh Movement and Indonesian 
government. After the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, women suffered different disaster impacts 
to men. For example, the problems related finding new jobs and change of marital status that 
increase women vulnerability after disaster (Daly et al. 2013; Deviani 2013). 
At the same time, the local government was ineffective at responding to the specific needs of 
women during the disaster. Moreover, the women NGOs are eager and open to collaborate with 
other stakeholders and support women contributions at the grass root level.  
One of the woman’s NGOs revealed that most of the Indian Ocean Tsunami victims were 
women because women did not have the capacity and knowledge to safeguard their lives. The 
direct impacts of earthquakes and the tsunami in 2004, showed that more women than men 
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died in Aceh Province:  
Most of the Tsunami (26 December 2004) victims were women because 
women didn’t know what they should do in the event of a tsunami. They were 
panicking. They also cannot read the natural warning signs of tsunami, so 
they fled in to the coastal areas after the huge earthquakes. (04-NGO-BNA) 
The experience and lessons from the 2004 Tsunami encouraged many local and international 
women NGOs to improve woman’s access and responses to early warning systems. However, 
in the traditional societies, this is less effective because there are so many barries for women 
in the villages to participate in various sensitizations and training, for example, husband permitt 
and household chores (Deviani 2013).  This adds to the vulnerabilities of women for future 
disaster event. It is interesting that after the lessons were learned and interventions put into 
place by the various women’s NGOs, women have still been excluded from various 
preparedness activities at the village and community levels:  
“In the community, there is no attention to fulfill particular needs of women. 
The evacuation routes not introduced to women. Village hazard mapping 
does not involve women. Sensitization is conducted in a general way and 
specific information for women is very limited.” (04-NGO-BNA)    
The central issue is the role of women in society. The simple technical problems such as 
invitations to participate, information, and timing of the meetings make it difficult for women 
to contribute to the development of policies and programs at the community level. This 
hampers their participation and representation in the village meetings:    
There is patriarchal culture, a woman is seen as less important in a village 
meeting and often only men can attend the meetings. This causes the needs 
of women to go unfulfilled. Usually, announcements are placed on the board 
in the Musala (small praying room), but often it is also difficult for women to 
go to the Musala because they have no time; they must take care of their 
children instead. (04-NGO-BNA) 
The inclusion of women in managing disaster resilience often requires specific consideration 
because they have to take care of children and sometimes have to work to support their family. 
One of the women’s NGOs suggested that men should change their mindset toward the role of 
women in society. The religious leader and village leader can support women’s contributions 
through religious teaching that’s which acknowledge the important role of women in society:    
To make changes, women must be involved in disaster management meetings 
where men are also invited, so women and men can communicate directly. 
The community leader must also be present at the meeting. This hopefully 
can change the patriarchal culture. (04-NGO-BNA) 
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Women remain marginalized in the development process because of the dominance of men and 
it is difficult for women to participate in decision making especially at the village level. This 
research found that mainstreaming gender inclusion in managing disaster resilience has been 
introduced by NGOs that work at the village level. They support women’s participation in 
planning and preparedness programs that fit with women’s needs. It started with women efforts 
to voice their needs and develop planning, mapping, and warning systems that women can 
manage and organize themselves based on their own experience and environment:  
We have to increase women’s knowledge about disaster preparedness. They 
can discuss their needs. They can make their own decisions regarding how 
to deal with disaster management in their village. They have mapped hazards 
and risk in their areas and chosen a woman to organize the activities related 
to disaster risk reduction. (04-NGO-BNA) 
It could be expected that after the NGOs leave; the local women leader can continue the process 
to promote female participation at the village level. The contribution of the women’s NGOs 
has integrated gender perspectives in managing disaster resilience. On the other hand, the 
learning and self-organization process of the women’s groups at the community level is 
important for engaging in current development programs and promoting the roles of women in 
managing disaster resilience.  
The other vulnerable groups that started to address the need for critical support and assistance 
programs for the disaster emergency are the disability groups. During the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase, several NGOs focused on disability issues and worked with these groups 
through various projects and activities. They tried to increase public awareness to include the 
persons with disabilities in managing disaster resilience: 
There are some marginalized groups that have become well. They have 
established a formal institution, so they can access the government and to 
other related institutions to petition for assistance. Recently, they conducted 
an activity facilitated by disaster management agency, I can say that these 
groups are quite good, maybe because they were initiated and empowered by 
the NGOs. But it still depends on government willingness to support and help 
these organizations to sustain. (26-NGO-BNA) 
Being well organized organizations is important for promoting their special needs and 
assistance required during a disaster or emergency. Many disabled people’s organizations have 
been established to facilitate their representation and inclusion in development programs and 
plans. However, after the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase, people with disabilities still 
lack awareness and are often excluded from various preparedness programs, such as training 
and tsunami drills run by the local government. Although they are sometimes reluctant to be 
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involved in these activities because they lack confidence due to their conditions:  
Yes, I asked them (the NGOs and government) to invite us (persons with 
disabilities), particularly for my friends who have severe disabilities, so they 
know what they must do if a disaster happens. There is a possibility that they 
are not getting involved because the awareness raising programs for 
disabled people may make them feel offended. (05-NGO-BNA)    
From the perspective of the persons with disabilities, they often experienced a lack of assistance 
during the disaster events. This is partly because community members lack awareness and fail 
to take responsibility to assist people with disabilities. They suggest increasing public 
awareness and sensitization for community members on the need and information on how to 
provide assistance to people with disabilities in a disaster or emergency situation:    
Disabled groups should be the main priority in an (tsunami) evacuation, but 
in a tsunami event, they have to flee and evacuate themselves without 
assistance. We have discussed these problems, but the community tends to 
evacuate their own family members, and disabled people have to rely on their 
own family members to help them to evacuate. 05-NGO-BNA 
The inclusion of disabled groups in managing disaster resilience is needed to overcome the 
increased risks these groups face and to promote broader community resilience.  
To conclude, in this research women and persons with disabilities are recognized as vulnerable 
groups and have been facilitated by NGOs to participate in managing disaster resilience. 
However, the engagement with other types of vulnerable groups is needed to facilitate greater 
community resilience.  
7.2.2 Perceptions of tsunami risk and uncertainty 
This research has found that religions and culture affect perceptions of tsunami risk and 
uncertainty. Community knowledge about Tsunamis as a hazard largely began after the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami in 2004: 
People in Aceh never knew what a tsunami was, and then after we 
experienced it, we started to understand what a tsunami really means. (09-
GO-BNA) 
Most people are more familiar with other hazards such as floods and landslides that strike more 
frequently. In addition, before the 2004 tsunami, disaster mitigation was integrated with the 
spatial planning, but the Tsunami risk was not included in the spatial plan:  
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“Before the tsunami, we had city planning based on disaster risk reduction, 
but it was not an obligation and there was no detailed plan for including 
tsunamis. At that time, we only thought about landslides and storms. Tsunami 
is a new thing in Aceh and people were really shocked when they experienced 
it. If we thought about coastal disasters, we only thought about abrasion.” 
(39-GO-SBG) 
The perceptions of earthquakes and tsunamis are significantly different between the tsunami 
survivors and people who did not directly experience the 2004 disaster. Past disaster experience 
has influenced how they perceive and respond to future tsunami risk: 
“We never experienced tsunamis here. If an earthquake occurs, people will 
not panic, and they will evacuate. It is not like in Banda Aceh when people 
flee desperately. Here in Sabang, we stay calm and confident when an 
earthquake strike.” (43-NGO-SBG) 
The results from the household interviews showed that almost all of the respondents (99 %) 
had heard about “Tsunami” and more surprisingly a small group of the respondents even knew 
about the indication that the earthquake in 2004 could generate a tsunami (12%). 
The knowledge about earthquake as an indicator of a tsunami was from the indigenous 
knowledge that is passed across generations. For example, one of the respondents explained 
that her grandmother has told her to flee into the hill after the big earthquake. But her 
grandmother did not explain why. Another story told by one of the respondents that was aware 
that a big wave could follow a big earthquake knew this from a song that she remembered from 
her childhood. She used to sing that simple song whilst playing with her friends.   
As for the knowledge of tsunami as a natural hazard, most of the respondents (84 %) understand 
what a tsunami is (Figure 10). These results may be also influenced by various public awareness 
and sensitization campaigns about tsunami preparedness during the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase through efforts by NGOs and local government. 
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Figure 10 The perceptions of tsunami risk and uncertainty 
 
Source: own analysis based on the household survey 2015 
Disaster experience affects personal beliefs and interpretations of the causes of a disaster. This 
research found that tsunami risk is often perceived as God´s will in the context of Islamic 
teaching. The analyses of the respondents beliefs in the causes of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 
2004 provides the same insights. Just over one third (39%) of the respondents perceived the 
Tsunami as a natural event (39%) (Figure 10). However, almost the same proportion (38%) 
perceived the tsunami as a warning from God, 11% as God’s wrath and 6% as a punishment 
from God. 
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Figure 11 The major factors that trigger a tsunami or the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004 
 
Source: own analysis based on the household survey 2015 
 
Most of the respondents told a different story of their interpretations of the cause of Tsunami 
and why the disaster impacts were so high. The stories were related to the social and political 
conditions that did not follow the Islamic teaching at that time. 
These findings indicated that interpretation of the cause of disaster challenges the prevention, 
preparedness, and mitigation programs that call for community participation:  
“In Aceh, we face a difficult situation because people think that disasters 
come from God and we cannot against fate.” (11-NGO-BNA) 
This creates considerable challenges for the organizations that aim to increase public awareness 
and sensitization to promote disaster preparedness. The organizations have had to use many 
approaches to explain the relationship between natural disasters and religious teachings: 
“The challenge is the community mindset that considers disasters as 
something that they cannot prevent. This mindset is the main challenge 
because people have a lack of disaster awareness and aren’t prepared.” (48-
GO-SBG) 
They tried to change people’s perceptions that preparedness is important to reduce future 
disaster risk: 
“The challenge is related to what the community believes, sometimes the 
community members consider that they cannot prevent disasters. Disasters 
come from God ... We must realize that we are also involved in taking action 
to make disasters happen, we also have to accept the risks. Thus, the main 
problem in dealing with disaster mitigation is the people’s mindset.” (45-
NGO-SBG) 
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Community rejection in participating in disaster preparedness programs or activities is also 
related to various interpretations of tsunami risk. For example, the discussions during a 
sensitization campaign or training about past tsunami events can increase the risk of tsunamis 
in the future: 
“Few people still think that when we remember about tsunamis, it means, we 
ask God to give us tsunamis again in the future.” (05-GO-BNA) 
On the other hand, the religious leaders can help to awareness and in some cases also change 
community perceptions towards tsunami risk and tsunami preparedness options. One of the 
Islamic leaders explained that there are also options to refer to Islam when promoting risk 
awareness: 
“We should learn how to prepare for disaster. If we do nothing resignedly 
and despair when disasters happen, we are totally wrong. We should save 
ourselves; it is what God has told us to do.” (05-NGO-BNA) 
After the tsunami in 2004, the authorities from this agency visited villages that were affected 
by the tsunami and met community members to give counselling for trauma. At that time, the 
campaign for increasing preparedness had also begun and it asked the community not to mourn 
for too long and to start their new lives because God has given them the opportunity to live: 
“The community has started to have an awareness about the importance of 
evacuation in the case of a disaster, even though, many people still think that 
disasters are the will of Allah and thus unavoidable.” (69-NGO-CLG) 
The roles of the religious leaders to motivate the community to be involved in the preparedness 
programs are very important. The community motivation and interest in participating in public 
awareness programs and activities decreased after the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. 
One of the reasons for this is because people perceive that they now have sufficient knowledge 
to respond to tsunamis in the future: 
“Our challenges and obstacles are that when we visited the community, most 
of the community members have not responded well when we sensitized them 
about disaster preparedness. This is because they felt that they already 
understood and know what to do to respond to a disaster.” (59-NGO-CLG) 
However, according to the household survey, a majority of respondents (67%) are still 
interested in to participating in disaster risk reduction activities in their village (figure). Those 
respondents who are reluctant to participate in disaster risk reduction (33%) are so because 
they have no time to participate, not because they feel they already have sufficient disaster 
preparedness knowledge.  
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In contrast, most people still panic during a large earthquake event. This indicates that they 
perceive that they know what to do in the case of a disaster, but the tsunami risk and 
uncertainties are difficult to imagine. In this situation, the tsunami preparedness programs and 
activities are still needed. One of the NGOs distinguished challenges to continue work with the 
community that are bored and fed up with scientific and formal forms of awareness programs:    
“Even though the tsunami happened over nine years ago, people still panic, 
they evacuate by motorcycle to somewhere else besides the escape building, 
as the door of the escape building is locked, and they cannot access the 
second floor, so there are still a lot of problems. People are having too many 
lectures, and this is also the case for children. So, our organizations try 
different methods to build public awareness, using local culture approaches 
(e.g. through additional theater performances) so it is interesting but also 
easy for them to understand. This is the easiest way to “approach” the 
people” (52-NGO-BNA) 
The variation of targeted groups for disaster preparedness programs such as working with 
children to enhance their risk awareness is important. Approaches for increasing risk awareness 
that refer to and use cultural approaches and religious symbols are needed to reach people 
effectively. 
The respondent’s perceptions about various tsunami strategies, such as capacity to evacuate 
and prepare for tsunamis has changed following their experiences of disasters and participation 
in many preparedness programs and activities.  The majority of respondents (87%) are 
confident that they have the capacity and knowledge to responds to tsunami warnings and 
evacuate (Figure 12).  Moreover, they are also confident because they feel better prepared 
compared to the situation before 2004 (83%).  
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Figure 12 Perception of tsunami preparedness strategies 
 
Source: own analysis based on the household survey 2015 
 
The respondents believed that their family members (80%) and neighbors (67%) have 
sufficient knowledge and capacities to respond to a future tsunami. Regarding these perceptions 
about the family members and neighbor preparedness levels, most of the respondents have also 
discussed preparedness strategies with their fellow household members and people in their 
villages. 
However, the perception of their own capacity to prevent tsunami losses is low (14%). The 
respondents believe that there will be difficulties in preventing losses because of the high 
uncertainty of tsunami consequences. Mitigation and preparedness measures may prevent the 
losses but the respondent’s lack of capacity to predict the tsunami impacts. However, due to 
their past experiences, the most important thing is to save their lives and the lives of their family 
members.  
It can be argued that the levels of knowledge and preparedness of the respondents are 
influenced by various preparedness programs and activities at the community level. Most 
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respondents are aware and have participated in various preparedness activities during and after 
the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. The community has organized several tsunami 
drills (45%), sensitization about the tsunami evacuation plan (42%), volunteer groups such as 
Tagana and Sibat (32%) and evacuation maps (25%).  
Figure 13 Knowledge about the community preparedness strategies at village level 
where the household members live 
 
Source: own analysis based on the household survey 2015 
The interview results show that these strategies at the community level are not well managed 
or need to be improved. Some households were not sure where the evacuation map is located, 
although they are sure that their village has prepared this map. Others did not know how to 
become involved in the various activities and programs. Moreover, after the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction had finished, preparedness activities were rarely organized at the community 
level. 
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Picture 16 Tsunami evacuation sign in Bahasa Indonesia and Acehnese language 
Source: own 
 
Stakeholder collaboration is important to address community perceptions of tsunami risk and 
uncertainty. This has implications for designing suitable approaches and strategies for 
community disaster preparedness in the future. The effective collaboration can promote a better 
understanding of tsunami risk in the future, particularly where stakeholders can contribute to 
risk appraisal and try different methods to mitigate the risk. 
7.2.3 Scales of the current collaboration 
This research highlights that collaboration to manage disaster resilience exists at the local level 
and involves various stakeholders, predominantly representative’s local government agencies, 
NGOs and community-based organizations that focus on disaster management. BPBD as the 
main disaster management agency have collaborated with stakeholders from different level of 
governments and different levels of organizations.  
Although the current collaborations do involve several stakeholders, the involvement of key 
actors from the community level, such as individual and household members is still particularly 
necessary. Inclusion of individual and household members would increase the capacity of the 
local government to manage disaster resilience:  
“Community disaster preparedness is important as well as family 
preparedness for disaster. In the past we have seen it as a separate issue, but 
now we should acknowledge that household members are part of the 
resilience community. Because when disasters strike, the external emergency 
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response is no longer effective after 6 hours but usually reaches communities 
24 hours late. As such, the community must be built to deal with a disaster 
more rapidly.” 24-NGO-BNA 
 
One mechanism to increase the effectiveness of collaboration with community members is by 
establishing disaster risk reduction forums at the village level. Community forums can enable 
community members to organize disaster management programs and activities in their villages. 
Consequently, this forum can enhance collaboration at the municipality levels because the 
members of the village forum can be part of the local multi-stakeholder forums:   
“We need to establish disaster risk reduction forums in every village for 
disaster preparedness. The members of this forum will determine the roles of 
the community members in disaster management. This is one approach to 
organize the community. The community needs communication and 
collaboration because most of them are still traumatized from the tsunami in 
2004. We should update the disaster risk data every six months in every 
village. We should update the data on the number of pregnant women and 
women with babies below one year old every year.” (04-NGO-BNA) 
This forum may aim empower community members to participate in disaster preparedness 
programs and activities, hazard mapping, and data collection that is needed to establish and 
maintain the community preparedness plan. The intervention of local government to facilitate 
these processes is needed to sustain community knowledge. During rehabilitation and 
reconstruction many villages were facilitated by NGOs with many community or village-based 
disaster management projects and activities. This indicates that the community has collaborated 
with various organizations from different levels in the past. Most of the projects and activities 
finished and were handed to the community to continue the programs. The problem with this 
was that the local government was not aware of most of the NGO projects that were 
accomplished during the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase:    
“So, it is now a question of how to ask the government to continue to 
empower the community. Otherwise, all that we have done will be wasted. 
That’s the reason why the capacity building must reach all of the community 
as well as the government. For example, the disaster mitigation program was 
only shared at the level of community without involving government, the 
situation turned into chaos when trying to communicate and coordinate with 
government because they weren’t aware of what was happening.” (26-NGO-
BNA)  
In order to maintain the sustainability of community disaster preparedness, BPBD has 
collaborated with IOM to establish the disaster resilient villages. According to the local 
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regulations the government is obligated to local the traditional community leaders that exist at 
the village level. As a result, it is difficult to introduce the same programs at the villages that 
have been targeted before by the NGOs. In addition, the local government asks for the full 
commitment of the village authority to organize the community members: 
“We have planned to establish disaster resilient villages: kampung Pande, 
Lampulo, dan Ganoe (name of three villages in Banda Aceh). Our selection 
criteria are based on the intention of the village authority, the community 
and village leader response. The village leader has to commit, agree, and be 
eager to mobilize the community. The other coastal villages (in Banda Aceh) 
have implemented the same programs but were organized by the different 
NGOs. (The consequence is that) we have to choose the villages that are not 
located near the coastal areas (02-GO-BNA) 
These findings have found that cross-scale and multi-scale collaboration are present at the local 
level in managing disaster resilience. The local government should find the strategies to 
enhance the collaboration across scales and invite more stakeholders to collaborate at the local 
level.  
7.2.4 Trust among the local actors 
This research has found that there is a lack of trust among the stakeholders in their current 
collaboration to manage disaster resilience. The issues of trust mainly arise between the 
government authorities and the non-governmental actors who have experienced working 
together during disaster emergency response. It seems that BPBD as the main coordinator for 
disaster management has a lack of competency in disaster management. This has affected the 
level of trust of other collaborators to engage in various activities that are coordinated by 
BPBD: 
It is normal to have such a distressed feeling when listening to the lectures 
from the government authorities who portray themselves as the „disaster 
management hero “, as they did nothing except for ceremonial activities. But 
we put aside these feelings, and think that we must cooperate, work together, 
no matter who the people we work with are, we have to put aside our 
concerns on this disaster management program (20-NGO-BNA) 
The absence of trust appears to arise because BPBD, the responsible government authority, 
often has not acted in conjunction with their promises. This becomes worse because the 
governments dictated the other party and fail to enact the leadership in the collaborative 
process.  
At the same time, the community lacks trust in the government’s capacity to manage disaster 
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resilience. As trust in the government was not generated during the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase, the community perceives the NGOs as more trustful than the local 
government. This happened because the local government did not show leadership and 
maintain good communication with the community. The government authorities have rarely 
conducted public meeting and interacted with community members: 
It is difficult to overcome the issue of the community lacking trust in the 
government, but it is supposed to be overcome through disaster risk 
reduction. The community, government and stakeholders should be put in one 
triangle in the DRR framework with leadership and participatory methods. 
This can be achieved through public meetings at the village, district and 
province levels for the disaster management plans (53-NGO-BNA) 
Although there have been some attempts to develop trust, the local actors understand that the 
local government should show their leadership in that process. The ideal condition is difficult 
to achieve but future collaboration needs to be more trusting to effectively manage disaster 
resilience. 
7.2.5 Sharing information mechanism 
This research has found that the system for sharing information in pre- disaster stage among 
the local actors is not well developed. At the government agency level, the type of information 
that they exchange is internally related to knowledge about the agency’s progress and 
performance in managing their development programs. In addition, meetings offer a 
communication channel to discuss community responses to their programs or activities as laid 
out in the development plan. The cross-agency information flows between the governmental 
actors through weekly formal meeting:  
 “We have a joint meeting with the Secretary of the city every Wednesday in 
Banda Aceh. In this meeting all of the agency heads will discuss their 
progress, problems and community complaints. This is an opportunity to get 
to know each other’s work and coordinate. The meeting report is then sent 
to the Mayor.” (07-GO-BNA) 
Inter-agency communication between the governmental agencies and NGOs are also not 
managed formally. The current multi stakeholder forums have failed to provide the platform to 
exchange information between the local actors. Most of the information related to the current 
government policy in disaster management is not available for the public. Alternatively, NGOs 
will request a meeting or send a formal letter to the government agency if they need 
information. The NGOs know which agency will provide the information that they request:   
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Whenever Walhi (NGO name´s) needs any information, Walhi will request 
the government authority to explain. There is no information proactively 
shared by the government. The government is open minded, they have a 
willingness to share information, it is just that they are still slow in acting as 
they also have some internal problems (06-NGO-BNA)  
This research suggests that the government agencies are eager to share information with the 
NGOs and communities but that the information sharing mechanism is not managed properly 
by the government. The local government has the responsibility to share information related to 
their operations, programs and activities with the community. The formal information sharing 
mechanism is to invite the community to be involved in the public discussion or hearing that 
organized by the government. The complicated bureaucracy affects the sharing of information 
between different levels of government and the community. Sometimes, the head of the village 
and the community are not aware of the programs and activities that take place in their villages: 
The challenge is the bureaucracy, if any activity is to be held, the government 
must pass information to the head of the sub district, and then to head of the 
village, and the community leader. But sometimes, the head of the village was 
not made aware of the activity held in his own village. Even though we know 
the problem, we think it is the head of the village’s responsibility to know 
what is happening in his village and to pass that information to the 
community (38-NGO-SBG) 
As such, the formal method for sharing information is not effective, especially with regard to 
sharing information about preparedness programs and activities. The local government has a 
limited budget to organize formal public meetings and the costs of such of meetings are high. 
The research findings indicate that the exploration of informal information dissemination is 
needed to increase the public awareness to engage actively: 
Regarding the method of engaging in dialogue with the community, it can be 
more effective, if it is done not only in formal meetings, but also through 
informal meetings in coffee shops, community activities, Friday prayer, or in 
the Islamic teaching gathering. The community has less enthusiasm if the 
dialogue happens in more formal meetings (45-NGO-SBG) 
A major issue is that the local government lacks strategies to empower many informal 
communication channels that exist at the community level. For example, to maximize the roles 
of religion or community leaders that have established many activities which could be used to 
provide information. These informal organizations can back up the communication between 
the government and communities.  
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7.2.6 Spanning boundaries 
The research findings indicate that the boundary-spanning activities should include efforts to 
identify and invite more stakeholders that represent the diversity of the following the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami. Vulnerable and marginalized community members have learned that without 
a formal organization they struggle to be recognizes and acknowledges. However, the 
recognition and acknowledgment of marginalized and vulnerable community groups is 
important as local actors that play significant roles in managing disaster resilience.  
For example, the Chinese ethnic community established a community-based organization to 
help their community engage in various governmental and social activities:     
“This is the time when we think we must find a formal Chinese ethnicity 
organization in Aceh. There was no organization for the ethnic Chinese 
before 2004, when the tsunami happened. We need this organization to help 
us, in case the (political or ethnicity) conflicts occur or we have problems 
with the government (…) Also, in case there is a tsunami in the future, the 
disaster relief (for our group members) can be organized by this 
organization.” (22-NGO-BNA) 
After this self-organization effort, the Chinese organization promoted the importance of 
including ethnic minorities in managing disaster resilience. As a minority group, their inclusion 
and representation are sometimes neglect in disaster preparedness programs and activities.  
 
Picture 17 Hakka Organization as one of the Chinese organizations that contribute in disaster 
resilience building in Banda Aceh 
Source: own 
 
Since the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, the governmental authority and NGOs started 
to invite organizations from different ethnic minorities ethnicities and religions to promote 
diversity in managing disaster resilience. The engagement of these populations is recognized 
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as boundaries-spanning activities which can exchange and link different values and knowledge 
from different community groups which is important for managing disaster resilience: 
“We invited Sekolah Methodist Banda Aceh (the name of Chinese ethnicity 
group school) to participate in our activity because most of their students are 
Chinese and Christian. So, the participants will come from different 
ethnicities and religious backgrounds. The students from ethnic and religious 
minority groups have been less frequently invited to be involved in disaster 
management activities by the NGOs and the government. We should help 
each other in disaster events without looking at their ethnicity and religion. 
Thus, in our activities they will be together, get to know each other to better 
understand about pluralism in disaster management. This is indeed about 
pluralism because, when the tsunami happened in Aceh, the disaster relief 
did not only come from Muslems, but from all nations, tribes and religions. 
So, why do we discriminate based on ethnicity and religion now?” (52-NGO-
BNA) 
In addition, the engagement of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) groups 
in disaster management has been initiated by the BPBD and IOM through their current projects. 
The LBGT groups were invited to participate in the local multi-stakeholder forum and were 
trained for disaster preparedness. Because of the cultural and religious situation in Aceh, the 
training was held outside Aceh, where the LGBT can show their identity and feel secure in 
participating in this training: 
“For the transgender groups, they had basic training for disaster 
preparedness which was facilitated by IOM. IOM gave the training to the 
groups. But maybe because there was no special module or interesting 
method that prepared their group for training, the training was very boring 
and not attractive for the participants. It only consisted of a lecture and no 
interactive training. Actually, the method needs to be reevaluated and must 
find a method that is acceptable for the groups so that they feel that the 
training is important for their groups.” (10-NGO-BNA). 
A special training module should have prepared because of the LGBT have different needs and 
capacities. However, the active participation of this LGBT group should be supported by the 
government and community because of the discrimination is faced by this group in Aceh 
society. The community has learned from the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 that in a disaster 
event, the most important thing is solidarity without discrimination. The disaster relief during 
the Tsunami 1n 2004 has been sent by people from different countries, ethnicities, religions, 
and sexualities.  
7.2.7 Complexities 
Research found that the complexities in managing disaster resilience after the post disaster are 
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mainly caused by fragmentation, inconsistencies, and a lack of coordination in managing the 
local actors during and after the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. The lack of 
coordination and transparency began during the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, for 
example in the distribution of disaster relief and housing benefit for the disaster victims:  
“Looking back at the rehabilitation and reconstruction in 2005, it was 
supposed to have good coordination and transparency to avoid the incorrect 
targeting of programs or approaches delivered to the community. There was 
no planning, no coordination and no transparency. At the post disaster 
phase, the transparency was at zero, so that many aspects were unclear such 
as support, funds, and its independency. In Sabang, the issue was not very 
high concern, but in Banda Aceh, one person could get seven houses in some 
locations. For example, it happened in Lampulo that one person got eight 
new houses, whereas some people got none. There was no justice and it 
happened because of the lack of coordination and transparency.” (44-NGO-
SBG). 
At that time, BRR coordinated the rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. This agency has 
reported their accountability and transparency in managing the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. The lack of coordination affected the location and construction of the vertical 
evacuation building: 
“During the post tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction, the NGO built 
the escape building; there was no coordination with the respective 
community and local government. We, as well as the BPBD Aceh Jaya, were 
not yet established. There were also few not so returned community members 
as Aceh Jaya had been flattened to the ground.” (61-GO-CLG) 
As a result, the effectiveness of the evacuation building is low because not many people 
evacuate to these buildings. Coordination and communication are important to avoid 
overlapping programs and to targeted communities. The coordination between the NGOs 
during the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase was difficult as such many NGOs worked 
with the same programs and targeted community: 
“Since the disaster management involved a lot of factors, coordination and 
communication become very crucial. I have one experience that when we 
were involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction in one area, it was found 
that another NGO has had done the same work as we have. That’s why in 
every phase of disaster management such as risk reduction, emergency-
response, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and mitigation, communication 
and coordination is an essential thing to do.” (10-NGO-BNA) 
After the rehabilitation and reconstruction phased finished, BPBD’s role was to coordinate the 
local actors in disaster management However, the BPBD did not manage to communicate well 
with the local agencies and NGOs. The communication and coordination were performed when 
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BPBD needed the contribution of other agencies but the efforts to maintain coordination 
formally and informally did not exist:  
“The problem is complicated; we were not involved from the beginning (by 
BPBD) and we did not understand their program. They only coordinated with 
us when they needed our help, for example, when they needed to install the 
disaster evacuation signs.” (66-GO-CLG) 
The complexities of the collaboration challenge were limited by rewards for the other 
collaborators to engage in various programs and activities. During the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction phase, many NGOs paid the community members for their participation in 
rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, meetings, public discussions, or drills. This “cash 
for work” culture created a new generation of community that is difficult to self-organize 
because it expects monetary rewards as motivation to participate: 
 
“The “community participation” jargon is apparent because it is not 
guaranteed that the community will participate actively (in the resilience 
program). They want to participate if (the organizer) compensates them for 
their participation. For example, when the UNDP organized the tsunami 
drill, they are reluctant to participate, but in the middle (of the event), they 
just realized (that it is important for them). (On the other hand) the 
community has to leave their work and they incur transportation costs, (so if 
they receive the compensation) the drill will be a bit more successful.” (53-
NGO-BNA)     
After the rehabilitation and reconstruction, volunteerism in disaster response was introduced. 
Besides the formal disaster management volunteer groups such Tagana and Sibat, at the 
community level, many volunteer groups were established during the emergency response. 
This voluntary action is a new form of self-organization that previously did not exists in Aceh:  
“When the disasters happened, many volunteers helped the disaster victims, 
such as from TNI and foreign countries as well as FPI (Islamic 
Organization), whereas the volunteers from Aceh were in small numbers. 
There was still a lack of awareness as they were not used to being in such a 
situation. There is no more awareness to help each other because there is no 
more money available like it was in post tsunami phase where NGOs gave 
money for people to work.” (52-NGO-BNA)  
However, there is a need to increase voluntary action since the current collaboration needs 
more volunteers to work on promoting disaster risk reduction at the local level.  
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7.3 Summary 
The key findings of this chapter suggest that the perceptions of tsunami risk and uncertainties 
are key challengs for the local actors to continue preparedness programs and activities.  Most 
of the community members are aware about the establishment of diverse strategies and 
approaches to build disaster resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami. The household surveys 
have shown that the community is in the position and able to evaluate the effectiveness and 
importance of these strategies. The evaluation shows that many valuable strategies have not 
been sufficiently implemented or the knowledge about the implementation is limited. The 
interviewed households also suggest sustaining strategies that contribute to building disaster 
resilience. Hence, many still see the need to continue activities even for such a rare hazard 
phenomenon. 
The second section explore the current collaborations and the challenges and obstacles that 
hamper effective collaboration between different actors. It has been shown that particularly the 
limited experience of working together in the past also hampers an effective cooperation in the 
post-tsunami context. Problems related to a shared vision, a joint leadership and building trust 
between different actors and agencies have been identified as key. The collaboration of the 
local actors has faced various problems, but the results showthat these problems remain 
unsolved also due to the fact that there was no mechanism (procedure) established by the 
provincial and local government to discuss and develop the collaboration. The collaboration 
between governmental and non-governmental organizations is critical for maintaining long-
term disaster resilience, particularly to encourage public and institutional learning.  
In the following chapter (see chapter 8), the challenges concerning collaboration that have been 
identified in this chapter will be discussed in terms of their implications for maintaining long-
term disaster resilience. A particular focus will be given to the challenges of shared goals and 
challenges related to trust within collaboration processes.  
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8   Discussion and interpretation 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize, discuss, and interpret key findings from the 
document analysis, semi-structured interviews and household surveys in the three case study 
areas in Aceh Province. After highlighting important findings in three previous empirical 
chapters (see chapters 5, 6, and 7), this chapter aims to critically revisit and interpret these 
findings and for formulate some conclusions for building disaster resilience in Aceh Province. 
This chapter summarizes key problems identified by local actors (e.g. government, NGOs, or 
community) and also discusses tools that are currently used for maintaining disaster resilience 
(e.g. local regulations, learning and collaboration).  At the same time, this chapter will revisit 
the challenges and barriers regarding the process of building disaster resilience. According to 
Bloomberg, Volpe (2015), the reflection of  findings aims to reveal the significance and deeper 
meanings of the empirical evidence, by looking at differences, similarities, and relationships 
between the findings and theories.  
In this dissertation, the discussion and interpretation take into consideration the literature on 
resilience, learning, governance, and collaboration. The resilience focused collaboration 
framework (see sub chapter 2.5) and the empirical findings generated through the different 
research methods applied. The objective of this discussion chapter is to answer the main 
research question of how disaster resilience strategies and activities are defined and how 
different state and non-state actors cooperate to achieve disaster resilience in the medium and 
long-term future at the local level. Most of the disaster risk research conducted in the context 
of the Indian Ocean Tsunami still focused on the disaster impact or the phases directly after the 
tsunami. The question on how to secure long-term resilience more than 13 years after the 
disaster has not been sufficiently addressed in the past. In this regard, the discussion of key 
findings and the development of recommendations also should also inform local and national 
stakeholders in order to strengthen and improve strategies and approaches for maintaining 
long-term disaster resilience in Aceh Province. 
Upon careful analysis of the key findings, the core challenges in building disaster resilience 
identified relate to issues of (1) finding and developing a common understanding and concept 
of the disaster resilience, (2) building coherent and joint strategies for disaster resilience, and 
(3) enhancing and establishsing effective collaboration between different governmental 
agencies and governmental and non-governmental actors. However, the empirical findings of 
the dissertaton also underscore that some efforts to maintain disaster resilience have failed due 
172 
 
to the complexities of the system and the various challenges (outmigration of international 
NGOs, closing of funds, etc.) that local actors face in promoting changes after a disaster. 
The following chapter is differenciated into seven sections. The first three sections focus on 
the discussion and interpretation of disaster resilience and disaster resilience strategies that 
were found in the empirical chapters (see chapters 5,6, and 7). The remaining chapter critically 
revisits on the theoretical basis, methods used and the limitations of the research within the 
context of the dissertation process. 
8.1 Challenges in a common understanding of disaster resilience concept 
Although Aceh currently has solid local regulations and structures to facilitate disaster 
resilience, the sustainability of the process requires a common understanding of the meaning 
of building disaster resilience. This common understanding is necessary to direct ideas, actors, 
and strategies to collaborate and coordinate effectively in maintaining disaster resilience over 
time. As such, the first empirical chapter examined the conceptualization and translation of 
disaster resilience into various strategies and approaches that have been developed by the local 
government, particularly the strategies that involve local stakeholders (e.g. NGOs and 
customary institutions) in building disaster resilience after disaster. The empirical evidence 
confirms that the development of a common understanding and vision of disaster resilience has 
not sufficiently been achieved among state and non-state actors and therefore also strategies 
and projects are not coherently linked and connected. Against this background, the following 
sections examines challenges and options on how to better promote a common understanding 
and translation of the disaster resilience concept, particularly through a participatory approach.  
8.1.1 Challenges to translate and communicate the meaning  
The concept of disaster resilience was introduced by the Indonesian government and 
international organizations during the phase of recovery from the Indian Ocean tsunami. As 
such, the local actors had to interpret the concept for operationalization into practical action. 
This process of interpretation is normally an important learning process as the local 
government, NGOs, and community need to develop a common understanding and shared 
meaning of disaster resilience to coordinate and maintain long-term disaster resilience. In 
addition, a shared understanding of disaster resilience and how to build disaster resilience in 
the long-term is important to build trust and enhance self-organization among local actors 
(Lebel et al. 2006). Based on the empirical analysis and as shown in Table 11, three major gaps 
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in translation the concept were identified that hinder the establishment of a common vision in 
Aceh. 
 
Table 11 Translation gaps and their implications 
Translation gaps Benefits for common 
understanding 
Benefits for maintaining long-
term disaster resilience 
Different perspectives 
and interpretations of 
the concept 
A mechanism to open 
dialogues to discuss different 
tools that used by local actors 
To propose a common 
understanding and meaning 
Lack capacity and 
political commitment 
to translate the 
concept 
Interventions and initiatives to 
strengthen the commitment  
To sustain various strategies and 
approaches  
Knowledge 
management 
Relevant tools for sharing 
information and knowledge 
transfer 
To sustain the learning process 
and knowledge transfer 
Source: own analysis 
The first gap in the translation of the disaster resilience concept arises from the different 
perspectives and interpretations of the concept of resilience. The empirical analysis highlighted 
that in the context of Aceh, there was no shared definition of the resilience concept proposed 
by the local government and by NGOs. In this regard, the disaster resilience concept mainly 
refers to international and national discourses, such as the Hyogo framework and the 
Indonesian disaster management law. Consequently, the concept has not sufficiently been 
translated for the specific local context of Aceh and the local government therefore also 
struggles to integrate the resilience concept into local strategies that need to be compatible with 
the specific local conditions (e.g. post conflict development approaches, post conflict 
societies).  
The analysis revealed that the differences in meaning of disaster resilience occur because there 
are different perspectives and approaches in building disaster resilience. One key explanation 
behind different levels of understanding of this concept is because the meaning is affected by 
organizational backgrounds, experiences, and capacities of different actors and organizations. 
Different perspectives and understandings of the meaning of the resilience concept are 
influenced by local actor’s identity as either governmental and non-governmental actors. 
The governmental actors, specifically those working in the disaster management agency, 
encounter the resilience concept through the policy making process. As such, they tend to 
interpret resilience more in line with the Hyogo framework. In contrast, the NGOs and 
174 
 
community-based organizations tend to encounter the disaster resilience concept through their 
projects and programs which are designed to achieve a specific outcome of resilience and in 
most cases these organizations focus on specific target groups. These actors have often well-
developed skills and experience of working with the local community. However, as the NGOs 
have limited funding, they tend to operate through projects that focus on particular community 
groups such as women, disabled people, fisheries communities or other livelihoods. In this 
way, they view resilience as the community empowerment and self-organization. In this regard, 
disaster resilience means that the community has a sufficient knowledge and experience to 
behave effectively and appropriately in disaster events, here in a tsunami event. 
The second gap relates to local government commitment to implement local disaster 
management regulations and plans, a commitment that decreases over time. Most of the disaster 
resilience programs are infrastructure projects for emergency and structural mitigation 
purposes such as, building new evacuation shelters, opening new evacuation routes, and 
widening the roads for evacuation. It is difficult to finance these projects and their subsequent 
evaluation programs. For example, according to the local disaster management law, BPBA 
should evaluate and renew the disaster risk reduction plans every five years, however, a budget 
(money) for this purpose has not been made available as other competing issues have begun to 
take precedence. In this case, it is essential to sustain resilience building as a priority in the 
current development programs including the allocation of a budget for these activities.  
The final translation gap is that there were few appropriate tools for knowledge management, 
particularly for communicating the meaning of disaster resilience. Knowledge management 
and exchange can promote common understanding of the meaning of building resilience after 
disaster (Kaklauskas et al. 2009).  
The popular knowledge management tools after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in Aceh are for 
example web-based Geographic Information Systems (GIS). This finding is in line with 
findings from Greve’s (2002) which showed that GIS is one of the most powerful decision-
making tools for governmental and public sectors. For example, TDRMC developed the Aceh 
Tsunami Digital Repository and Disaster Risk Management Information System (DRMIS) 
(Syahputra, Munadi 2011). The DRMIS is particularly helpful for enabling the decision maker 
and community to generate thematic maps that help demonstrate disaster risk in Aceh Province 
(Ardiansyah, Munadi 2016). However, these knowledge management tools are difficult to 
finance in the long run at the local level. For example, the Aceh Disaster Data and Information 
(DIBA) ((http://diba.acehprov.go.id) website and Pusat Informasi Bencana Aceh (Aceh 
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Disaster Information Centre) website (http://piba.tdmrc.org) are two websites that were 
established as a repository system for material, information and geospatial data sharing but 
both are now closed. In addition, this method for knowledge transfer also requires technological 
literacy, particularly skills in GIS application. These skills are not available and not maintained 
over time because of the limited GIS literacy programs provided by the government, NGOs, 
and universities. 
To maintain long term disaster resilience, the governments, NGOs, and community need 
effective knowledge management tools that sustain their learning process. In this regard, multi-
stakeholder forums can facilitate knowledge transfers and exchanges between the local actors, 
such as sharing information, collaboration, and discussion. On the other hand, to be able to 
facilitate the learning process, these multi-stakeholder forum needs to be active and supported 
by the local stakeholders.  
8.1.2 Challenges to invite participation  
Maintaining long-term disaster resilience correlates strongly with the participation of local 
actors learning and working together. Effective collaboration to maintain disaster resilience is 
best developed by inviting various local actors and community members that can contribute 
with their diverse knowledge, capacities, and experiences. The empirical analysis explores 
some of the participation gaps associated with building disaster resilience, particularly in 
practice. Three major gaps emerge from the empirical analysis that highlight challenges in local 
actor participation, these are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12 Participation gaps and their implications 
Participation gaps Benefits for common 
understanding 
Benefits for 
maintaining-long term 
disaster resilience 
Lack capacity to invite local 
actors participation  
 Local actors empowerment To learn how to 
collaborate with various 
local actors 
Interests in participation 
 
Clear and simple mechanism to 
participate 
To offer the clear 
mechanism for 
participation 
Community did not receive 
feedbacks on their 
comments  
Open the dialogues to discuss 
the community interests and 
expectations 
To follow up the 
community interests and 
expectations 
Source: own analysis 
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The first significant gap associated with local actor participation is the capacity of government 
to invite the stakeholders and community members to participate in building disaster resilience. 
The disaster management laws require the government to invite local actors, such as schools, 
customary and religious groups, women, disabled people and community members in general, 
to participate in developing and maintaining disaster resilience (see chapter 6.2).  
The findings show that the local government prefers to implement a top-down policy in 
decision making and the local disaster management agency (BPBD) has also adopted a top-
down planning for disaster resilience programs at the local level (Ahdi 2015). As White (1996) 
suggests, this discourages community participation. With the top-down planning mechanism, 
the community are aware that their efforts to contribute in the planning process at the village 
level will be fruitless. 
On the closer inspection, most of the resilience building programs are proposed by the local 
government. These programs were often a continuation of previous programs and there was 
limited capacity, also due to budget problems and bureaucratic procedures to establish new 
programs. This meant that because the programs weren’t tailored specifically to maintain long-
term disaster resilience. Investing more time into learning the needs and expectations of 
targeted beneficiaries could have improved the program planning and implementation.   
In future, local actors should be able to participate in designing the programs, to recommend 
that the government uses particular approaches or strategies and an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the government programs should be part of the design. As Cornwall (2008) 
highlight, it is crucial to invite community participation while encouraging community 
empowerment. Here, empowerment refers to increasing the community’s capacity to highlight 
their interests and expectations in the development agenda (White 1996). In the context of 
promoting a common understanding, empowerment of the community is also important for 
translating the resilience concept into appropriate programs that are suited to the community’s 
needs. 
The next gap is associated with the current participatory mechanisms, particularly for public 
involvement in making decisions that matter for maintaining long-term disaster resilience. The 
local government have only one participatory mechanism for development planning. It is a 
local stakeholder consultation forum for development planning (Musrenbang) among 
representatives at the village, regency and municipality, and province levels. However, the 
legislative committee or commissions (DPRA or DPRK) play powerful roles in determining 
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the budget and deciding which programs should be implemented each year. This highlights that 
the local government should increase this local stakeholder consultation forum (Musrenbang) 
accountability by reviewing their participatory mechanism to increase a better community 
participation. In the Aceh context, following the long political conflict, the invitation to 
participate is not sufficient because there is a lack of trust which prevents the community from 
being involved and working with the government. The local government must show their 
sincere intentions and strong commitment in building resilience together with the community.  
The final gap in participation relates to how to respond public comments associated with 
maintaining disaster resilience. While in theory (see e.g. Hattie, Timperley (2007)  feedback 
provided by the community is valuable to evaluate and improve government performance in 
building disaster resilience, the findings, however,show that most comments submitted by the 
public have been ignored by governmental agencies. Indeed, the comments from the 
community could improve local government capacity to maintain long-term disaster resilience. 
This feedback can be helpful to increase the local government capacities to tailor new programs 
and strategies that fit well with the community needs. However, the overall mechanisms need 
to be improved to ensure that the comments are considered and that those who provided 
comments also get a feedback on how their comments were considered in the process. That 
means there is a need to follow up the community comments and learn together by providing 
the space and time for direct participation in planning, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation of the current strategies to maintain long-term disaster resilience. These comments 
are the important learning sources in evaluating the progress of resilience building as a whole 
process over time.  
8.2 Challenges in maintaining medium and long-term disaster resilience  
The second empirical chapter (see chapter 6) analyzes the governance structure of building 
disaster resilience, specifically looking at various tools and strategies that are preferred by the 
local actors to maintain medium and long-term disaster resilience. The findings in the disaster 
resilience governance chapter (see chapter 6) underscore that the challenges in maintaining 
long-term disaster resilience comprise challenges to increase the local actor’s capacity and 
challenges to evaluate the process of building disaster resilience.  
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8.2.1 Challenges to increase the local actor capacities   
As highlighted in the theory chapter (see subchapter 2.3.2), various strategies have been 
implemented to enhance local actor capacities to maintain resilience. Turning to the issue of 
the existing gaps between the expectations and capacities in maintaining long-term disaster 
resilience, the research found that the local authority capacities should be improved to better 
maintain long-term disaster resilience. Table 13 lists the main gaps in increasing the local actor 
capacities and their implications in maintaining long term disaster resilience. 
Table 13 Capacity gaps and their implications 
Capacity gaps Benefits for maintaining-long term 
disaster resilience 
Capacity to stimulate learning and self-
organization 
 
Learning and self-organization to build 
local actor capacities 
Capacity to negotiate and communicate 
 
to negotiate and communicate better 
Source: own analysis 
The empirical evidence shows that the internal problems for example linked to the the capacity, 
capability, and competency of the local authorities are associated and connected with the 
willingness and political commitment of the government to improve human resources at the 
local disaster management agency (BPBA/BPBD). Although the Aceh government has solid 
local regulations, to maintain disaster resilience, the local authorities have to enhance their 
capacity to implement the regulations. More precisely, local disaster management agencies in 
Aceh often lack capability and capacity due to organizational problems such as attitudes and 
local expertise to manage disaster resilience. 
A key challenge is that the current resilience governance is weak in stimulating learning and 
self-organization for the actors responsible for managing disaster resilience. This is 
problematic since learning and self-organizations were defined as important characteristics of 
resilience building in social-ecological systems, such as coastal communities (Birkmann et al. 
2016a). Learning refers to the ability of the actors to capitalize on the mega disaster experience 
to enhance their capacity to manage disaster resilience. The local government missed 
opportunities to learn due to bureaucratic constraints that affects the ability of actors to improve 
the regulations and strategies. BPBD realizes that their current capacities for maintaining 
disaster resilience are limited, particularly their capacity to learn from experience in building 
disaster resilience. This is because BPBD was established after the recovery ended, so BPBD 
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did not have in-depth experiences working together with various international, national, and 
local actors.  
In practice, most of the BPBD staff have limited educational backgrounds and experience in 
disaster management. Consequently, strong political support is needed to develop the capacity 
of BPBD staff through, for example, training and scientific discussions. This strong political 
support is important, particularly to allocate a significant budget for the BPBD staff´s trainings 
or capacity development programs continuously. At the same time, it is also difficult to increase 
the quality of the staff because the rapid changes and transfers of people who have prominent 
positions in this agency. In fact, most of the local disaster management staff interviewed for 
this research have since transferred to other positions or other offices. Some of them have 
retired because they started to work in the agency during their preparation for retirement.  
The next gap is to increase the capacity to negotiate and communicate with various local actors.  
This capacity relates to the ability to ensure that communication is not complicated. The 
findings show that the capacity of BPBD is limited to negotiating and communicating with 
various stakeholders. The core problem also lies in establishing communication channels 
between DPRK and BPBD. BPBD often complains that they suffer from a limited budget, 
particularly for non-infrastructure programs and activities, such as planning, sensitization, and 
training. The findings revealed that the DPRK budget cuts have decrease the quality of the 
programs and the number of outcomes that can be fulfilled. As a coordinating agency, it can 
be challenging for BPBD to increase their budget allocation for disaster management programs 
and activities as this will mean compromising other areas of work. To resolve these problems, 
it might be best to open dialogues and communication with NGOs, academia, and communities. 
At the same time, BPBD should seek greater political commitment to supports their 
performance in maintaining long-term disaster resilience.  
8.2.2 Challenges to evaluate the process of building disaster resilience 
Despite the urgency of building disaster resilience, a credible evaluation of strategies and 
approaches for maintaining disaster resilience is a must. In the long run, the main objective to 
conduct various evaluations is to enhance and secure effective strategies to maintain disaster 
resilience. However, the impacts and benefits of resilience building programs are difficult to 
evaluate because the tools for evaluation are not set from the outset. Numerous questions 
related to the effectiveness of design, implementation, and impacts of these programs remain 
to be answered by a useful evaluation framework.  
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Two major points emerging from the empirical analysis related to the gaps in evaluation of the 
current strategies in maintaining long-term disaster resilience are shown in Table 14. 
Table 14 Evaluation gaps and their implication   
Evaluation gaps Benefit for maintaining-long term 
disaster resilience 
Evaluation of implementation  to provide recommendations for 
improvements  
 
Evaluation of performance, outcomes, and 
impacts 
 
to promote learning and accountability  
Source: own analysis 
The first gap in evaluation is to evaluate the current strategies and approaches in building 
disaster resilience, particularly the needs of programs for the stakeholders. The findings 
indicated that there remains a challenge to design and develop programs that must meet the 
needs of stakeholders. These stakeholder needs are associated with their interests, expectations, 
and problems in building disaster resilience. As Rossi et al. (1999) highlighted, problem 
identification and need assessment should be conducted to ensure an effective program. More 
often, the evaluation aims to improve local government transparency, accountability, and 
performance (Newcomer et al. 2010).  
However, many of the strategies that were developed and implemented were not compatible 
with stakeholder needs and expectations. It means that the local government has limited 
capacity to plan and design programs that are compatible with stakeholders needs. At the same 
time, targeted stakeholders should understand the goals of the programs. It is almost certain 
that the key stakeholders will be involved in the evaluation of the process. 
The starting point to create a useful evaluation is to plan and design the evaluation so that it 
can improve local government performance in implementing the programs. The findings show 
a lack of local government evaluation for planning, implementation, and outcomes of the 
programs. According to Newcomer et al. (2010), to measure the impacts and outcomes of the 
programs, it is necessary to look at the level of implementation, whether the programs are 
implemented as planned and designed. One question that arises from the program planning is 
how to structure the planning process in a way that its implementation and impacts can be 
effectively evaluated. In planning, the local government have stated their goals, budget, and set 
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a definite timeline that can be evaluated. Planning evaluation will help to provide reliable 
options and suggestions to improve the programs going forward. 
The findings reveal that development programs are evaluated by Bappeda, particularly for 
program expenditure and levels of implementation. In practical way, the local government 
prefers infrastructure projects rather than the non-infrastructure programs. For example, the 
Banda Aceh Tsunami structural mitigation measures were evaluated to assess their progress 
over time. The local government evaluation approach is a general quantitative analysis to 
evaluate the programs and activities. This measure is associated with the budget expenditure 
and planning that takes place at the end of the year. This means that the government only 
evaluates programs through budget allocation and review processes (UNDP–DRR ACEH 
2011). A more comprehensive evaluation that also involves the perspective of other actors is 
absent.  
BPBD´s exposure to budget cuts affects their capacity to propose new programs as they often 
fail to achieve support from DPRK. This results in many new programs never being initiated. 
As such, BPBD’s reduced budget expenditure translates into a decrease in the quality of the 
programs and the number of outcomes that can be fulfilled. For example, the local government 
has built a new vertical evacuation building, opened new evacuation routes, and widened the 
road for evacuation but these have been implemented almost without any follow up awareness 
programs, such as drill activities and sensitization programs. It is difficult to propose regular 
drill activities or sensitization programs that embedded in the development of these evacuation 
facilities. 
An additional gap relates to the evaluation of outcomes and impacts. Because the current 
evaluation framework remains ineffective, the impacts of the programs, including impacts of 
evacuation training and sensitization, are difficult to measure. As Hatry et al. (2010) point out, 
the main advantage to conducting an evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of the programs 
so that the local government can either make adjustments or learn for the future.  Thus, the 
main consequence of ineffective evaluation processes is that the government will never receive 
feedback from the intended beneficiaries of the programs. This feedback is important to 
improve strategies to maintain resilience. 
Participation is also essential in communicating the evaluation findings to key stakeholders, 
specifically to improve the policy and local legislations. Conducting an evaluation is part of 
the learning process for the local actors to enhance the outcomes of the implementation of local 
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policies (Newcomer et al. 2010). Ultimately, the key objective of effective evaluation is to 
implement good governance practice, particularly the accountability of local authorities in 
maintaining long-term disaster resilience.   
8.3 Challenges for collaboration 
The final empirical chapter (see chapter 7) focuses on dealing with the existing collaborative 
efforts to build disaster resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. These collaborative 
efforts were developed as the critical strategies to maintain long-term disaster resilience. 
Emerging from the key actors interviews are complex challenges that affect collaboration in 
building resilience. The key findings highlight how local actors struggle to participate in 
resilience focused collaboration efforts. At the same time, it is difficult for local actors to 
benefit from their current collaborative efforts because there are no useful activities in their 
current collaboration. The main gaps in collaboration include a lack of shared goals and open 
and trusting collaboration. In the following sections, some of the complex challenges 
concerning local actor collaboration are discussed and interpreted. 
8.3.1 Challenges to have shared goals  
As highlighted in the empirical chapters, collaboration is one of the main strategies that has 
been promoted by the Aceh government to maintain resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
in 2004.  The empirical analysis found that the development of the current multi-stakeholder 
forum is problematic. It is believed that if these problems were addressed and discussed, the 
local actors could better collaborate to better maintain long term resilience. The summary of 
specific collaboration goal gaps is illustrated in the table 15. 
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Table 15 Specific goals gaps and their implications 
Specific goal gaps Implications for collaboration Benefits for 
maintaining-long term 
disaster resilience 
Unclear purposes 
 
 
 
Discuss and communicate local 
actors interests, expectations, 
and needs 
 
to find considerable 
shared goals and 
agreement 
No space to exchange 
information and learning 
Creative space to which 
learning take place  
to open communication 
share ideas, and 
information 
 
Limited resources 
 
Attract new resources 
 
to invite and involve 
more local actors to bring 
more resources 
 
Source: own analysis 
The first gap in collaboration is in the formulation of common goals for maintaining long-term 
disaster resilience. The purpose of collaboration may exist, but it is not stated or understood 
and implemented by the local actors. Although Aceh currently has local regulations and 
structures to manage disaster resilience, the sustainability of this process requires a common 
purpose to drive the actors to work together. As Nayar (2014) suggests, a clear description of 
purpose will help provide direction for collaboration success. To formulate this shared goal, 
the local actors should communicate their interests, expectations, and needs for this 
collaboration. At the same time, they have to realize that accomplishing these goals on their 
own is difficult. In the end, it is also essential for the local actors to be able to articulate these 
shared goals to strengthen their commitment to collaborate in maintaining disaster resilience.  
The second gap centers on the limited opportunities for knowledge sharing and learning. 
According to Bryson et al. (2015), effective collaboration can stimulate joint learning for 
stakeholders benefits. The ultimate goal is to establish a local multi-stakeholder forum is to 
facilitate collaborative learning. However, the empirical analysis in this research has found that 
the local actors are interested in collaboration for the purpose of learning, particularly through 
increasing their scientific knowledge and capacity to practice disaster management. Although 
local actor interests in learning is a positive contribution to maintaining disaster resilience, the 
multi-stakeholder forum failed to provide space for this learning activity. For example, public 
discussion series on building disaster resilience that were organized by ICAIOS. International, 
national, and local researchers and experts were invited to present their research projects or 
their works in disaster management, particularly researches or projects that conducted in Aceh. 
184 
 
The purpose of this public discussion is to share and disseminate lesson learned from their 
works. However, the disaster resilience topics are decresased significantly in this public 
discussion series, due to shift in research interest and NGOs projects in Aceh Provice. To foster 
collaborative learning, the local government should provide space in which learning can be 
facilitated. Local actors can then start to learn from each other by opening communication to 
share information that important for managing disaster resilience.  
The next gap is associated with the lack of resources in the current collaborative efforts to 
maintain long-term disaster resilience. The findings show that the most challenging aspects for 
local NGOs and communities to participate in maintaining disaster resilience is their limited 
resources in crafting new projects, accessing funding, and limited resources to finance and pay 
their staff. At the same time, the new resources refer to relevant ideas, knowledge and practices 
that can increase the local actors capacities to maintain disaster resilience.  To deal with the 
complex challenges that arise due to severely limited resources, local actors hope that this 
collaboration can open their opportunities to attract new resources, particularly to have joint 
projects and better leadership.  
One of the more effective ways to attract new resources is to invite and involve more local 
actors who, in turn, bring more resources and encourage wider participation, fostering 
collaboration. In Aceh context, this is also a means to start inviting the business and private 
sectors which, can invest new resources, to work in partnerships.  This strategy was already 
implemented by inviting several local banks and insurance agencies to engage in the local 
multi-stakeholder forum. These joint projects may sustain the organizational and public 
learnings between the local actors.  
It is evident that local actors need to be explicit in their expectations and priorities from the 
collaboration. Collaboration is effective only if local actors can find considerable shared goals, 
specifically agreeing on the problems that they may then attempt to solve together in order to 
support the maintenance of long-term disaster resilience. Creating partnerships involves 
leveraging synergies from various actors to contribute towards a shared purposes real (Linden 
2010).  In the Aceh context, the shared goals include joint learning and attract new resources 
to maintain better disaster resilience. However, achieving these collaboration goals will take 
time and the commitment of the local actors.  
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8.3.2 Challenges to have open and trusting collaboration  
Although, collaboration theory clearly outlines the importance of building trust (Lucini 2014; 
National Research Council 2011), in reality, this has been a particularly challenge due to a 
range of factors. The findings of the analysis highlight that trust and leadership issues were 
remain problems in local actor collaboration. The initiative to establish a multi-stakeholder 
forum was from the central government and as such, it was a top down policy, whereas the 
provincial and local government must set up this platform for the local actors to meet and 
collaborate. On the other hand, from the outset, the local government realized that they lacked 
the capacity to lead this collaborative process and that they are not ready to take full 
responsibility to drive this process. The three major gaps that have emerged from the empirical 
analysis, relating to the challenges of ensuring open and trusting collaboration in maintaining 
long-term disaster resilience, are shown in the table 16. 
Table 16 Gaps for open and trusting collaboration and their implications 
Gaps for open and trusting 
collaboration 
Implications for collaboration Implications for 
maintaining-long term 
disaster resilience 
Lack of trust 
 
 
Opportunities to build trust to build open and trust 
relationship among each 
other 
Leadership 
 
Improvement of the leadership 
roles, practices, and skills 
 
to develop collaborative 
leadership 
Collaborative culture Promoting collaboration 
advantages 
to nurture collaborative 
culture 
 
Source: own analysis 
As highlighted in the theory chapter, collaboration develops in stages and takes time to evolve 
and grow (Gajda 2004). It is useful to examine relationship issues between the local actors and 
then take significant action to build trust. The analysis of the current collaborative efforts 
relating to the resilience focused collaboration framework (see chapter 7.2) found that local 
actors faced trust and relationships problems. According to Vangen, Huxham (2003), the first 
step to develop trust is to develop joint projects and build trust through working together. This 
strategy for building trust was implemented by BRR and the non-governmental organizations 
through joint rehabilitation and reconstruction programs during the recovery process. At that 
time, BRR collaborated with 900 organizations, including governmental authorities, donor 
countries and organizations, Red Cross organizations, international and local NGOs, and local 
and private sectors.  The trust building in this initial collaboration was initiated by promoting 
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integrity, credibility, transparency, leadership, and solving the coordination problems 
(Mangkusubroto 2011). 
In practice, opportunities to build trust are difficult to create. As Longstaff, Yang (2008) 
suggested, ongoing communication and coordination can stimulate trust. For example, the local 
actors can begin to acknowledge many “sensitive” issues that are local actors currently avoid 
discussing openly. Without trust and an open relationship, it is difficult to complain, or express 
any collaboration discouragement. Trust is a particularly complex issue for governmental 
authorities and NGOs. As the findings show, local actors are reluctant to express their 
criticisms in this forum openly. Criticism tends to be perceived as an attack that can destroy 
the current “good” relationship among the local actors. In the multi-stakeholder forum, BPBD 
is a common target of criticism relating to their capacity to lead the process of maintaining 
disaster resilience.  
Although most of the local actors had known each other for more than ten years and most had 
experienced working together during the recovery, the findings show that they still find it 
difficult to communicate openly and clearly through each other. It is obvious that the purpose 
of the multi-stakeholder forum is to provide opportunities for local actors to have face to face 
dialogues and, to communicate their interests and needs. However, the empirical evidence 
shows that this local forum did not function properly, and the members do not have trusting 
relationships with one another. They do not function properly because there is no significant 
activities or contributions to facilitate the process of learning together.  The findings show that 
there are various inconsistencies between policies and actions or words and actions. This is 
particularly evident in the local government strategies designed to implement various local 
regulations relating to disaster management. For example, the local government commits to 
maintaining long-term disaster resilience, but at the same time, disaster resilience is not a 
priority in the current development agenda (Pemerintah Aceh 2017).  
A consequence of this is that local actors have often questioned the leadership roles of the local 
government. Leadership  here refers to “the consistency between words and actions” that affect 
trust and performance of the local government (Palanski, Yammarino 2007). Trust is difficult 
to achieve when many collaboration problems remain unsolved and while the mechanism to 
discuss the collaboration is not sufficiently facilitated. In this regard, increasing the local 
government leadership capacity and then showing these improvements in practice is critical. 
For example, the analysis thus far suggests that the multi-stakeholder forum needs a competent 
facilitator who can not only organize the meetings or other activities but also manage trust in 
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this collaborative effort. Although BPBD is mandated by the law to take more responsibilities 
in facilitating the multi stakeholder forum, they lack the strong leadership capacity to maintain 
this process (Indriyan, Hariani 2014; Hapsari, Djumiarti 2016). For example, from the 
experiences of the local actors working with BPBD, BPBD has struggled to coordinate and 
organize the stakeholders in many emergency situations effectively as a result of complexity 
of bureaucracy. 
Changes to improve the situation could begin by BPBD focusing on improving their leadership 
role, practices, and skills to improve the quality of collaboration (Bryson et al. 2015). The 
findings also suggest that the personal informal relationships, such as friendships among the 
local actors, can foster collaboration. This friendship allows local actors to communicate better 
and to feel secure in performing cooperation without having to deal with the judgement and 
criticisms. Better leadership practice may encourage wider participation and foster 
collaboration. The local government needs to learn from their experiences and mistakes to 
address leadership and trust issues in managing long-term disaster resilience. 
The current collaboration of local actors shows various collaboration failures, including 
communication, trust, and leadership. These problems deal mainly with the dynamic of local 
multi-stakeholder who have found it difficult to function effectively. These problems reflect 
cultural issues, particularly, in social behavior which, to some extent, affects the collaborative 
process. First, various people and actors interviewed in Aceh find it difficult to be assertive and 
express their own views, particularly in a formal forum. This makes it difficult to challenge, 
disagree, and refuse ideas under discussions. Second, people tend to take criticism too 
personally, and therefore think that critiques are impolite and rude. Thus, it is difficult to have 
an open discussion as people prefer to resolve their conflict personally. Third, the leader is 
elected through personal relationships rather than by their capacity, intellect, and charisma. 
That makes it also more complicate to critize him or her directly. 
This study also confirmed that the problems of collaboration relate to the decades long political 
conflict taking place in Aceh. According to (Fara 2012) the loss of communal togetherness was 
due to the controls and restrictions of the authority (GAM and TNI) so that the freedom to 
speak and express themselves were limited during that time. This made Aceh a closed society 
where people tended to mistrust new people. It has been reported that the situation during the 
time of conflict was very sensitive and anything could happen to people, including the loss of 
their lives, if one is suspected by both parties in the conflict. It seemed to take time for people 
in Aceh to heal their trauma and build their confidence to collaborate without this fear.  
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Despite perceiving these behaviors as disadvantageous aspects in a collaborative process,  
(Thomalla, Larsen 2010) encouraged people to understand various aspects of cultures that can 
be later used to raise awareness and to resolve problems in promoting disaster resilience. This 
can be done by exploring and selecting some shared local beliefs and cultures to confront these 
challenges for local actors to collaborate. As indicated, the exploration of culture suitable for 
promoting resilience is possible since collaboration is part of Aceh culture. It is useful to 
harness cultural context in maintaining long term disaster resilience, particularly to promote 
resilience focused collaboration. Culture refers to practices, behavior, attitudes, beliefs, 
knowledge, tradition, customs and norms that have high position in Aceh society. In the past, 
Aceh Kingdom governed people based on these cultural aspects to protect the Islamic religion. 
Aceh people perceived their cultures and identities as Muslim and as such, the customs and 
religion have been inseparable (Zainuddin 2012). 
The findings underscore that the religion and culture affect the motivation of the local actors 
to collaborate in building disaster resilience, particularly for the community based-
organizations to work together with the government agencies in emergency response 
voluntarily.  In Acehnese culture, creating partnerships requires strong cultural and historical 
roots. Collaboration or “meuseuraya” means working together to benefit people and the well-
being of the community. The definitive goals of these collaborations are to have sincerity, 
comfort, and reward from God. Furthermore, (Soelaiman 2011) describes three kinds of 
traditional collaboration practices in a village in Aceh: (1) collaboration for individual 
concerns, for example helping a neighbor in house construction (2) collaboration for the 
community, for example: cleaning up the environment and public facilities, and (3) 
collaboration as a custom and tradition, for example in funeral and religious ceremonies and 
rituals.  
Hasdy (1994) highlighted two “Hadih Maja” (proverbs) that illustrate how Acehnese 
perceived collaboration in their daily life. As the Acehnese proverb goes “Hase ngon meufakat, 
kuat ngon meuseuraya”, which means that success can be achieved by collaboration and 
“Meunyo ka meupakat lampoh jirat ta peugala”, (If we have agreed, we can sell our farm and 
grave yard), where farm and burial ground are most valuable to the Acehnese since the farm is 
their livelihood resources while the grave yard symbolizes family and religious dignity. Both 
proverbs explain that collaboration has been practiced in the past. This means that the Acehnese 
have a clearly understood philosophy and conceptualization of collaboration. Furthermore, 
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these traditional collaboration practices are strongly based on the Islamic teaching that has 
encouraged the community to work together and help each other: 
“Help one another to do what is right and good” (The Feast verses 2) (Abdeel Haleem 2010). 
This is one example of an entry point to promote the development of disaster risk reduction 
capacity by harnessing religion (Schipper 2010).  In this case, using Islamic teaching can 
change the perspectives of local actors and increase their motivation to participate in resilience 
focused collaboration.  
Mattessich, Monsey (1992) argues that collaboration based on a shared historical background 
and courage was most likely to be successful. In addition,  maintaining long-term tsunami 
resilience is a process of “reconnecting it with the cultural past” (Daly, Rahmayati 2013).  This 
reconnection helps to sustain various strategies and approaches due to the community’s 
familiarity with their cultural identity, rather than overwhelming them with new concepts 
around maintaining disaster resilience. This cultural framing helps people to understand and 
accept that maintaining disaster resilience is a part of their local wisdom.  
However, these cultural spirits of collaboration are decreasing over because of the domination 
of personal interests and activities. Aceh cultures and past are betting on the process of social 
transformation after suffering the long-lasting traumatic conflict and mega disaster (Feener 
2011).  To foster a collaborative culture, linking cultural contexts and resilience focused 
collaboration is useful but does not guarantee success. After the tsunami, through which the 
cultural and social values have changed, it is important to ensure that other factors influencing 
the success of collaboration are present. This collaboration culture is needed to maintain 
medium and long-term disaster resilience, however, direct rewards and benefits of participating 
in collaboration are crucial to foster. 
8.4 Reflections on theory and conceptual framework 
Selecting and writing the theoretical and conceptual framework for such a complex topic and 
research object was a challenging task. At the beginning, this research intended to follow the 
grounded theory, methodology and construction theory, allowing the researcher to apply 
flexible strategies in developing systematic data collection and analysis (Charmaz 2015). 
However, during fieldwork, the qualitative data collection was conducting by semi-structured 
interviews following the interviews protocol in investigating the processes of building disaster 
resilience. This interview protocol was designed using a prior literature reviews that focusing 
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on governance and capacity to manage resilience (Lebel et al. 2006) applied in the context of 
post disaster at the local level. Within the process of writing and conducting the PhD thesis it 
became evident that different theoretical approaches need to be combined and need to inform 
the empirical analysis in order to capture the multifaceted nature of building long-term disaster 
resilience after disasters. In this regard, it was useful to combine theoretical concepts 
particularly from resilience theory (learning and self-organization in the context of crises) 
(Folke 2016; Cutter 2016), governance theory (Tierney 2012; Lebel et al. 2006), and 
collaboration theory (National Research Council 2011; Noran 2014b) 
A conceptual framework was developed to show the interlink of concepts aimed to give 
integrated understanding and interpretative approach to a social reality (Jabareen 2009). In this 
research, the concepts and category were based on the qualitative data. These data from the 
first stage using mixed methods were analyzed by open coding and writing memo to build the 
questionnaire for the household surveys. During analyzing the initial and open coding 
procedures, the themes related governance and collaboration were frequently found in the 
interview transcripts.  Altogether these three approaches were identified from the findings that 
related to the problems and challenges of building disaster resilience.  
The conceptual framework of resilience focusing on collaboration to maintain resilience at the 
local level was inspired by the National Research Council (2011)  that introduced “challenges 
to sustainable resilience-focused collaboration”. In this research, the direction of the framework 
was shifted from “sustaining collaboration to build resilience” into “maintaining medium and 
long-term disaster resilience”. This framework means to focus on collaboration as one of many 
modes in governing disaster resilience to keep resilience alive now and in the future. The 
framework was based on the resilience theory in directing the governance and collaboration of 
the local actors. These three concepts were synthesized and analyzed to answer the main 
research questions. 
The process of making more sense and connections among this concept were repeatedly 
mentioned to increase understanding of the process of maintaining resilience at the local level. 
During this iterative process, the initial concept of building resilience changes that maintaining 
disaster resilience may contribute more to the resilience literature. The conceptual framework 
was the main consideration in empirical analysis and guide the discussion in this research. To 
identify the disaster resilience factors and key components of resilience focused on 
collaboration, the research findings were referred and synthesized. At the same time, 
theorization process was supported by literature relevant to this conceptual framework, such 
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as: learning, self-organization, participation, capacity development, evaluation, leadership, 
and, trust building. These theories are used continuously in discussion and interpretation 
chapter to understand the meaning of the empirical evidences.  
The construction and operationalization of this conceptual framework were based on the 
research questions and research findings. However, this framework has some certain 
limitations related to theories and concepts emerging from the epistemological and 
methodological consequences of this research. This thesis applied the general theory of 
resilience, governance, and collaboration. On the other hand, it is difficult to capture the process 
of building resilience, learning, and collaboration over a long-term. Using different approaches 
and theories were possible, particularly specific theories (e.g. organizational learning or a 
community-of-practice approach), instead focus on general theories to explain the resilience 
building process. However, these general approaches were used as the starting points to identify 
factors affecting the learning and collaborative efforts to maintain long-term resilience, 
specifically enhancing the local actor´s capacities in post disaster context. 
8.5 Reflections of the mixed-methods research 
The main purpose of applying the mixed methods research is enrich the data to answer the main 
research questions. To answer the questions related to sustaining disaster resilience and 
proposing “resilience focused collaboration” need not only the local actors and community 
experiences in addition to their perspectives, but, also their perceptions towards the current and 
future collaboration. This mixed methods data collection has allowed the researcher to have 
qualitative and quantitative data format and conducted triangulation analysis in this research.  
The design of methods applied in this research were formulated during the first fieldwork. To 
collect the qualitative data, the researcher explored and tried different methods such as focus 
group discussion and scenario building as the triangulation methods from the first phase of the 
mixed-methods. However, the pilot of group interviews was facilitated by BPBD Banda Aceh 
that who formally invited to the Geuchik (village leaders) whose areas experienced the Tsunami 
in Banda Aceh as part of their disaster management training activities. These focused group 
discussion (FGD) aimed to enable the local actors to talk and share their experiences in 
answering the questions at the same as the semi-structured interview protocols. During the 
discussion, various of the leaders were quiet and reluctant to speak, indicating that they were 
not familiar with this interview methods. Other factors that made the researcher did not use the 
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FGD because the number and wide range of the potential interviewees needs to invite more 
people, but and the availability and priority time of the participants were limited. 
Another method that was also tried during the research was scenario building aimed to predict 
the process of maintaining and sustaining disaster resilience. The pilot of scenario building 
simulations was facilitated by the ICAOS by inviting the participants who were interested in 
the research topic in a discussion section. In this section, most of the participants were refused 
to participate in this process as well preferred to share their prior experiences in emergency, 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction phases (2004-2010). The evaluation process revealed that the 
participants had problems to predict the future but, prefer to analyze what happened in the past. 
In this case, this method was difficult to conduct because they were reluctant to participate in 
this scenario building process. 
The semi-structured interview was the main data collection method in this research. In 
conducting these interviews, it was effective in selecting and meeting the key local actors who 
were targets in this research. Making appointment with the interviewees for the semi-structured 
interviews was more flexible to follow the schedule of the interviewees. It would be easier to 
make the appointment if the researcher could refer to one name who happened to be his or her 
has personal relations or whom was respected by the interviewees. Most of the interviews were 
recorded but several interviewees objected to record their answers. This made different scales 
of detail in transcribing and analyzing the answers.  
Although the semi-structured interview has large number of respondents and local actors (75 
respondents) who chosen by snowballing method but most of the respondents did not 
understand and had no prior experience with the resilience building process. The understanding 
and familiarity of the respondents were different from three case study areas, particularly the 
local actors in Sabang and Aceh Jaya who were left behind the knowledge and experiences of 
the respondents in Banda Aceh. The actors who worked for the university and local NGOs was 
difficult to meet in Sabang and Aceh Jaya. Most of the NGOs ended their missions after the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction stages. The domination of respondents from the Sabang and 
Aceh Jaya were working for the government agencies that made it is challenging to analyze the 
contributions of the non-governmental actors in resilience building. This showed that the 
discourse of disaster resilience was concentrated in Banda Aceh as the capital city of Aceh 
Province.  
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The findings from the three case study areas were potentially comparable, but the analysis 
suggest that the answer from the local actors and community at large were identical regarding 
the collaboration process, their problems, and challenges at the local level. Various analysis 
themes and open coding can be developed to explore opportunities to link among different 
characteristics of urban, rural, and small island represented by these three case study areas. On 
the other hand, the findings are used good examples to illustrate the current practices in building 
disaster resilience and predicting local actor´s strategies in maintaining long-term resilience in 
the future at the local level in Aceh Province.  
The number of households involved in this research were limited due to the budget and time 
constraints, but this number is sufficient. This quantitative data was useful to diversify and 
strengthen the robustness of qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews. It could be 
much better if the household involved in this survey were selected more systematically, in term 
of numbers and their locations in term of the Tsunami impact zones in 2004.  
It was interesting that the duration of the respondents to answer the household surveys that was 
conducted in Aceh Jaya on the average was longer than in Banda Aceh and Sabang. The main 
reasons were that Aceh Jaya was a rural area where people have more time and happier to share 
their experiences. Most of the household surveys in Aceh Jaya were conducted in local 
language (Bahasa Aceh) encouraging the participants to talk and share their experience 
although the answers were not related to the survey questions. The stories told by the 
participants were interesting, however during the survey the opportunities to takes the stories 
in the answer sheets were limited.  
The high number of researches also affected the expectations of the respondents of the semi-
structured interviews and the household surveys participants to gain the direct benefit of the 
research. For example, the rewards of answering many survey questions that the researchers 
often pay an amount of money after the completion of the survey. On the other hand, the 
interviewee from the local NGOs and civil society organizations ask how the research can 
change or answer the current problems in building resilience. The interviewee from the 
governmental agencies request the researcher to share the findings and policy recommendation 
related to this research topic. In the efforts to fulfill the inquires of the transferability of research 
findings, it is important to send summary of findings to the respected interviewee from the 
governmental organizations.    
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On the other hand, most of the basic questions related to disaster event, disaster memory, and 
individual, and family evacuation planning were familiar to the participants. After the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami 2004, many international and local researchers came to Aceh conducting 
studies related to this mega disaster. However, the participants were bored and exhausted 
answering the same types of questions. Although the aims of the studies were varying greatly, 
but the focus of the study was related to the impacts of the disaster. It was important to 
formulate the questions creatively and innovatively, not only in rewording the questions, but 
also in how to address them. 
After the fieldwork, an extensive volume of data was also collected using mixed-methods 
research. The process has allowed the researcher to examine and analyze various aspects in 
greater detail. On the other hand, the analysis and interpretation of this substantial volume of 
qualitative and quantitative data requires more time than was anticipated. In this case, the 
researcher had allocated more time to familiarize and learn how to analyze quantitative and 
qualitative data. The process of analyzing the qualitative and quantitative data were incremental 
and simultaneous with reviewing the literature and developing conceptual framework. In this 
regard, the triangulation process was feasible with different data collection methods and 
analyses.  
8.6 Research contribution 
This dissertation extends the knowledge of the key tools and strategies that preferred and 
implemented by Aceh government to maintain medium and long-term disaster resilience after 
disaster at the local level. This research is also unique because it provides the evaluation of the 
challenges in the current multi-actor collaboration by proposing resilience focused 
collaboration framework. The empirical findings are also innovative, since most studies focus 
on the disaster event and the reconstruction phase.  
The empirical findings in this study can make several contributions to the current resilience 
literature. First, the main strength of this study is the exploration of the meaning of building 
and maintaining medium and long-term disaster resilience at the post disaster context. It means 
that this research provides certain empirical works to enrich the resilience theory, particularly 
how the local actors common understanding of resilience and how they operationalize this 
concept in practices at the local level (Bhamra et al. 2011). Secondly, this research added to 
the growing body of literature on maintaining disaster resilience by providing foundation to 
shift research from building resilience during recovery to sustaining resilience for a long run 
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following a mega disaster. This study has also provided additional evidences to the key tools 
and strategies to manage long-term resilience. 
Although the study was based a case study in Aceh Province after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
of 2004, the findings suggest that maintaining medium and long-term disaster resilience require 
better strategies and approaches beyond building resilience following disaster. This research 
also provides a new understanding of the key challenges in local actor´s capacities to achieve 
resilience by evaluating the current strategies and practices. The analysis of local actors´ have 
contribution have extended our knowledge about the gaps between the concept developed and 
translated these concepts into the policies and practices at the local level. Taken together, these 
findings underscore that a resilience-oriented approach can contribute more to the current 
disaster management policy in Aceh Province. The gaps identified in this dissertation are very 
concrete and therefore show areas and processes where changes and modifications are needed. 
Resilience focused collaboration as an evaluation framework which is proposed in this 
dissertation has also made several contributions to the literature. This framework has identified 
the relevant components of the collaboration which are important to maintain disaster 
resilience. Furthermore, this framework shows the linkages among these components that can 
applied in maintaining long-term disaster resilience. In the operationalization of this 
framework, the findings provide also additional tools to evaluate the multi-actors capacities to 
maintain resilience at local level. 
However, the most important thing is that this research has several practical applications and 
recommendations for the local government in the three case study areas: Banda Aceh, Sabang, 
and Aceh Jaya and the Aceh Provincial government. This evaluation framework also applied 
to evaluate their current strategies in maintaining disaster resilience. Thus, it points out that 
there are problems and challenges faced due to a neglect or unconsciously forgotten by these 
local governments. This research can contribute to open new discussion and dialogue among 
the local actors (different governmental actors as well as governmental and non-governmental 
actors) by articulating these problems. At the same time, to rethink on how to maintain disaster 
resilience and keep it alive for the future disaster risks in Aceh Province. The findings, 
however, are also important for international actors (e.g. UN institutions) if they design new 
strategies and approaches for building disaster resilience in post disaster regions. 
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8.7 Limitation of the research 
The scope of this research is limited in terms of the generalizability of the disaster resilience 
concept and definition. In this case, the evaluation of resilience building is focused on the 
current approaches and practices of local government and non-governmental actors following 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. These limitations mean that the empirical evidences need to 
be interpreted cautiously particularly on the term of maintaining long-term resilience that 
specifically defined and discussed in this dissertation. These results may not be applicable to 
measure resilience and explain the results of the resilience building process quantitatively. 
Other limitations of this research are related to the methodology, especially in excluding the 
potential respondents that who might contribute to this research to enrich the data and analysis. 
This group of people include Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik 
Indonesia) and Indonesian National Armed Forced (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) who have 
significantly contributed to emergency response and recovery after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
2004. Some potential names of respondents from the police and military institutions were 
available from the snowball method used to select them considering that them already had prior 
experience working together with the police and army in building disaster resilience. However, 
it is very difficult and complicated to obtain permission from the authority to interview police 
and army groups and therefore the possibility to succeed was low. The procedure to obtain the 
interview permission was strict due to their tight policy of sharing their information with others 
outside of these institutions. Another disadvantageous factor is because the research was 
conducted by a student from a foreign university.  
The other respondents who were absent when the data collection was done were from the 
business communities, private sectors, and financial institutions. According to Sendai 
Framework UNISDR (2015), the business and private sectors are the important stakeholders in 
building disaster resilience by supporting investments, business continuity and development of 
research and innovation. The involvement and direct contribution of the private sectors in 
building disaster resilience were not found during the fieldwork in Aceh Province. However, 
when the first meeting of the establishment of local multi-stakeholder forum in Banda Aceh on 
October 2013, the representatives from the local banks were present and they acknowledged 
that they were interested to join this platform, but at that time they did not have any ideas, 
programs, and activities related to disaster resilience building. This means that there is a 
possibility in Aceh that the private sectors will contribute in maintaining disaster resilience in 
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the future. But this can only be achieved by inviting and engaging the business community in 
resilience focused collaboration.  
But unfortunately, the study did not include the vulnerable populations such as: The Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) groups and those people with HIV/AIDS (Human 
Immune Deficiency Virus, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) found in Aceh Province. 
These group of people, however, are often marginalized and were not willing to contribute due 
difficulty to approach them. However, during the fieldwork, the invitations to interview were 
rejected because they were not interested in contributing to this research. But the secondary 
data related their condition were obtained by interviewing one of the NGOs who has worked 
with these vulnerable groups in promoting disaster resilience.  
This study is also limited by the numbers of municipalities and regencies that chose to include 
as the case study areas. The different characteristics of the impacts of tsunami in Aceh Province 
can be discussed more comprehensively by including for example, West Aceh regency that has 
only slightly different characteristics with Banda Aceh and Aceh Jaya but, providing more 
strategies and achievements in building disaster resilience. On the other hand, this research is 
relevant to look at the disaster resilience governance at the local levels and the strategies of the 
local government in maintaining disaster resilience.  
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9 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The purpose of this research was to provide in the in-depth knowledge and systematize the 
knowledge about how disaster resilience concept is translated to different policies and long-
term development plans, particularly in learning and implementation of specific DRR measures 
to build disaster resilience. The conclusions from this study follow the research questions and 
the findings and therefore address four areas: (a) conceptualization of disaster resilience and 
key characteristics of building disaster resilience at the local level; (b) strategies and 
approaches employed by state and non-state actors to build disaster resilience; (c) local actors 
collaboration in the development and maintenance of building resilience to disasters; and (d) 
challenges to the development and / or the sustainability of multi-actor and comprehensive 
strategies to promote disaster resilience at the local level. Following is a conclusion drawn from 
this research. This conclusion is followed by the research´s recommendations for practioners 
and decision making and recommendations for furture research needs.   
9.1 Conclusion 
This study focuses on the process of resilience building that emerged after the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction phase following the Indian Ocean Tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia. Through 
this case study, the research aims to understand whether and how post-disaster resilience can 
be maintained in the medium to long term. In this regard, a conceptual framework based on 
resilience theory, governance theory and collaboration theory has been developed and 
contextualized for the case study of Aceh Province. As described empirically throughout the 
case study, the study identified key problems to implement disaster resilience strategies after 
the tsunami for local actors (e.g. government, NGOs, and community members) as well as tools 
that are currently used for maintaining disaster resilience (e.g. local regulations, learning, and 
collaboration).   
The major finding of this research is that governmental and non-governmental actors have 
conceptualized and translated disaster resilience based on their perspectives and interpretations 
of the concept of resilience. The different interpretations of resilience manifest in different 
approaches to building disaster resilience that influenced by their identity as either state and 
non-state actors that learn how to see and understand about the resilience after the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami 2004.   
Local government actors tend to interpret resilience in line with the Hyogo framework which 
provide priorities for action and implementation strategies. The local government interpretation 
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which is closely linked to the Hyogo Framework itself, lead to a focus on developing 
comprehensive disaster resilience policies, legislation, and institutions. In this regard, the Aceh 
government has successfully established various legal tools to integrate disaster resilience in 
the medium and long-term development plans, such as local regulations, standard operating 
procedures, management plans, and local action plans for disaster management. In contrast, 
NGOs and community groups see resilience as learning and self-organization in building 
disaster resilience lead to a focus on practical efforts such as learning to evacuate and self-
organization in an emergency event (tsunami or earthquake). In this way, most of the NGOs 
perceived resilience as community empowerment and self-organization, particularly to 
promote disaster preparedness and awareness through their projects. In addition, community 
members tend to understand disaster resilience as their capacity to respond to disaster events. 
As such, they focus on developing individual and family evacuation plans to prepare for future 
tsunami events 
Theoretical approaches have underscored that learning, self-organization, and collaboration are 
essential for building resilience and maintaining medium and long-term resilience. The 
empirical findings of this study confirm that the local actors have learned from the recovery 
process and are still learning, more than ten years after the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. 
Over the past decade, evacuation strategies and infrastructure, establish the vertical evacuation 
shelters have been developed to strengthen preparedness and disaster risk reduction capacities. 
Despite this and the recognition of local actors realize that learning is important in building 
disaster resilience, the learning process is limited by local government, local NGOs, and 
community’s lack of learning resources, funding, time, and motivation. In this regard, false 
alarms from the early warning system have demonstrated the weak commitment of the local 
government to learn from past experience as people may ignore and underestimate these 
warnings in the future. 
The next key characteristic of disaster resilience at the local level is related to self-organization 
after the disaster. Self-organization is considered as a process of change that focuses on the 
governance system, institutions, cooperation, and actor networks at the institutional level. This 
was manifest in Aceh through the government’s introduction and integration of new legislation, 
rules and structures for disaster resilience building into their development agenda. At the same 
time, self-organization is revealed as changes at the community level, particularly in how the 
new legislation, plans, and strategies are viewed and received by the community. The 
perceptions of tsunami risk and uncertainties are key challenges for the local actors to 
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encourage community self-organization. However, community members have an awareness 
and ability to be able to evaluate the effectiveness of diverse strategies and approaches to build 
disaster resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami. This is because most of the community 
members have seen or involved in the recovery process after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.  
Although learning and self-organization are the key characteristics of disaster resilience, the 
local actors believe their instruments and tools (laws, programs, and activities) are more 
important than the monitoring and evaluation of their current strategies and approaches in 
maintaining disaster resilience. This is problematic because the evaluation is needed to achieve 
effective strategies in maintain long-term disaster resilience.  In addition, stakeholders and 
community members cannot contribute directly to the development of these strategies and the 
decision-making process which results in participation gaps and the process of community self-
organization.  These community members involvements are restricted because of the top-down 
approach in planning and decision making that is employed by the local government in building 
disaster resilience. The top-down approach is problematic because it creates participation gaps, 
particularly for the community members to participate in decision making and get feedbacks 
on their interests, comments, and expectations. Local government, therefore, needs to develop 
a mechanism to enable learning through critical reflection on their existing activities. 
In the Aceh context, local actor collaboration is the key characteristic of the development and 
maintenance of disaster resilience. Local actor attitudes towards collaboration are very positive 
because of their experiences of working together during the recovery phase and this has 
encouraged continued engagement. On the other hand, between provincial government and 
local government, there was no effective mechanism or procedure established to discuss and 
develop collaboration.  The local multi-stakeholder forum that was established by the 
provincial and local governments have struggled to facilitate the collaborative process between 
the state and non-state actors in maintaining medium and long-term disaster resilience. This is 
due to trust issues among the different actors and limited leadership of interventions of the local 
government to encourage a formal long-term collaboration.  
The main strategies and approaches employed by state and non-state actors to build disaster 
resilience centred on developing a strong structure of disaster management policies and 
organizations, including new local regulations, establishment of the local disaster management 
agency, and establishment of local multi-stakeholder forums at the local level. The next 
strategy is to set up various preparedness and mitigation measures, such as an early warning 
system, evacuation strategies and infrastructure, and buffer zone in the spatial plans. However, 
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more systematic information and evaluation tools would be needed to improve knowledge 
about the maintenance of preparedness and mitigation activities, particularly at school and 
village level. 
In terms of encouraging a range of participation, the government invited NGOs, civil society 
organizations, and community members to participate in various programs and activities. A 
particular effort was made to invite vulnerable groups such as elderly people, women, children, 
and disabled groups. In this regard, women have been involved in building disaster resilience, 
however, this has not led to fully gender equitable resilience as it is difficult for women to 
participate in decision making process, meetings, trainings or sensitizations due to technical 
problems (e.g husband permit and household chores). Gender inequity hampers the 
implementation of an effective preparedness strategy in the long-run.  
Furthermore, the range and plurality of the local actors who dealt with the disaster risk 
reduction and resilience building decreased significantly over time as the local NGOs struggled 
to maintain their contributions as donor funding became harder to attract.  
The findings from the household survey suggest that the disaster mitigation infrastructure and 
local government performance in promoting disaster resilience have improved. However, there 
are three main challenges to the development and sustainability of disaster resilience at the 
local level, (1) challenges in a common understanding of disaster resilience concept, (2) 
challenges in maintaining medium and long-term disaster resilience, and (3) challenges for 
collaboration. The root causes of these challenges are the different concepts and perspectives 
of resilience, different understandings and priorities in translating resilience, and different 
modes of operations among the government, NGOs, and community. This is particularly 
pertinent at the local government level which has been found to be struggling to integrate the 
resilience concept into development strategies. This stems from an inadequate translation of 
the resilience concept into the specific local context of Aceh as a post conflict society which 
needed a development approach that accounted for this post conflict situation.  
These challenges are complicated and remain unresolved while the local actors not aware of 
these challenges to improve the capacities to maintain long-term resilience.  Local actors need 
to articulate and discuss these problems actively to be able to collaborate better in maintaining 
medium and long-term disaster resilience. 
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9.1 Recommendations for practitioners and decision makers 
This research sheds light on the challenges, mismatches, and problems that have affected the 
maintenance of resilience in Aceh However, this highlights the need to focus on maintaining 
an ongoing collaboration between different actors in order to keep maintain resilience over 
time. Based on the empirical and discussion chapters (see chapters 5,6,7, and 8), the 
recommendations to maintain medium and long-term resilience are highlighted below: 
Recommendation 1:  Promoting common understanding of the conceptualization and 
translation of disaster resilience  
This research found the gaps in the translation of resilience concepts into policies and practices 
at the local government level. Maintaining disaster resilience requires a long-term political 
commitment and willingness from the government and other local actors, particularly in 
monitoring and evaluating existing programs. Therefore, the promotion of a common 
understanding of the resilience concept is key, particularly for communicating it clearly to the 
different stakeholders. It is recommended that the learning process in translating and 
integrating the resilience concept into development plans and action programs is strengthened 
by continually reviewing and evaluate the implementation of disaster resilience building 
strategies and approaches. 
Recommendation 2: Inviting and involving local actors and the community at large  
This research highlights that the implementation process was weakened by programs that had 
not been designed and developed in line with community needs. In complex contexts such as 
post-conflict Aceh, it is essential that care is taken to develop approaches that enable effective 
community collaboration for the design of approaches that fit with local needs, culture, and 
beliefs. Efforts are needed to review the current participatory mechanisms to invite and include 
a more diverse set of actors in maintaining resilience. This particularly applies to the 
participatory mechanism at the village level (musrenbang). The local government needs to 
learn to implement a bottom-up approach instead of the current top-down way of working. At 
the same time, local government needs to follow up on community engagement to provide 
feedback. Another option may be for the government to provide rewards for local actors (local 
government, NGOs, and community) that offer and implement the best strategies for 
maintaining disaster resilience over time. These rewards could be awards or offers of funding. 
This would be particularly beneficial for the local NGOs and community based-organizations 
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that contribute actively in this process but struggle to maintain their commitments over time as 
funding wains.   
Recommendation 3:  Improving the capacities of the local actors  
The findings have identified that there are gaps between the expectations and capacities of the 
local government that are not sufficient to achieve their goals in disaster management, 
particularly in terms of leadership and communication strategies. There is a need to make 
improvements in the human resources capacities of the disaster management authorities, as 
relevant skills and knowledge of disaster recovery processes are lacking and must be improved 
in order to ensure that their roles and responsibilities as the main governmental agency for 
building resilience can be met. The local government should choose their staff based on their 
educational background, interest and skills in disaster management rather than general 
administrative skills.  Staff should be well prepared through training in leadership programs 
and the provincial government should carry out periodic assessments to measure the 
performance of the local disaster management agency. It is also important to provide assistance 
(funding, expertise, or consultation) to support the local NGOs, civil society, and research 
institutions to develop their capacities in sustaining disaster resilience over time. 
Recommendation 4: Conducting credible and useful evaluation 
The findings address the challenges to the design and development of programs that meet with 
stakeholders needs. It is important to conduct an evaluation of the impacts and benefits of 
current strategies and approaches in maintaining long-term resilience as part of a continuous 
learning process. This evaluation should aim to improve the local government performance by 
offering options for better strategies and recommendations. In this regard, the key stakeholders 
should be involved in this evaluation process. It is also important to communicate the 
evaluation findings to the key stakeholders in order to promote learning and accountability. 
The most important thing is to encourage uptake and integration of the evaluation findings by 
decision-makers in the medium and long-term development plans. 
Recommendation 5: Shared goals in collaboration 
The study found that the process of building resilience is hindered by fragmentation, 
inconsistencies, and a lack of coordination among the local actors. The purpose of the multi-
actor collaboration may exist but is not stated and understood by local actors. Bureaucratic 
constraints affect the communication between different levels of government and key 
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stakeholders. Therefore, it is recommended to identify shared goals by discussing the interests 
and expectations of the local actors pertaining to the maintenance of medium and long-term 
resilience with the stakeholders and communities. 
Recommendation 6: Open and trusting collaboration 
The analysis findings highlight that trust and leadership issues were the key barriers to multi-
actor collaboration. To improve collaboration, it is useful to examine relationship issues 
between the local actors and then take significant action to build trust. Efforts are needed to 
improve the local government leadership roles, practices, and skills. It is highly recommended 
that the local government promotes collaboration advantages and nurtures a collaborative 
culture in managing long-term disaster resilience. At the same time, it is important for the local 
government to improve their formal and informal relationship and communication with the 
local NGOs, civil society, and academic communities in maintaining disaster resilience over 
time.   
Recommendation 7: Strengthening the contributions of local NGOs and civil society 
(informal leaders, consultants, professionals, volunteer groups, community based-
organizations) 
These organizations should initiate and take steps document and disseminate the lessons 
learned from the rehabilitation and reconstruction stages that are important for sustaining 
disaster resilience. Non-state actors should collaborate with the local government by 
introducing various programs and activities, such as providing feedback on government policy 
and exchanging information on effective disaster resilience processes. It is also important to 
work collaboratively to empower the community to contribute in managing long-term 
resilience.  
Recommendation 8: Enhance academic community contributions 
Academia should conduct research and policy analysis to respond to the problems in sustaining 
disaster resilience over time. These efforts can be used to develop targeted interventions that 
provide actionable recommendations. Therefore, the recommendations and feedback from 
academic communities are needed to improve the local actor capacities in maintaining medium 
and long-term resilience.  It is important that research findings for the state and non-state actors 
are effectively disseminated so that local actors can understand and learn together. In addition, 
the maintenance of the GIS as a knowledge management tool could be achieved through a joint 
effort by local authorities and universities or similar academic institutions in Aceh.     
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9.2  Recommendations for future research needs 
Although various research has been undertaken to investigate the implications of the recovery 
process directly after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004, it is evident that further research is 
needed to evaluate the progress of maintaining resilience over time. Further research in both 
theoretical and practical aspects of maintaining resilience is important as a largely neglected 
aspect of disaster resilience research. This is the right moment to shift research directions from 
building resilience in the post-disaster context to evaluating these processes over time.  
This dissertation focuses on the evaluation of disaster resilience ten years after the Indian Ocean 
tsunami in 2004. As shown, this research has provided a foundation for resilience studies by 
examining the conceptualization and translation process of this concept among different actors 
in Aceh Province. This research has clarified different roles and contributions of local actors 
and how they are influenced by different interpretations of resilience. The research has focused 
on how resilience building has emerged after the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, 
particularly the conceptualization, interpretation, and challenges to promote disaster resilience 
through collaboration in maintaining disaster resilience over time. 
Based on this study, further research is needed to identify and provide a better understanding 
of the variables that can nurture the collaboration between state and non-state actors in 
maintaining medium and long-term disaster resilience at the local level. What is now needed 
is a new culture of leadership for maintaining disaster resilience. This should be led by local 
government with careful attention to the religious and cultural beliefs that can stimulate other 
local actors to participate in this process. On the other hand, it is recommended that further 
research be undertaken to determine the willingness and capacities of local NGOs and civil 
society organizations. This work should pay particular attention to long term funding 
mechanisms or incentives to maintain contributions to maintaining long-term resilience. It 
would also be interesting to assess the contribution of these non-state actors particularly the 
private and informal sectors in maintaining disaster resilience, in terms of their contribution to 
learning, self-organization and adaptation process.   
Regarding the long history of political conflicts and uncertainties in the government 
commitment to support the resilience process, future research should therefore concentrate on 
the exploration of various strategies that can be applied not only by the local government but 
also the private sector and academic communities. It is also important that the future research 
builds on prior research and early insights that have been obtaining in the last ten years. More 
possible future studies are highly recommended to establish a better understanding of long-
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term aspects of disaster resilience. Further research should progress and extend methodological 
and theoretical approaches to assess the long-term process of building and maintaining disaster 
resilience and their integration in long-term development plans.  
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10 Appendices 
10.1 Protocol for semi-structured expert interview 
Governance and Collaboration 
1. What strategies and approaches are employed and preferred by the government and the 
community to build tsunami resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 in Aceh 
Province? 
2. How do these approaches differ from concepts and strategies conducted before the 
Tsunami 2004? 
3. What are the remaining challenges and problems faced by the government and the 
community in building tsunami resilience after the 2004 Indians Ocean tsunami in Aceh 
Province? 
4. What are key stakeholders and networks that deal with disaster risk reduction and 
resilience building at the local level (municipalities) in the province of Aceh? 
Capacities to manage resilience 
5. What do you think, today, if the tsunami early warning system rings and tell people that 
tsunami will approach, do the community members know how to save their life, if they are 
in their houses, at their offices or anywhere in this city? 
6. What community members still need so they can safe from the future tsunami? 
7. Do you consider, the government, non-government organizations or the community can 
provide it? 
8. Do you reckon, all the plans, infrastructures, and efforts that government and community 
provide for tsunami resilience building are fit with the community members need? 
9. How community members gain the knowledge about the evacuation plans and routes, 
evacuation building and where they must run to save their life in future tsunami event?  
Resilience 
Self-Organization 
10. What evidence is there of change in the community after the 2004 Indians Ocean Tsunami 
in Aceh province in term of building tsunami resilience? 
Learning 
11. What do you learn or what can be learned from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Aceh 
Province experience?  
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12. Do you still learn now? 
13. What limits it? 
Evaluation of the disaster resilience building strategies 
14. What do you think, the progress of tsunami resilience building in Aceh province after the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh province? 
15. How strong is your commitment to involve in tsunami resilience building in Aceh 
province? 
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10.2 List of semi-structured interviews 
Code Type of 
organisatiton/ 
agency 
Organization/Agency Administrative 
Entity 
Administrative 
level/ 
responsibility 
Date of 
Interview 
01-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental PMI (Indonesian Red Cross) Banda Aceh Province 10.10.2013 
02-GO-BNA Governmental Banda Aceh Disaster Management Agency Banda Aceh Municipality 11.10.2013 
03-GO-BNA Governmental SMP Negeri 1 (Junior High School ) Banda 
Aceh 
Banda Aceh Municipality 22.10.2013 
04-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Solidaritas Perempuan (Women Solidarity, 
NGO) 
Banda Aceh Province 23.10.2013 
05-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Young Voice (organization for disable 
person) 
Banda Aceh Province 25.10.2013 
06-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Walhi (Environmental Organization, NGO) Banda Aceh Province 28.10.2013 
07-GO-BNA Governmental Bappeda  
(Regional development and planning agency) 
Banda Aceh Municipality 4.11.2013 
08-GO-BNA Governmental Dinas Sosial 
(Social agency) 
Banda Aceh Municipality 7.11.2013 
09-GO-BNA Governmental SAR  
(Search and rescue) 
Banda Aceh Province 7.11.2013 
10-GO-BNA Governmental Balai Arsip Tsunami 
(Tsunami archieve agency) 
Banda Aceh Province 8.11.2013 
11-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Forum Jurnalis Aceh Peduli Bencana 
(Journalist Forum for Disaster awareness) 
Banda Aceh Province 8.11.2013 
12-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental PKBI  (Persatuan Keluaga Berencana 
Indonesia) 
Banda Aceh Province 8.11.2013 
13-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental JKMA (Jaringan Komunitas Masyarakat 
Adat)  
(Indigenous people network) 
Banda Aceh Province 12.11.2013 
14-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental JKMA (Jaringan Komunitas Masyarakat 
Adat)  
Banda Aceh Province 12.11.2013 
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(Indigenous people network) 
15-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Disaster Risk Reduction Forum Banda Aceh Banda Aceh Municipality 13.11.2013 
16-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Rumpun Bambu Indonesia Banda Aceh Province 14.11.2013 
17-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental ICAIOS 
(International centre for Aceh and Indian 
Ocean Studies) 
Banda Aceh Province 18.11.2013 
18-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Prodeelat Banda Aceh Province 19.11.2013 
19-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Yayasan Pena Banda Aceh Province 19.11.2013 
20-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental RAPI 
(Radio communication community) 
Banda Aceh Municipality 19.11.2013 
21-NGO-BNA Governmental Dinas Perhubungan dan Infokom 
(Transportation and telecommunication 
agency) 
Banda Aceh Municipality 20.11.2013 
22-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental HAKKA 
(Chinese community organization) 
Banda Aceh Municipality 20.11.2013 
23-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama 
(Islamic religious leaders agency)  
Banda Aceh Municipality 21.11.2013 
24-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental American Red Cross Banda Aceh Province 22.11.2013 
25-NGO-BNA Governmental Dinas Pekerjaan Umum  
(Public works agency) 
Banda Aceh  25.11.2013 
26-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental CRRC (Community rehabilitation and 
research centre) 
Banda Aceh Province 26.11.2013 
27-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental International Organization for Migration Banda Aceh Province 26.11.2013 
28-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Aceh Institute Banda Aceh Province 28.11.2013 
29-GO-BNA Governmental BPBD 
(Local disaster management agency) 
Banda Aceh Municipality 27.11.2013 
30-GO-BNA Governmental  BPBD 
(Local disaster management agency) 
Banda Aceh Municipality 28.11.2013 
31-GO-BNA Governmental DPRK Banda Aceh 
(The people´s representative council) 
Banda Aceh Municipality 2.12.2013 
32-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental PMI  Banda Aceh Municipality 5.12.2013 
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(Indonesian red cross) 
33-GO-BNA Governmental Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata 
(Tourism  and culture agency) 
Banda Aceh Municipality 10.12.2013 
34-GO-SBG Governmental Dinas Pendidikan  
(Education agency) 
Sabang Municipality 12.12.2013 
35-GO-SBG Governmental Tagana Sosial 
(Disaster mitigation volunteer ) 
Sabang Municipality 12.12.2013 
36-GO-SBG Governmental BPBD  
(Local disaster management agency) 
Sabang Municipality 12.12.2013 
37-GO-SBG Governmental Dinas Kelautan dan perikanan 
(Marine and fisheries Agency) 
Sabang Municipality 12.12.2013 
38-NGO-SBG Non-Governmental Balohan Village Sabang Municipality 12.12.2013 
39-GO-SBG Governmental Bappeda  (Regional development and 
planning agency) 
Sabang Municipality 13.12.2013 
40-NGO-SBG Non-Governmental RAPI (Radio Communication Community) Sabang Municipality 13.12.2013 
41-NGO-SBG Non-Governmental PMI  (Indonesian red cross) Sabang Municipality 14.12.2013 
42-NGO-SBG Non-Governmental Flora Fauna International (FFI) Sabang Province 14.12.2013 
43-NGO-SBG Non-Governmental JKMA (Jaringan Komunitas Masyarakat 
Adat)  (Indigenous people network) 
Sabang Municipality 15.12.2013 
44-NGO-SBG Non-Governmental World Conservation Society (WCS) Marine 
Aceh 
Sabang Province 17.12.2013 
45-NGO-SBG Non-Governmental KNPI (The national comittee of Indonesian 
youth) 
Sabang Municipality 18.12.2013 
46-NGO-SBG Non-Governmental PMI (Indonesian red cross) Sabang Municipality 19.12.2013 
47-NGO-SBG Non-Governmental SAR  (Search and rescue) Volunteer Sabang Municipality 19.12.2013 
48-GO-BNA Governmental Balai Arsip Tsunami 
Tsunami Archieve Agency 
Banda Aceh Province 3.1.2014 
50-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Disaster Management Consultant Banda Aceh Municipality 7.1.2014 
51-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Aceh Civil Society Banda Aceh Province 7.1.2014 
52-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Tikar Pandan Community Banda Aceh Province 8.1.2014 
53-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Karst Aceh Banda Aceh Province 8.1.2014 
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54-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Indonesian Doctor Association  Banda Aceh Province 9.1.2014 
55-GO-CLG Governmental BPBD (Local disaster management agency) Aceh Jaya Municipality 21.1.2014 
56-GO-CLG Governmental BPBD (Local disaster management agency) Aceh Jaya Municipality 21.1.2014 
57-GO-CLG Governmental BPBD (Local disaster management agency) Aceh Jaya Municipality 21.1.2014 
58-NGO-CLG Non-Governmental Women Leader Aceh Jaya Municipality 21.1.2014 
59-NGO-CLG Non-Governmental Sibad, PMI Aceh Jaya Municipality 22.1.2014 
60-GO-CLG Non-Governmental Sibad, PMI Aceh Jaya Municipality 22.1.2014 
61-GO-CLG Governmental BPBD (Local disaster management agency) Aceh Jaya Municipality 22.1.2014 
62-GO-CLG Governmental Dinas Sosial (Social agency) Aceh Jaya Municipality 22.1.2014 
63-GO-CLG Governmental Dinas Kesehatan (Health agency) Aceh Jaya Municipality 22.1.2014 
64-GO-CLG Governmental Bappeda (Regional development and 
planning agency) 
Aceh Jaya Municipality 22.1.2014 
65-GO-CLG Governmental Dinas PU (Public works agency) Aceh Jaya Municipality 22.1.2014 
66-GO-CLG Governmental Dinas Perhubungan dan Pariwisata 
(Transportation and tourism agency) 
Aceh Jaya Municipality 22.1.2014 
67-GO-CLG Governmental Dinas Perhubungan dan Pariwisata 
(Transportation and tourism agency) 
Aceh Jaya Municipality 22.1.2014 
68-NGO-CLG Non-Governmental Aceh Jaya Search and Rescue Volunteer Aceh Jaya Municipality 23.1.2014 
69-NGO-CLG Non-Governmental RAPI (Radio Community) Aceh Jaya Municipality 23.1.2014 
70-GO-CLG Governmental Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan (Marine and 
fisheries Agency) 
Aceh Jaya Municipality 23.1.2014 
71-GO-CLG Governmental Dinas Pendidikan, Pemuda dan Olahraga 
(Education, youth, and sport agency)  
Aceh Jaya Municipality 23.1.2014 
72-GO-CLG Governmental DPRK Aceh Jaya 
(The people’s representative council) 
Aceh Jaya Municipality 23.1.2014 
73-GO-MBO Governmental Bappeda Aceh Barat 
(Regional development and planning agency) 
Meulaboh Municipality 24.1.2014 
74-NGO-BNA Non-Governmental Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) 
Banda Aceh Province 27.1.2014 
75-GO-BNA Governmental BMKG, UPT Mata Ie Banda Aceh Province 30.1.2014 
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10.3 Sample of transcript interview from government agency   
Code: 07-GO-BNA  
Governance and Collaboration 
1. Apa kontribusi dari organisasi ini untuk meningkatkan kemandirian dan 
ketahanan masyarakat dalam menghadapi risiko bencana? 
 
What strategies and approaches are employed and preferred by the government 
and the community to build tsunami resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 
2004 in Aceh Province? 
 
Dari segi perencanaan memasukkan pengurangan risiko bencana sebagai program 
strategis RPJM 2012-2014. Bappeda akan memprioritaskan anggaran PRB untuk 
infrastruktur escape route dan jalan. Perawatan escape buiding dan memanfaatkan 
escape building sebagai tempat pemberdayaan masyarakat. Kerja sama ini sedang 
dijajaki dengan JICA. 
Selain itu, pemerintah kota juga memfasilitasi kerja sama antar lembaga sehingga 
terbuka peluang dibangun fasilitas dengan bantuan dari pihak luar.  
Adanya kerja sama untuk melakukan research tsunami dalam bentuk kajian. 
Adanya kurikulum tambahan di sekolah.  
Fasilitasi pembentukan forum pengurangan risiko bencana dan aktif di dalamnya. 
 
Terus melakukan kerjasama-kerjasama. Misalnya dengan Jepang dalam 
memberdayakan escape building dan meminta bantuan pusat untuk membuat escape 
building di tibang. 
 
Masyarakat sulit langsung untuk berpartisipasi, kecuali mereka memiliki wadah 
khusus. Misalnya jika terjadi gempa, masyarakat dapat melihat langsung apakah ada 
aparat pemerintah yang siap dan membantu. 
Cara yang lain adalah dengan mengirimkan SMS kepada walikota 
Menulis di surat kabar 
Dan mendirikan forum untuk berdiskusi. Diskusi biasanya dilakukan melalui BPBD. 
Semua hasil ini kemudian disampaikan kepada walikota. 
 
Jika masyarakat komplain bisa didiskusikan di rapat-rapat yang dilaksanakan 
 
Perencanaan ini dilakukan dengan mekanisme bottom up, melalui musrenbang 
masyarakat bisa mengusulkan kebutuhan mereka misalnya tanggul air untuk 
gelombang pasang.  
Pemerintah juga bisa memberikan kebutuhan masyarakat yang tidak diusulkan tapi 
dianggap penting, misalnya pelebaran jalan untuk escape route. 
 
Kebutuhan-kebutuhan ini juga akan dibicarakan di musrenbang. Kebutuhan yang kecil 
akan dipenuhi oleh pemko. Jika besar maka akan ditanggung bersama antara pemko 
dan provinsi. Jika besar maka akan diusulkan ke pusat. 
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Jika keputusan sudah disahkan maka tidak bisa lagi diubah. Misalnya RTRW, jika 
sudah diundang-undangkan tidak bisa lagi diubah. 
Jika mau mengubah harus sebelum disahkan dan sudah ada mekanisme untuk itu yaitu 
melalui public hearing sebelum dijadikan peraturan daerah. 
Namun biasanya rencana-rencana ini akan lebih mementingkan kepentingan 
masyarakat. 
 
Masyarakat tidak akan pernah merasa puas. Satu sisi pemerintah juga sudah melakukan 
yang terbaik. Komplain akan selalu ada karena dana yang sedikit sementara usulan dari 
masyarakat sangat banyak. Jadi pemerintah akan menetapkan prioritas apa yang akan 
dikerjakan terlebih dahulu dan sisanya akan dikerjakan untuk tahun depan. Yang paling 
penting adalah memberikan penjelasan yang baik kepada masyarakat.  
PAD harus disubsidi silang karena pembangunan di satu wilayah biasanya dibangun 
dengan sumber dana dari wilayah lain. 
Masyarakat dari wilayah yang memiliki PAD kecil sebaiknya jangan terlalu banyak 
meminta. 
 
Informasi-informasi ini diberikan melalui poster APBD yang dikirim ke desa-desa dan 
dapat diakses secara online melalui website pemko. 
Pemko juga memiliki aplikasi e-monev, e-kinerja dan e-planning yang memuat usulan 
dari masyarakat namun akses untuk aplikasi ini masih terbatas namun saat ini masih 
dalam proses agar bisa dibuka untuk umum. 
 
Kualitas dari setiap informasi ini sangat baik karena data yang dikumpulkan langsung 
dari pihak yang berwenang. 
 
Semua pelaporan dilakukan dengan baik. Ada laporan fisik dan hasil setiap tahun. 
Biasanya penyusunan laporan terkendala terbatasnya waktu untuk mempersiapkan 
laporan tersebut. 
 
Diskusi selalu dilakukan dengan SKPD melalui pendiskusian anggaran. Proses 
komunikasi dengan masyarakat dilakukan dengan mekanisme musrenbang. 
Masyarakat akan diundang melalui camat dan kepala desa akan memilih siapa yang 
akan datang mewakili desa ketika musrenbang. Bukan Bappeda yang menentukan 
daftar undangan. 
 
In term of a planning to include the Disaster Risk Reduction (PRB) as the Midterm 
Development Plan (RPJM) strategic program for 2012-2014, Bappeda will prioritize 
the PRB budgets to build escape route infrastructure, to enlarge road, to maintain escape 
building, and to support community-based activities and trainings regarding the 
utilization of escape buildings. In order to achieve those targets, Bappeda will join a 
team with JICA to objectify the plans.  
 
In addition, Bappeda and local government will join force to facilitate a teamwork 
between agencies in order to provide opportunities to build the escape building 
infrastructure with the help of central government or other private organizations in 
Indonesia or overseas.  
 
Besides, Bappeda plans to create a collaboration with any relevant institutions to 
conduct research regarding tsunami issues as well as to insert the PRB information into 
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the school curriculum.  Moreover, Bappeda will facilitate the establishment of PRB 
forum as a place for the communities to actively participate in reducing the disaster 
risk. However, if communities are unable to participate in the forum, they can send 
direct messages to mayor and/or to write news in the local newspaper. 
 
The Disaster Risk Reduction (PRB) programs are designed with the bottom-up 
mechanism or deliberative planning. Through this method, the communities can 
propose their needs, such as a need for water levee to prevent the overflow of tidal 
waves. Additionally, the government can also provide people’s needs, which are 
considered essential, but are not proposed, such as road’s widening for escape route. 
Generally, the small needs are the responsibility of local government, while the large 
one will be proposed to the central government.  
Before any decisions related to PRB programs are officially accepted, any 
considerations that may disrupt the implementation of the plans should be seriously 
taken into account. If the decisions are approved, then they could no longer be changed. 
The changes must be done before the approval and usually the public hearing 
mechanism is used to make a change to the proposed programs prior to being made as 
local regulations and the changes need to be more concerned with the interests of 
society. 
 
The society will never be satisfied with government efforts. Although the government 
have done their best, they may find many complains if they could not fulfil 
communities’ demand. One of the reasons that triggers critiques from communities is 
insufficient fund. In this case, the government may not be able to meet all the needs of 
society. In general, the government will set priorities of what should be firstly done and 
what could be postponed.  
 
The local revenue should be cross-subsidized or distributed evenly to all areas due to 
the development of an area is usually built with the budgets from other areas. Therefore, 
the government usually urges any areas that has low local revenue to limit their 
demands. In addition, the information regarding the proposed programs is informed 
through the budget poster that will be distributed to all villages as well as could be 
accessed online through the official website of the local government. Besides, the local 
government also have mobile applications that can be accessed through smartphones, 
such as e-money, e-performance, and e-planning. Unfortunately, those applications are 
currently only accessible to certain circles and in the process to be opened to the public.  
 
The quality of information is very good because of the data was collected directly from 
the authorities. 
All reporting is done well. There will always be an annual physical report as well as its 
results at the end of the year. Usually, the only obstacle in writing an annual report is 
the limited time to prepare the report. 
 
Discussions are always done, particularly the discussion about the budget on education. 
We communicate with the public through the mechanism musrenbang. The public will 
be invited through the district and village leaders will choose who will come to 
represent the village when musrenbang. Not Bappeda that determines the list of 
invitees. 
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2. Apa yang membedakan pendekatan ini dengan strategi yang dilakukan sebelum 
tsunami 2004? 
 
How do these approaches differ from concepts and strategies conducted before 
the Tsunami 2004? 
 
Sebelum tsunami, tata ruang kota Banda Aceh sudah memasukkan ancaman bencana 
seperti banjir, kebakaran dan puting beliung. Pemko sudah mempersiapkan itu. 
Setelah tsunami, semuanya diarahkan menghadapi bencana tsunami. 
 
Before tsunami, Banda Aceh city planning has included the threat of disasters - such 
as floods, fires and tornados - into its design. However, today, every disaster planning 
is designed to be ready to face the tsunami disaster. 
 
3. Tantangan dan masalah apa yang masih dihadapi organisasi anda untuk 
melakukannya setelah tsunami 2004? 
 
What are the remaining challenges and problems faced by the government and 
the community in building tsunami resilience after the 2004 Indians Ocean 
tsunami in Aceh Province? 
 
Untuk Bappeda, isu tsunami telah familiar, namun di dinas lain sangat susah agar 
semua dapat berpandangan sama bahwa suatu saat tsunami akan datang lagi. Apakah 
kita siapa? Jika pun hanya terjadi gempa, apakah masyarakat siap untuk melakukan 
evakuasi dengan baik? Apakah fasilitas mencukupi ? karena dari pengalaman terakhir 
evakuasi dilakukan dengan kenderaan sehingga banyak terjadi kecelakaan lalu lintas. 
 
Masyarakat juga belum siap, seperti untuk melakukan tsunami drill, apa yang harus 
disiapkan? 
 
Dari segi perencanaan juga belum baik, fasilitas vital masih berada di daerah rawan 
tsunami, meskipun pemko banda aceh sudah memindahkan fasilitas seperti rumah 
sakit, namun masih banyak sekolah di daerah rawan tsunami. 
 
Masyarakat juga masih memiliki kebiasaan untuk menyekolahkan anaknya tidak di 
wilayah tempat tinggalnya, sehingga ketika terjadi gempa semua orang kembali untuk 
mengambil anaknya, tidak langsung menyelamatkan diri.  
Bappeda tidak bertemu dengan masyarakat kecuali pada saat musrenbang. Pada saat 
musrenbang ketika mayarakat memiliki masalah maka Bappeda memberikan 
informasi. Masyarakat selalu datang jika diundang mengikuti musrenbang. 
 
Karena meminta bantuan dari pihak lain maka harus menunggu kepastian jadi atau 
tidaknya. Sampai saat ini belum dilakukan. 
 
For Bappeda itself, tsunami issues are familiar things. However, it is still difficult to 
share similar ideas regarding tsunami, which may happen in the future, with other 
departments. Are we prepared? Even if it is only an earthquake, is the public ready to 
evacuate well? Are the facilities adequate? Based on the last experience, the 
evacuation is conducted with vehicles. As the result, many casualties and traffic 
accidents were occurred during the process. 
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Besides, communities tend to send their children to school that are located far away 
from their home. In this case, when an earthquake occurs, people may likely be 
returning to school to pick up their children instead of escaping to a secure location to 
save themselves.  
 
Based on the above story, it can be concluded that the communities are not ready yet 
to face another potential threat of tsunami. In conducting tsunami drill, for example, 
the communities are still not sure what to be prepared. The planning itself is not good 
enough, many vital facilities are still located in areas prone to tsunami threats. 
 
4. Dengan siapa saja atau organisasi apa saja, anda bekerja sama dan 
berkoordinasi? 
 
What are key stakeholders and networks that deal with disaster risk reduction 
and resilience building at the local level (municipalities) in the province of Aceh? 
 
Pada level kabupaten/kota, Bappeda bekerja sama dengan semua SKPD dan BPBD. 
Pada level provinsi, Bappeda bekerja sama dalam bidang anggaran, misalnya dalam 
pembebasan tanah untuk jalan atau usul untuk membuat escape route.  
Pada level pusat, bantuan rambu-rambu arah evakuasi dan pelatihan-pelatihan. 
Forum PRB dan PMI dengan memfasilitasi pertemuan. 
Bappeda menyediakan peta dan data mitigasi untuk pihak-pihak yang membutuhkan. 
Bappeda juga bekerja sama dengan lembaga dari dalam dan luat negeri, khususnya 
mahasiswa atau lembaga penelitian yang melakukan kajian tsunami. 
 
At the district or city level, Bappeda usually cooperates with the local agencies 
(SKPD) and the local disaster management agency (BPBD). Meanwhile, at the 
province level, Bappeda joins a team with the provincial financial department to 
handle budget spending issues, such as in paying the land acquisition to be used for 
the road or in designing a budget proposal to build escape routes. Additionally, in 
term of the needs for the evacuation signs and trainings, Bappeda generally consults 
the central government to provide all the needs for them.  
Moreover, Bappeda will facilitate meetings with other groups that are incorporated 
into the local multi stakeholder forum (PRB).  Bappeda also provides maps and 
mitigation data for every party that needs them as well as cooperates with both 
national and international agencies, particularly research students or institutions that 
conduct tsunami studies.  
 
Capacities to manage resilience 
5.  Apakah menurut anda, saat ini, jika terjadi peringatan sirene akan terjadi 
tsunami masyarakat akan aman atau mampu menyelamatkan diri jika anda 
berada di rumah, di kantor atau sedang berada dimanapun di kota ini? 
 
What do you think, today, if the tsunami early warning system rings and tell 
people that tsunami will approach, do the community members know how to 
save their life, if they are in their houses, at their offices or anywhere in this city? 
 
Aman tidaknya masyarakat tergantung skala gempa dan tsunami yang akan terjadi. 
Tidak semua akan selamat karena fasilitas belum mencukupi. 
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Secara mental lebih dari siap karena akan banyak korban karena fasilitas jalan kecil 
dan berputar-putar, simpang, jalan buntu dan vertikal building belum banyak.  
 
The safety of a community will depend on the scale of an earthquake or tsunami. It is 
currently predicted that not all people will survive the disaster due to inadequate 
facilities, such as narrow and circuitous roads, too many dead-end roads and lack of 
vertical buildings.  
 
6. Menurut anda, apa yang masih dibutuhkan agar jika terjadi tsunami 
masyarakat dapat selamat dari bencana tersebut? 
 
What community members still need so they can safe from the future tsunami? 
Infrastruktur yang lebih baik dalam kuantitas dan kualitas. 
Penyadaran dan pembiasaan terhadap masyarakat masih kurang harus terus menerus 
melakukan tsunami drill untuk semua lapisan masyarakat. Masyarakat tau tapi tidak 
ada biasa melakukannya. Harus ada komitmen dan paksaan dari pemerintah. 
 
People are in needs of better infrastructure in both quality and quantity. Raising 
public awareness of tsunami through tsunami drill activities is one way of educating 
the community on how to survive another tsunami threat in the future. In doing so, 
there must be a commitment and an interference of local government in order to 
guarantee the successfulness of activities.  
 
7. Apakah menurut anda pemerintah, LSM, atau organisasi anda mampu 
menyediakan semua kebutuhan tersebut? 
 
Do you consider, the government, non-government organizations or the 
community can provide it? 
 
Bisa tapi bertahap karena dana yang tidak mencukupi sehingga penyelesaian 
kegiatan-kegiatan itu membutuhkan waktu untuk menyelesaikan. Harus ada bantuan 
dari pihak-pihak lain. 
 
Yes, they could. However, it could not be done at once due to insufficient funds. The 
availability of supports from other parties will be much appreciated.  
 
8. Menurut anda, apakah semua rencana, fasilitas, dan usaha pemerintah dan 
masyarakat untuk meningkatkan kemandirian dan ketahanan masyarakat 
dalam menghadapi risiko bencana sudah sesuai dengan kebutuhan masyarakat? 
 
Do you reckon, all of the plans, infrastructures, and efforts that government and 
community provide for tsunami resilience building are fit with the community 
members need? 
 
Idealnya harus memenuhi kebutuhan masyarakat karena sulit untuk menyesuaikannya 
dengan kebutuhan masyarakat. Pemerintah memenuhi kebutuhan ini secara paralel 
dan bertahap. 
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Not all the needs of community have been fulfilled because it is hard (for the 
government) to fit (the budget) with the community needs, but the local government 
will gradually accomplish it from time to time.  
 
9. Darimanakah masyarakat mendapatkan pengetahuan tentang apa yang harus 
dilakukan ketika suatu saat terjadi tsunami untuk menyelamatkan diri 
(evacuation plans and route, evacuation building?) 
 
How community members gain the knowledge about the evacuation plans and 
routes, evacuation building and where they have to run to save their life in 
future tsunami event?  
 
Resilience 
Self-organization 
10. Perubahan-perubahan apa saja yang terjadi untuk meningkatkan kemandirian 
dan ketahanan masyarakat dalam menghadapi risiko bencana setelah tsunami 
2004? 
 
What evidence is there of change in the community after the 2004 Indians Ocean 
Tsunami in Aceh province in term of building tsunami resilience? 
 
Sistem anggaran berubah sekarang menggunakan RPJM. Tata ruang disesuaikan 
dengan konsep resilient city dan kota madani. 
 
Infrastruktur sudah banyak dan penataan ruas jalan, pemukiman yang lebih baik.  
 
Currently, the budget system has changed into the midterm development plan. The 
spatial concept is adapted to fit with the concept of resilient city and civil society.  
 
We have better infrastructure, road, and housing now.  
 
Learning 
11. Apa saja yang telah organisasi anda pelajari dari pengalaman tsunami 2004? 
 
What do you learn or what can be learned from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in 
Aceh province experience?  
 
Kota Banda Aceh rentan terhadap tsunami sehingga ini menjadi dasar dalam 
melakukan perencanaan dan kegiatan. Baik dalam melakukan sistem transportasi 
publik semuanya harus dilihat berdasarkan ancaman tsunami. Jika terjadi tsunami 
apakah infrastruktur akan bertahan, apakah akan aman, inilah yang menjadi 
pertimbangan dalam melakukan perencanaan. 
 
Banda Aceh city is vulnerable to tsunami treats, in that case, every plan, particularly 
the public transportation, and activities has to be designed to survive all-natural 
disaster threats, particularly tsunami. If the Tsunami come, we have a good 
infrastructure, so if the question, do we have a robust infrastructure, this is our main 
consideration in planning. 
 
12. Apakah proses belajar ini masih berlangsung? 
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Do you still learn now? 
 
Proses belajar ini masih berlangsung dalam proses perencanaan dan monitoring. 
Tsunami adalah rahasia alam sehingga manusia hanya bisa berusaha. Jangan tidak 
melakukan apa-apa padahal sudah tau ada ancaman tsunami. 
 
The learning process is still under way in terms of planning and monitoring. Because 
tsunami is a natural disaster that can occur anytime, the community have to be 
prepared in order to survive. Do not do nothing, we all know that we have tsunami 
risk  
 
13. Apa yang membatasi proses belajar ini? 
 
What limits it? 
 
Bahan belajar kurang, bahan kajian kurang karena tenaga ahli tidak berkontribusi dan 
tidak mau membagi hasil kajian dengan pemerintah. Pemerintah juga sangat terbatas 
waktunya sehingga harus berkoloborasi dengan ahli-ahli. Harus ada sinergitas antara 
masyarakat dan pemerintah. 
 
Lack of learning materials and resources. Experts do not want to contribute and share 
their research with the local government. We as the local government have a limited 
time to learn, so we have to collaborate with the disaster experts. We have to create 
synergy between the community and the government. 
 
Evaluation of the disaster resilience building strategies 
14. Menurut anda, bagaimana perkembangan dari proses meningkatkan 
kemandirian dan ketahanan masyarakat dalam menghadapi risiko bencana 
setelah tsunami 2004 di masa yang akan datang? 
 
What do you think, the progress of tsunami resilience building in Aceh province 
after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Aceh province? 
 
sudah dilakukan tapi masih kurang karena masih banyak persoalan lain selain 
masalah bencana. Misalnya masalah kemiskinan, penurunan moral, dan 
perkembangan kota banda aceh menuju urban sehingga berubah masyarakatnya dari 
heterogen menjadi plural. Jika terjadi gempa, baru masyarakat teringat kembali.  
 
The local government has done their best efforts to prepare and train communities to 
be ready in facing tsunami threats in the future. However, due to the availability of 
other issues, such as poverty, moral decline, and the development of Banda Aceh city 
toward the urban community, which is changes from a heterogeneous community to 
become a plural one.  
 
15. Bagaimana komitmen organisasi anda untuk terus melakukannya?  
 
How strong is your commitment to involve in tsunami resilience building in Aceh 
province? 
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Perkembangannya akan semakin baik. Pembangunan infrastruktur mitigasi tsunami 
sudah sejak tahun 2008. Awalnya tidak jelas domain siapa dan semua diserahkan 
kepada Bappeda. Kegiatan ini semakin terorganir sejak ada BPBD and TDMRC. 
TDMRC sudah melakukan banyak pertemuan internasional dan melakujan diskusi 
yang membahas masalah sosial korban tsunami.  
 
Komitmen tetap kuat, harus siap menghadapi tsunami. Perencanaan akan terus 
dilakukan dalam mempertimbangkan semua aspek ancaman tsunami. Juga 
berkomitmen untuk menjadikan kota resilient dan madani. Siapapun yang akan 
menjadi walikota tetap akan mempertimbangkan kedua konsep kota ini. Mungkin 
hanya akan menentukan arahnya kemana dan penyesuaian-penyesuaian. 
 
The construction of tsunami mitigation infrastructure was begun in 2008. At the 
beginning, it was not clear whose responsibility it was, and all the burden is directed 
to the local government officials (Bappeda). However, this activity was properly 
organized since the establishment of the local disaster management agency and the 
TDMRC. TDMRC has conducted a lot of international meetings and discussion on 
social issues of tsunami victims.  
 
Our commitment to be ready to face any potential tsunami threats remains strong.  All 
planning to build a better city will consider all aspect of tsunami threats. Also 
committed to making cities resilient and civil. Anyone who will be the mayor will 
still consider both the concept of the city. Perhaps only will determine the aim and the 
revision of the plan. 
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10.4 Sample of transcript interview from NGO 
Code: 24-NGO-BNA 
Governance and Collaboration 
1. Apa kontribusi dari organisasi ini untuk meningkatkan kemandirian dan 
ketahanan masyarakat dalam menghadapi risiko bencana? 
 
What strategies and approaches are employed and preferred by the government 
and the community to build tsunami resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 
2004 in Aceh Province? 
 
Dulu organisasi kami pertama kali datang ke Aceh karena ada recovery program 
tsunami, dan kegiatan tersebut menyediakan budget yang cukup besar yaitu 300 juta 
USD. ada beberapa program yang dikerjakan. Kalau terkait ketangguhan masarakat 
dalam menghadapi resiko bencana saya melihat ada dua aspek, yang pertama memang 
ada program khusus yang menjalankan program mengurangi resiko bencana, saat 
tsunami dulu kita mulai. Kita jalankan program ini dulunya di 19 desa yang ada di 
Banda Aceh dan Aceh Jaya pada tahun 2010-2011. Dengan rincian 9 desa di Aceh Jaya, 
10 Desa di Banda Aceh. kita jalankan setelah 2011 kita jalankan program berbasis 
masyarakat. Tapi kalau sebenarnya kita bicara berbasis masyarakat community based, 
itu istilah yang banyak orang pakai, tidak hanya disuport oleh satu program saja tapi 
banyak program-program lain. Kita juga punya livelihood, ada program air bersih dan 
sanitasi, sosial dan kesehatan, kemasyarakatan dan itu dapat menunjang ketangguhhan 
masyarakat. ada yang di dekati secara langsung, ada yang tidak dengan program 
pengurangan resiko bencana. Dampak yang lebih luas dari program yang lain. 
 
At first, our organization came to Aceh for the tsunami recovery program, and it 
provided a quite big amount of budget which was around 300 USD. There were several 
programs we worked on at that time. When it comes to the resilience of community in 
managing risks of disasters, I can see that there are 2 aspects here. First, indeed we had 
a special program that was specifically created to restrain the risks of disaster, which 
was started after the tsunami. We ran this program back then on 19 different villages 
within Banda Aceh and Aceh Jaya in the years of 2010-2011. To be more detail, 9 
villages in Aceh Jaya, and 10 villages in Banda Aceh. After 2011, we started to run 
community-based programs. But when we’re talking about community-based program, 
a well-known term used by many, it was not only supported by one program but also 
by many other programs. We also had livelihood program – such as clean water and 
sanitation, social and health programs, and community programs – which were 
expected to be able to increase the community resilience in managing the risks of 
disaster. Sometimes we used direct approach, and sometimes instead of using disaster 
risk reduction programs, we used programs that could give broader impact. 
 
Jargonnya program kita partisipatory yang dalam perencanaannya mengumpulkan 
masyarakat dan ini menjadi tantangan bagi kita. Kurang kadang-kadang kelompok 
termaginalkan di masyarakat ini merasa berkenan atau tidak cukup dapat kesempatan 
dalam kesempatan itu. Nah cara mengatasi itu ada beberapa komponen, kalau untuk 
gender untuk siaga bencana itu di setiap desa kita bentuk 50% laki-laki 50% lagi 
perempuan, kemudian kelompok-kelompok dengan kebutuhan khusus seperti ibu 
hamil, orangtua, anak-anak, difabelitas ini menjadi kelompok rentan, ketika kita buat 
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rencana kontigensi mereka perlu mendapatkan perbuatan khusus untuk evakuasi dan 
lain-lain. 
 
Within the programs, we used term “participatory” which was initially planned to 
gather all community and then turned out to be another challenge for us. In this term, 
the participatory was not enough. Sometimes we also had to deal with the marginalized 
group of societies who feel neglected and did not get enough chance to be engaged with 
the programs. Well, in coping with these issues, we had several components. First, by 
giving 50-50 quotas gender-based allocation for the disaster-response team. Secondly, 
by creating group where the people with special needs such as pregnant women, elders, 
children, and people with disability were joined as the vulnerable group which in our 
contingency plan would be receiving more attention in terms of evacuation, and so on.  
 
Mekanisme itu setiap desa kita bentuk tim siaga bencana, ini jadi modifikasi di tim 
siaga bencana ini, kalau ada ya ada, jadi disanalah kadang-kadang fungsi kami cuma 
mengingatkan aja, kenali kelompok-kelompok dengan kebutuhan khusus dan perlu 
mendapatkan perhatian khusus. Tapi sejauh ini ada kelompok yang berkebutuhan 
khusus menyampaikan konsen mereka secara langsung, bisa jadi link dengan PMI, tim 
PMI dengan tim SIBAT (Siaga bencana berbasis masyarakat), tim SIBAT dengan 
masyarakat, karena tidak ada komunikasi dengan mereka. 
These mechanisms were applied to each village by forming a disaster risk reduction 
team, with several modifications to suit the participation on site. Our roles were mostly 
to remind them, and to engage with those with special needs within the society as the 
vulnerable group who required more of our attention. But so far, we had groups with 
special needs who spoke up their concerns directly [to the American Red Cross]. 
Otherwise, they [the American Red Cross] would talk to PMI before the 
communication would go from PMI to SIBAT [Community-based disaster 
management] and SIBAT to community, because there is no direct communication in 
between. 
 
Ditempat –tempat yang programnya berjalan dengan bagus seperti Bireuen dan Bener 
Meriah bisa di cek kok, tanggapannya positif terus kemudian program kami akan 
selesai maret 2014, tapi banyak masyarakat minta program tersebut diperpanjang atau 
di beberapa desa di bener meriah yang tempat kami tidak menjalankan program, 
mengapa di tempat mereka tidak di jalankan program serupa. Keberhasilan program itu 
beragam, kalau di Aceh tamiang memang tidak begitu berjalan programnya karena 
jaraknya, letak kantor PMI dengan tempat dilaksanakan program harus di tempuh 
selama 2 jam (ketamiang hulu) dengan kondisinya yang cukup berat. Mungkin tingkat 
kedekatannya beda tidak seperti didaerah-daerah lain.  
On places where the programs went successfully like in Bireuen and Bener Meriah; 
you might want to check; they gave us positive response. Although we had to end our 
program on March 2014, many of them asked for a program extension. However, in 
some villages in Bener Meriah, outside of the villages where we ran these programs, 
we had people protesting and demanding for the same programs to be applied also in 
their villages. The success of the programs would be different in each site. In Aceh 
Tamiang, indeed, the programs were not that successful due to the distance between 
facilities. For example, from the PMI office to the site of the program we need to take 
a 2-hours-long trip (to Tamiang Hulu), not to mention the very bad condition of the 
road. Thus, the distance may be varied, and the problem is not always the same with 
the other villages.  
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Umumnya saya lihat programnya di masyarakat diterima dengan baik. Sampai titik 
tertentu kita juga di anggap bagian dari mereka, ketika ada anak atau keluarganya yang 
nikah di undang, jika ada yang meninggal kita ikut takziah. Di awal program kita buat 
pertemuan dengan BPBA di Banda Aceh dan menjelaskan strategi yang akan kita 
lakukan, begitu juga di kabupaten atau kota lainnya, kita berkoordinasi dengan BPBD 
dan pemerintah setempat. PMI kabupaten dengan provinsi punya kerjasama dengan 
BPBD untuk menjalankan program-program ini, termasuk beberapa kabupaten mereka 
membuat laporan tahunan untuk diserahkan ke BPBD Kabupaten kota di daerah 
mereka. Yang menjadi pertanyaan adalah beberapa staf disitu jika ditanya open gak 
open. 
 
Generally, I could see how the programs were well accepted by community. To certain 
extent, we were even counted as part of them. We were invited to wedding events of 
their families or relatives, and if there was a family lost we would be asked to join them 
praying together (takziah). At the beginning of the programs, we set a meeting with the 
BPBA in Banda Aceh to explain about our strategies and plans. The same procedure we 
did in other municipalities and regency, where we coordinate with BPBD and the local 
government. The PMI in both local and provincial levels also had cooperation with 
BPBD to work together in running our programs as well as preparing annual report to 
be submitted to the BPBD. The only problem was that the staffs there did not really 
care when we came to ask some questions related to the program.   
 
Seharusnya itu harus berjalan dalam forum pengurangan resiko bencana di Aceh, tapi 
forum pengurangan resiko bencana di Aceh saat ini tidak begitu aktif, namun kita 
mencoba dan mendorong mereka untuk membuat program setelah gempa 11April 2012 
itu kesempatan yang bagus untuk semua pihak berefleksi, apa benar yang kita lakukan 
selama ini sudah ada dampaknya karena saat itu tes yang sebenarnya. Jadi kami 
menghadirkan referensi-referensi seperti itu maunya kami bulanan tapi agak sulit untuk 
hal itu.  
 
These programs were supposed to be run within the Disaster Risk Reduction multi-
stakeholder’s forum. But at the same time, the forum was not working properly. 
Nevertheless, we kept trying and encouraging them to create another program after the 
11th April 2012 earthquake, because that was the perfect moment for all of us to get 
reflection whether what we have done so far have given good impact or not. That’s the 
real evaluation for the strategies and approaches we have applied. So, we hoped that 
we could provide such references every month, but apparently, it was rather hard to do 
so. 
 
Diantaranya kami lihat Forum PRB Aceh hanya sebagian kecil yang aktif, sementara 
yang lainnya lagi tidak aktif. Kemudian lembaga-lembaga seperti ini sudah menjadi 
ajang untuk perebutan kepentingan pribadi, ada pihak A, pihak B. jika pihak A yang 
menang, pihak B narik diri, begitu juga sebaliknya, jadi ya tidak begitu jalan. Itu pihak 
A atau B mewakili organisasi dan uniknya ini jika di forum PRB Aceh ini dulunya dia 
merasa penggagas forum (pendirinya)setelah mempersiapkan semuanya untuk calon 
kandidat ketua, namun yang terpilih malah orang baru, orang yang mereka anggap tidak 
terlalu berkecimpung dalam pendirian sehingga komunikasi tidak bagus. 
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Among those in Aceh PRB [Disaster Risks Reduction multi-stakeholder forum], a few 
people actively participated, while others were rather passive. Institution/organization 
like this has always been an arena where personal interests were put in competition; A, 
B, and so on. If A for example wins, B will withdraw, and vice versa. So, you can say 
that the organization has never been functioned properly. The A and B here were the 
representatives of organization members in this forum, and they thought that they had 
contributed in the establishment of the PBR forum (as the founders). So, after preparing 
everything for the candidate election of new leader of the forum, the moment the seat 
was eventually taken by someone new [a new member] who they considered never 
contributed ever since the beginning, and as the consequence it caused the unconducive 
working atmosphere within the forum members. 
2. Apa yang membedakan pendekatan ini dengan strategi yang dilakukan sebelum 
tsunami 2004? 
 
How do these approaches differ from concepts and strategies conducted before 
the Tsunami 2004? 
 
Yang membedakan adalah, pendekatan strategi setelah recoveri yaitu, kita pada masa 
setelah tsunami dulu kita punyak dana yang besar US$ 300 juta untuk Aceh saja, jadi 
komponen kerjanya lebih luas dan kita sebut nama programnya Integrated Risk Based 
Community. Cuma dulu AR tidak pernah bekerja sendiri tapi bekerja melalui PMI dan 
kami berpikir dengan komponen yang banyak dan butuh biaya yang banyak dan butuh 
biaya besar, maka program akan sulit di replikasi atau dilanjutkan oleh PMI, jadi 
kemudian sejak tahun 2012 kita ada pengurangan dari program itu, namun juga ada 
penambahan. Kalau dulu kita selalu lihat program AR itu di bawah goalnya. Goalnya 
biasa untuk mengurangi tingkat kematian orang, mengurangi kerusakan harta benda. 
 
The difference between the strategy before tsunami 2004 and the approach we used in 
the post-recovery program, is that we had a huge amount of funding after tsunami, 
which was around 300 million USD for Aceh alone. Thus, the scope of the program 
was larger, and we named the program as the Integrated Risk Based Community. But 
anyway, the AR [the American Red Cross] had never worked alone. They worked with 
PMI. And we thought that with the huge amount of component and budget, the 
programs would be hard to be replicated or continued by PMI, considering their limited 
capacity. Thus, after 2012 we modified the programs. Usually, we run assessment to 
the AR programs based on the goals. Generally, the goal is to increase the survival rate 
of the disaster event, and to reduce any kind of property damage. 
 
Itu pada masa tsunami dibagi tiga untuk peningkatan kapasitas masyarakat, 
menguatkan kapasitas sekolah dan PMI. PMI harus kuat karena mereka implementing 
agency. Di samping itu, belakangan ini menjadi refleksi kita kalau sekolah dan 
masyarakat tidak bisa dipisahkan, seharusnya menjadi satu komponen. Ada sekolah, 
masyarakat dan peningkatan kapasitas PMI dan juga hubungan dengan stakeholder. 
Misalnya kita di sini menjadi pemain yang aktif juga dalam pengurangan resiko 
bencana dengan melakukan kegiatan dengan BPBA, setelah itu kita juga libatkan 
perguruan tinggi dan untuk tahun lalu kita ada kerjasama dengan 4 kampus yang ada di 
Aceh yakni, Universitas Teuku Umar, Sekolah Kesehatan di Bener Meuriah, Al-
Muslim Bireuen dan kampus di Tamiang untuk membuat peta tematik untuk 
pengurangan resiko becana pada kegiatan KKN mereka. 
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During the tsunami relief, we divided our approach into three programs: first is to 
increase the community capacity; second is to strengthen school capacity; and third is 
to develop the PMI capacity. The PMI should have a good capacity because PMI has a 
main role in implementation of the programs. Besides, recently we found that schools 
and community cannot be separated in the program, as they are supposed to be targeted 
as one component. In these programs, we involved schools, community, and capacity 
enhancement for PMI, as well as connections with the stakeholders. For example, we 
took an active role in disaster risk reduction by cooperating with the BPBA, and we also 
involved several universities. Last year we involved 4 universities based in Aceh – 
Universitas Teuku Umar in Meulaboh, Bener Meriah Medical School, Al-Muslim 
University in Bireuen and a university in Tamiang – to create a thematic map for risk 
reduction program as part of the students’ community service program (KKN). 
  
Yah itu kontribusinya, evaluasi programnya, walaupun saya lihat sekarang juga. 
Dulukan konsep seperti Community Resilience, implisit di program, hari ini saya lihat 
trendnya termasuk di AR, kita juga melihat eksplisit Community Resilience, terus 
bagaimana kita mengidentifikasi komponen-komponen CommunityResilience itu yang 
berbeda-beda antara peneliti dan konseptor tapi secara umum hampir mirip-mirip, tapi 
itu belum dimulai. Kedepan kita akan gagas dengan cara itu. 
These all are our contributions and the evaluation of the programs. And we keep giving 
contribution until today. Back then, the concept of Community Resilience was very 
implicit in the programs. But today, we can see the trend, including in AR, we can 
identify several explicit Community Resilience in the programs. Furthermore, the way 
we identify the components of the Community Resilience are different among 
researchers and contributors, though generally they are rather similar. It has not started 
yet, but we are going to introduce the explicit Community Resilience component in the 
future.   
 
3. Tantangan dan masalah apa yang masih dihadapi organisasi anda untuk 
melakukannya setelah tsunami 2004? 
 
What are the remaining challenges and problems faced by the government and 
the community in building tsunami resilience after the 2004 Indians Ocean 
tsunami in Aceh Province? 
 
Tantangan malah bukan bekerja dengan masyarakat, justru saya tidak melihat ada yang 
signifikan bekerja dengan masyarakat. Tantangannya justru dengan tim pelaksana 
karena kita bekerjanya itu dengan volunteer, relawan kemudian terus standart 
management programnya. Ada take over relawan yang dibentuk yang nantinya akan 
sangat berpengaruh ke masyarakat. Jika volunteer kerja di lapangan dengan masyarakat 
baik, aktif, maka mereka akan terus berusaha saat pelaksanaan program ke depannya 
di masyarakat.  
 
Surprisingly, our main challenge in this program was not when we worked with local 
people. 
I could not see any significant challenge during our work with the people. The real 
challenge was within PMI team, since we were working on a voluntary basis, it thus 
sometimes affected the work productivity and the program management. We had 
volunteers who later would take over the programs and play significant role to the 
community. If volunteers work together with the community in cooperative way, they 
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will keep doing their best on the next program implementation in the future within 
community.  
 
Namun kendalanya dalam bekerja berkaitan pemerintah lokal seperti BPBA atau 
BPBD. Kapasitasnya terbatas, dan kendalanya lagi di negeri ini saat orang mejadi PNS 
semangat untuk bekerja, semangat untuk melayani tipis, ya itu, kadang-kadang juga 
tidak bisa disalahkan orang karena sistemnya. Kami saat ke BPBD-BPBD, sering 
ketemu dengan satu, dua anak muda yang mau bekerja lebih tapi tidak survive juga, 
karena kalau kata orang sini, ujung-ujung mentok juga jadi itu sih tantangannya. Kalau 
dengan masyarakat cukup baiklah dan cukup lancar.  
 
But the problem then also occurred when we worked with the local government 
institution like BPBA or BPBD. They have a very limited capacity, and the problem in 
this country is that when someone became a civil servant (PNS), the spirit to work and 
to serve community is very weak. But, well, you cannot blame the government officer 
when it is the fault within the system. When we came to BPBD, we often met one or 
two young officers who would like to perform better but unfortunately, they do not 
receive enough appreciation. This is because the Acehnese community believe that the 
extra effort will be useless at the end. So, that’s the real challenge in working with our 
government. On the other hand, I think everything was fine and went smoothly with 
the community.   
 
Kadang memang ada masalah dan masyarakat kita, pasca tsunami dengan menyebutnya 
entitlement mentality, penghayatan keberhakan, orang merasa berhak. Jadi kalau ada 
bencana masyarakat secara otomatis mereka berpikir akan dibantu seperti materi. Ada 
pengalaman-pengalaman, misalnya teman-teman mendampingi masyarakat 
dampingan. Dalam progress jika terjadi banjir teman-teman sudah datang ke desa 
tersebut jam 2 pagi, tapi tidak bawa sekardus Indomie, masyarakatnya langsung bilang 
ngapain kemari? Ya secara mentality juga berpengaruh tergantung bagaimana kita 
membawa diri kemasyarakatnya. 
 
Indeed, we could have some problems. After tsunami, we identified a problem within 
the local community that was called ‘entitlement mentality’. It means the sense of 
having certain rights, where people feel entitled to certain rights. So, when a disaster 
happens, the people would immediately think that they will soon receive aid in form of 
goods or money. We have some experiences, for example when the volunteers visited 
the affected community. During a flood event, our volunteers had been in the village 
since around 2 AM in the morning. They did not have a box of instant noodle [a 
common food supply in emergency] to give. The people then asked, “What are you 
doing here?” Well, this statement discouraged us badly, but then it depends on how we 
deal with the local people during our mission. 
 
4. Dengan siapa saja atau organisasi apa saja, anda bekerja sama dan 
berkoordinasi? 
 
What are key stakeholders and networks that deal with disaster risk reduction 
and resilience building at the local level (municipalities) in the province of Aceh? 
Saat ini partner bekerja utama kami PMI dengan cara menyediakan dana dan teknis, 
kemudian PMI yang bekerja di lapangan. Kita juga bekerjasama dengan BPBA di 
beberapa daerah dan Kabupaten/Kota di Aceh juga dengan forum pengurangan bencana 
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di Provinsi Aceh. pernah juga melakukan koordinasi dengan IOM yang masih bekerja 
di bidang ini 
Our main partner now is the PMI. We support PMI by providing them funds and 
technical supports, while they will work on the program implementation. We also 
cooperate with BPBA in some regions in Aceh and with the Disaster Risk Reduction 
forum in Aceh Province. Once we also coordinated with IOM who still work in the 
same field. 
 
Capacities to manage resilience 
5.  Apakah menurut anda, saat ini, jika terjadi peringatan sirene akan terjadi 
tsunami masyarakat akan aman atau mampu menyelamatkan diri jika anda 
berada di rumah, di kantor atau sedang berada dimanapun di kota ini? 
 
What do you think, today, if the tsunami early warning system rings and tell 
people that tsunami will approach, do the community members know how to save 
their life, if they are in their houses, at their offices or anywhere in this city? 
 
Kalau sebagian besar bisa menyelamatkan diri sebagian lagi tidak (ya fifty-fifty lah) 
kenapa tidak bisa menyelamatkan diri? Karena perilaku untuk menyelamatkan diri 
masyarakat masih belum jelas, sebenarnya belum clear bagaimana menyelamatkan diri 
secara efektif.  
I think some people could survive (50-50 possibility). Why could not they survive 
during tsunami event? Because they do not have a good evacuation plan. They do not 
have sufficient knowledge related to the effective evacuation procedure. 
 
Pada gempa 11 april 2012 lalu saya berada di desa alue dayah teungeh kecamatan 
meuraxa saya melihat sendiri, bahwasannya diantara masyarakat ada gedung evakuasi 
namun sedikit sekali masyarakat yang mau menggunakan gedung itu. mereka mau lebih 
memilih pergi dengan motor kedaerah yang mereka anggap tinggi, kemudian jalanan 
jadi macet, kalau terjadi tsunami wasalam semuanya akan jadi korban dan meninggal.  
 
On the 11th April 2012 earthquake, I was in Alue Dayah Teungeh village in Meuraxa 
district. I saw that there was an evacuation building available, but very few people were 
willing to evacuate to that building. They preferred fleeing with motorcycle to the 
higher places, which then led to the serious traffic jams everywhere. In that situation, 
if something like tsunami happened, no one could survive. 
 
Kenapa ini bisa terjaadi: pertama, fasilitas evakuasi masih tidak cukup, kedua jika 
fasilitas cukup belum digunakan secara maksimal karena tidak cukup ada evaluasi. 
Ketika setelah ada gempa itu saya melakukan FGD ke 3 desa, Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar 
dan Aceh Jaya, saya tanyakan ke masyarakat kenapa mereka mengapa mereka tidak 
mengggunakan gedung evakuasi, kemudian mereka mengatakan tidak yakin dengan 
kontruksi bangunan tersebut karena ini kontruksi Indonesia dan Pemerintah yang 
mengawasinya. Dan mereka juga tidak dapat sosialisasi yang cukup tentang berapa 
ketinggian gedung tersebut dan berapa kekuatan gedung tersebut, untuk kekuatan 
gempa berapa SR. 
 
How could this happen? First, the evacuation facility is not sufficient. Even if the 
facility was sufficient, people would not use it to the optimum utility due to the lack of 
appropriateness study for the facility as the vertical tsunami evacuation shelter. After 
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the earthquake, I conducted some FGDs in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, and Aceh Jaya. I 
asked them why they did not evacuate to the evacuation building, and they said that 
they were unsure with the construction quality of the building since it was built by 
Indonesian engineers under supervision of Indonesian government. They also did not 
get enough sensitization in terms of the height and the strength of the building, and 
what is the maximum earthquake magnitude in Richter Scales it could resist. 
 
Yang kedua mereka yang di Banda Aceh tidak mau menggunakan gedung terssebut, 
bukan karena hanya ingin menyelamatkan diri tapi harta mereka juga. Dan Informasi 
harus mengungsi kemana, bagaimana kondisinya seperti itu belum menjadi auto kritik 
bagi lembaga-lembaga kami yang pernah bekerja di Banda Aceh. Salah satu yang 
menjadi tantangan adalah program-program ini desainnya di perdesaan yang orang-
orangnya ingin berkumpul bersama ingin membicarakan hal-hal bersama, ada 
kunjungan dari rumah kerumah atau buat kelompok-kelompok kecil untuk pertemuan. 
Dan hal ini sulit diterapkan di perkotaan dan menjadi PR kedepannya menjalankan 
program dalam kontek urban. Program sudah berjalan dulu, tapi kita masih pukul rata 
pendekatannya, sekarang kita coba mereview kembali program yang sudah pernah kita 
jalani. 
 
And then, people in Banda Aceh prefer not to evacuate to the building because they 
wanted to save not only their lives, but also their valuable personal belongings. And 
information about where to evacuate and about building capacity have never been the 
main concern to the relevant organizations in Banda Aceh. One of the challenges in 
Banda Aceh as an urban area is that these programs previously were designed for rural 
communities, where the people like to gather around and talk about issues together, 
visit door-to-door, or have small groups meeting. Next, this program will be 
implemented in urban context and thus it is harder. It then becomes another task for us 
to be able to implement this program in urban context in the future. The programs have 
been managed well, and we are still generalizing the approach that we use. Now we are 
trying to review the programs we have implemented before. 
 
 
6. Menurut anda, apa yang masih dibutuhkan agar jika terjadi tsunami masyarakat 
dapat selamat dari bencana tersebut? 
 
What community members still need so they can safe from the future tsunami? 
 
Fasilitas penyelamatan diri, rambu evakuasi, kemudian juga jalur evakuasi perlu 
ditambah. Yang kedua pendidikan masyarakat apa yang perlu dibawa saat 
menyelamatkan diri, dimana mereka bisa berkumpul dengan keluarga, bagaimana 
warga bisa punya rencana tanggap darurat dan yang sangat penting kesiap siagaan di 
pemerintah. Pemerintah punya rencana kontegensi yang dibuat betul-betul kemudian 
ada dishare di masyarakat. Namun yang saya lihat tidak begitu dan saya yakin banda 
Aceh punya S.O.P peringatan tsunami dini, namun sejauh mana disosialisasikan, itu 
saya juga tidak tau atau jangankan untuk disosialisasikan untuk dipahami saja susah 
oleh aparat pemerintah. Karena yang paling besar di negeri ini, mutasinya sering. 
Karena yang buat dokumen siapa yang mengurus siapa. Saya melihat publik service 
paling kurang, pemimpinnya berlatar politik sehingga tanggungjawabnya kurang. 
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Survival facilities, evacuation signs, and evacuation routes still need improvement. 
Next is how to educate community, for example about things they truly need to bring 
with them while saving their own lives, about where they should be heading to in case 
of they want to gather with their whole family, how their emergency plan would be and 
then the most important is the government’s disaster emergency plan. The government 
has also created a contingency plan that has been sensitized to the community. But, 
unfortunately that was not what I saw on field. As far as I am concerned, Banda Aceh 
has its own S.O.P. for tsunami warning, but I am not sure about how far it has been 
sensitized. It is difficult to be implemented, because the government do not have 
sufficient knowledge and understanding about the plan. One of the reason is because 
the government were frequently transferred to different job position. The ones who 
created the documents are different with the ones who will take care of the next 
procedures. I think that the government officials are controlled by a strong political 
agenda and have a very little sense of responsibility in public service. 
 
7. Apakah menurut anda pemerintah, LSM, atau organisasi anda mampu 
menyediakan semua kebutuhan tersebut? 
 
Do you consider, the government, non-government organizations or the 
community can provide it? 
 
8. Menurut anda, apakah semua rencana, fasilitas, dan usaha pemerintah dan 
masyarakat untuk meningkatkan kemandirian dan ketahanan masyarakat dalam 
menghadapi risiko bencana sudah sesuai dengan kebutuhan masyarakat? 
 
Do you reckon, all the plans, infrastructures, and efforts that government and 
community provide for tsunami resilience building are fit with the community 
members need? 
 
Sudah ada tapi apakah sesuai atau belum, perlu di cek lagi sepertinya. Tapi yang 
menjadi tantangan adalah dokumen-dokumen itu sudah selesai, disimpan di lemari dan 
jika ada pameran pembangunan baru di keluarkan lagi untuk di pajang. Saat orang 
Jakarta datang tinggal d tunjukin namun apakah sudah di sosialisasi. Itu yang jadi 
pertanyaan besar apakah masyarakat tau?  
We do have plans, facilities, and efforts, but whether it is fit or not, we still need to 
review our approaches. But the next challenge is when all the paperwork (related to the 
plans, facilities, and efforts) are done, the documents are kept in the drawer. These 
documents are used only for the government expo, and as the evidence to show when 
people from Jakarta (the central government officers) came to monitor the program. 
But has it ever been sensitized to our community? Have the community ever get the 
information? These are the big questions. 
 
9. Darimanakah masyarakat mendapatkan pengetahuan tentang apa yang harus 
dilakukan ketika suatu saat terjadi tsunami untuk menyelamatkan diri 
(evacuation plans and route, evacuation building?) 
 
How community members gain the knowledge about the evacuation plans and 
routes, evacuation building and where they have to run to save their life in future 
tsunami event?  
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Masyarakat tau selama ini dari pengalaman mereka di gempa tsunami 2004, itu 
pengetahuan yang paling banyak masyarakat dapat dan yang kedua dari media massa, 
yang ke tiga pastilah dari lembaga-lembaga yang dulunya bekerja di aceh saat bencana 
meninggalkan sesuatulah ke masyarakat adalah informasi dan tantangannnya 
informasi-informasi tersebut kita bisa mendukung untuk memilah mana yang paling 
penting dan mengemasnya untuk mudah di ingat. 
 
People learned a lot from the experience in the 2004 earthquake and tsunami. That was 
the experience where they gained most of their knowledge from. Secondly, from the 
mass media, and third is from institutions/organizations that used to work in Aceh 
during disaster reliefs. They left lots of things or information for the community to learn 
from, which makes the only challenge left is how to classify things that are more 
important and easier to be remembered from all the information. 
 
Resilience 
Self-organization 
10. Perubahan-perubahan apa saja yang terjadi untuk meningkatkan kemandirian 
dan ketahanan masyarakat dalam menghadapi risiko bencana setelah tsunami 
2004? 
 
What evidence is there of change in the community after the 2004 Indians Ocean 
Tsunami in Aceh province in term of building tsunami resilience?  
 
Masyarakat yang pasti tahu apa itu tsunami, yaitu gempa besar yang disertakan naiknya 
air laut kedaratan, kemudian kalau mereka menyalamatkan diri dengan motor maka 
jalanan akan macet, itu masih harus lama ditingkatkan untuk perbaiki perubahan-
perubahan dari masyarkat pasca tsunami. Ada perubahan positif di masyarakat aanya 
peningkatan pengetahuan, peningkatan keterampilan sedangkan perubahan negatifnya 
kehidupan sosial masyarakat lebih menurun, karena mereka dulu bersaing untuk 
mendapatkan bantuan. Dan ini akan jadi sulit bagi masyarakat saat pemerintah, LSM, 
tidak bisa diharapkan untuk berbuat sepenuhnya. 
 
The community have certainly become more aware of tsunami. They have known 
tsunami as a tremendously strong earthquake followed by the big wave. And they have 
learned that if they try to evacuate with motorbike, it would cause serious traffic jam. 
We still need a long-term improvement and transformation within the society after 
tsunami. There are however some positive changes like the improvement of knowledge 
and skills. One negative social change is the declining of social lives quality, because 
they used to compete to get the aid, and it will be challenging for the community once 
the government, NGOs, cannot be expected to perform excellently. 
 
Learning 
11. Apa saja yang telah organisasi anda pelajari dari pengalaman tsunami 2004? 
What do you learn or what can be learned from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
in Aceh province experience?  
 
Kesiapasiagaan dalam masyarakat itu penting, kesiapsiagaan di keluarga juga penting, 
dulu kita sering melihat hal ini dalam kontek terpisah tapi sekarang kita malah berpikir 
ketangguhan masyarakat saat ini tidak akan terkotak-kotak lagi. Kemudian 
pengetahuan yang penting jika terjadi bencana bantuan dari luar bisa datang paling 
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cepat 6 jam dan itu tidak efektif, yang efektif itu biasanya setelah 24 jam sehingga 
kapasitas masyrakat harus ditingkatkan dan meningkatkan dalam menghadapi bencana.  
 
The emergency response of the community is important. The emergency response of 
families is also important. In the past, we often saw these things in separate contexts. 
But now, we would like to think that the community resilience should no longer in a 
comprehensive concept. Another important thing to know is when a disaster happens, 
the aid will be coming only after 6 hours at the fastest, and it is not even sufficient 
during the time. The capacity of community should be improved to be able to self-
respond the disasters while waiting for the additional aid that would come after 24 
hours. 
12. Apakah proses belajar ini masih berlangsung? 
Do you still learn now? 
 
13. Apa yang membatasi proses belajar ini? 
What limits it? 
 
Evaluation of the disaster resilience building strategies 
14. Menurut anda, bagaimana perkembangan dari proses meningkatkan 
kemandirian dan ketahanan masyarakat dalam menghadapi risiko bencana 
setelah tsunami 2004 di masa yang akan datang? 
 
What do you think, the progress of tsunami resilience building in Aceh province 
after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh province? 
 
15. Bagaimana komitmen organisasi anda untuk terus melakukannya?  
 
How strong is your commitment to involve in tsunami resilience building in Aceh 
province? 
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10.5 Sample of transcript interview from community-based organization 
Code: 20-NGO-BNA 
Governance and collaboration 
1. Apa kontribusi dari organisasi ini untuk meningkatkan kemandirian dan 
ketahanan masyarakat dalam menghadapi risiko bencana? 
 
What strategies and approaches are employed and preferred by the government 
and the community to build tsunami resilience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 
2004 in Aceh Province? 
 
Karena gini, kita memang di RAPI ini terdidik care sekali dengan penanganan bencana, 
makanya ketika kita menghadapi pihak-pihak yang seharusnya menghadapi bencana, 
mereka melempem dan kita ini dongkol, emosi dong. Kita gak punya gaji, RAPI itu 
relawan murni lo mbak, gak punya gaji seperak pun, tapi kita berani berbuat habis-
habisan, sementara ada instansi pemerintah yang punya dana luar biasa, kok mereka 
adem-adem ayem, pergi pagi apel segala macam pulang sore selesai. RAPI 24 jam stand 
by, itu realita selama ini di lapangan, terlepas dari ada satu dua yang belum maksimal 
mungkin, tapi secara umum untuk RAPI saya berani bilang luar biasa untuk carenya 
terhadap bencana. 
 
Because, here is the thing. We, [members of] RAPI, are very well educated in disaster 
management. That is why, when dealing with parties who are supposed to take care of 
this issue instead of being sluggish/passive, we get very annoyed and upset. We do not 
get paid as in RAPI all of us are pure volunteers. We do not get paid at all though we 
go all out in our work, and meanwhile a government institution with a huge funding 
out there is doing nothing; their staffs are coming in the morning, doing all routines, 
and then going home in the afternoon just like nothing happened. RAPI would stand-
by for 24 hours per day; that is what happened on site for real. Apart from maybe one 
or two more unfinished work, just yet, generally I dare to say that RAPI exceptionally 
care about disaster. 
 
Masuk RAPI itu kita ngurus izin dari pemerintah, izin kepemilikan perangkat juga izin 
frekuensi itu kita bayar lo mbak. Setelah itu, alatnya, radionya, alat komunikasi kita 
beli sendiri dengan uang sendiri. Bergabunglah di RAPI, menjadi relawan RAPI. 
Begitu ada bencana, orang lain belum datang, kita harus sudah datang, itulah yang kita 
terapkan di RAPI. Mulanya adalah sedikit mula-mula berfikir ini uang sendiri, semua 
sendiri, bantu-bantu orang sendiri, tapi lama-kelamaan anggota RAPI ini caranya 
tumbuh sendiri, kita larangpun ketika ada bencana jangan datang, marah sama kita. Jadi 
kalau ada bencana sudah overload jumlah anggota kita, keseringan seperti itu, mungkin 
artinya efektifnya hanya 8 orang untuk satu kegiatan. Tiba-tiba yang datang karena rasa 
solidaritas sama sodara-sodaranya bisa puluhan, berhari-hari, berminggu-minggu, kita 
di lampuuk tempo hari yang baru-baru ini agak sering intensitasnya tinggi kemarin ada 
yang tenggelam di lampuuk, sampai dua minggu kita masih siaga di sana. Saat orang 
lain sudah bubar, pihak-pihak terkait sudah bubarkan pencarian, rekan-rekan kita masih 
ngetime juga, tapi kadang-kadang kita juga harus memberikan apresiasi yang luar biasa 
kepada rekan-rekan ini. Wajar kita sempat emosi kalo mendengar ceramah-ceramah 
dari pemerintah, dari orang-orang yang selama ini seakan-akan bajunya berlabel 
“sayalah pejuang kebencanaan”, sementara kerjanya pagi pergi apel pulangnya sore, 
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wajar saya sedikit emosi, tapi intinya mari kita bergandengan tangan, siapapun itu, mari 
kita sama-sama peduli terhadap kebencanaan ini. 
 
To join RAPI, we must get permission from the government - the devices ownership 
permit, the frequency licenses - and we must pay for all of it. We paid for everything. 
Moreover, the tools - radio and other communication devices - it is all in our personal 
expenses. Joining RAPI means becoming vounteer for RAPI. When a disaster happens, 
everybody else may not be there yet but we have got to be there and be ready. That is 
what we always do in RAPI. At the beginning, they might have been thingking through 
everything, that they would use their own money, do all work on their own, and help 
people on their own will. But in the long run, RAPI members somehow are growing 
together. If they are told not to come/help in a disaster situation, they will feel 
disappoint. So, every time a disaster is occured, most of the times we got team members 
more than we need. Normally, eight people should be enough for an incident. However, 
dozens would come for solidarity, and are willing to stay helping for days, for weeks. 
In Lampuuk [a beach area name in Aceh], not long ago, someone was drowned. We 
were there stand-by for two weeks. Everyone else had gone home and another team had 
stopped searching, but our team continued to stand-by. We should give a great 
appreciation to them. It is just normal to get mad hearing the speeches of the 
government officers, who only wear uniforms that seemed to be labeled/saying like 
"I'm a great rescuer", while all they do are just signing in every morning and going 
home in the afternoon. It is normal to get a little upset, but anyway the most important 
thing here is to work hand in hand, whoever you are, let us work together and show that 
we care.  
 
Saat air sedang naik. Saat sebahagian diluluh-lantakan, ini ada rekan kita si julidar yang 
bawa lari perangkat dan langsung melaporkan. “kami baru diguncang gempa yang 
sangat kuat” dan kita belum tau berapa kekuatannya, pokoknya sudah mirip-mirip 
kiamat, sambil lari langsung melaporkan bahwa air laut sudah naik, kita tidak tau bahwa 
massa itu tsunami, Karena masyarakat kita pengetahuannya rendah tentang tsunami 
bisa kita kategorikan masa itu nol, kecuali orang-orang yang memang pendidikannya 
di bidang kebencanaan pernah ke luar negeri, dia tau tsunami apa, kalau kita disini 
orang lokal tidak tau, kacuali ada beberapa daerah seperti simeulu. 
 
When the water was rising high [Sunday morning, 26.12.2004, right after the 
earthquake], and some parts [of area] could have been destroyed, we had our partner, 
Julidar, who took the radio communication device right away and reported to us, 
“We’re just hit by a strong earthquake! “, while we had not known yet how strong it 
was, but anyway it was felt like the end of the world already. While kept running, he 
reported that the water was rising very high. We did not know at that time that it was 
tsunami, because the people had no knowledge about tsunami at the time. Except for 
those who studied disaster related subject, or who ever went abroad, they might have 
known about what tsunami is. However, the local people here had no clue, except for 
those who lived in a village like Simeulu. 
 
Di Simeulu bukan tsunami juga katanya mereka lebih mengenal ‘smong’, itu cerita 
turun-temurun, sehingga mereka juga antisipasi. Begitu gempa sudah kencang dan 
dilihat air sudah surut, memilih untuk naik kepuncak gunung, sebelumnya mereka 
belum pernah melihat tsunami, tapi karena cerita turun-temurun itu, itu sebenarnya 
warisan lokal yang memang sangat baik untuk dikembangkan untuk dijaga 
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kelestariannya. Jadi kita juga dari RAPI, kearifan lokal yang seperti itu juga kita cari. 
Setiap kita tugas kelokasi-lokasi bencana, kita juga tetap mengutamakan kearifan 
lokalnya, kita juga harus tau kebiasaan masyarakat setempat bagaimana, kita juga harus 
bisa beradaptasi dengan itu, sehingga apa yang kita berikan bantuan tidak salah kaprah. 
Karena berbicara tentang informasi, ini saya kira sensitif. Orang korban, datang kita 
tanya, “pak, berapa orang korbannya, apa yang butuh, berapa orang yang kakinya 
patah?” bagitu kita Tanya ini, sebelum kita mungkin sudah puluhan orang yang tanya 
juga, alhasil nanti mereka tanya kembali, “bantuan yang kalian bawa apa?”, ini sensitif 
kalau kita tidak mengerti kearifan lokal, kalo kita untuk mencari informasi yang akurat, 
sementara penanggulangan itu tanpa informasi data yang akurat, nol jadinya.  
 
The people in Simeulu [an island name in Aceh which has a history of tsunami in 1907] 
don’t call it tsunami anyway as it is rather known as ‘smong‘. They have traditional 
story from generation to generation, thus it was anticipated by them very well. When 
an earthquake comes very strong and somehow the sea level ran farther low, the people 
would immediately run up to the hill. They might have not seen an actual tsunami 
before, but it was from the traditional stories they could understand the situation very 
well. It is a good local wisdom that should always be preserved. Within RAPI, we also 
try to find out about that kind of local wisdom. Everytime we are on site where the 
disaster is happened, we will put the local wisdom first - finding out and adapting to 
the local traditions - so that when it’s time to give them aid/support, there will be no 
misunderstanding between us and the local people. Because when you’re talking about 
an information, I think it’s a sensitive matter. When we come [to the affected area] and 
ask “How many victims are there? What do you need? How many people got leg 
fracture? “; there might have been dozens of people coming and asking the same 
questions before us, that the people would most likely ask back, “What kind of aid do 
you provide? “. This is a sensitive issue if we don’t understand the local wisdom. So, 
we’ll have to seek for that information accurately, because mitigation without the 
accurate data and information will result to nothing. 
 
Kita buat kegiatan lain seperti, pelatihan dasar untuk SAR, kita tetap libatkan basarnas, 
untuk p3k kita bekerjasama dengan PMI, jadi satgas yang terjun kelokasi minimal dia 
mampu memprotek diri sendiri, jangan sampai dilapangan, kita tidak tau dia bisa 
berenang atau tidak, life jacket tidak pakai, sampai ketengah rakit terbalik. Mudah-
mudahan tidak. Itulah yang selalu kita ingatkan kepada rekan-rekan agar itu menjadi 
suatu perhatian, jangan sangking semangatnya menolong orang sampai lupa bahwa kita 
tidak bisa berenang. Dalam setiap pertemuan, sharing-sharing kita selalu 
mengingatkan. 
 
We also created other activities such as SAR basic training, where we involved the 
BASARNAS [Indonesian National Association for Search and Rescue], and for the first 
training, where we cooperated with the PMI [Indonesian Red Cross]. Therefore, the 
team that will be sent on the field at the very least will be able to protect themselves. 
We do not want a situation where they are being deployed while we’re still unsure in 
whether he can swim or not, they don’t know how to use a life jacket or even flip the 
boat in the middle of the water. We hope not. That’s what we always remind the crew, 
to also pay attention to such a thing. Don’t be too eager on helping people, that you 
even carelessly forget you can’t swim. We remind them this through the sharings on 
every meetings/gathering.  
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Mulai dari proses evakuasi kita sudah terlibat, menyampaikan kondisi yang aktual, 
yang sebenarnya, yang paling efektifnya menjadi pusat informasi masyarakat. 
Misalnya ada masyarakat yang bertanya, kita akan sebarkan berita ini kepada semua 
melalui radio, mungkin ada rekan kita yang sedang bertugas di pos yang dibutuhkan. 
Kita disini ada Asosiasi Keuchik Kuta Alam, 11 desa keuchik dan ketua pemudanya 
sudah kita bekali pengetahuan komunikasi radio, termasuk pengetahuan komunikasi 
bencana, seperti penanggulangan bencana, seperti golden time. Setelah masyarakat 
sudah tidak panik, tidak bertabrakan di jalan, golden time kami sudah habis, kita gak 
ikut APBA, gak ikut punya pemerintah. Pemerintah golden timenya dihitung ke rupiah, 
kalo kita gak. Jadi misalnya masyarakat setelah kami tanya sudah aman, nyaman, saat 
itulah goldentimenya berakhir, jadi ketika ditanya sampai berapa lama, ya tidak 
terbatas. Kami selalu menjaga goldentime, jangan selamat dari air, malah meninggal 
karena kecelakaan. 
 
We’ve been involved in phases started from the evacuation, delivering the actual 
condition, and becoming the most effective source of information for the people. For 
example, when someone asks, we will spread the news to everyone through radio, 
where we might have someone that could help at the [emergency] post/location in need. 
We have the Keuchik [the village’s leader] of Kuta Alam Association: 11 villages 
respectively with leaders both of village community and of the young people who have 
been trained with radio communication procedures, including disaster communication, 
like disaster management, golden time, etc. 
[Then they are explaining about how they set the golden time] When panics have gone 
and no more crashing on the road, it means the golden time is up. Our work is not 
limited to the APBA [Aceh Provincial Government Budget], nor to the government rule 
[they criticize the local government staffs’ practice for being too money-oriented]. 
Their golden time is converted to rupiahs [they tend to be irresponsible or have less 
consideration in helping evacuation process, would ask for extra payment for extra 
work outside of their regular job, for instance to assist people during evacuation after a 
strong earthquake happens]. It’s different from our golden time. For example, when we 
have confirmed that the people have felt safe and comfortable/relieved, that’s when the 
golden time ends. So, if we are asked,” How long is your golden time?“, we would say 
that it  depends on disaster characteristic. We always consider golden time is crucial, 
we don’t want them to survive from the tsunami wave but then get killed by a traffic 
accident. 
 
2. Apa yang membedakan pendekatan ini dengan strategi yang dilakukan sebelum 
tsunami 2004? 
 
How do these approaches differ from concepts and strategies conducted before 
the Tsunami 2004? 
 
Sudah[...], jadi RAPI itu dari dulu sudah seperti itu, cuma waktu tsunami kita masih 
kondisi konflik. Pada saat konflik hampir semua unit radio disita oleh Negara, baik 
disita secara baik-baik maupun dengan paksaan, dan sebagian besar memang 
menyembunyikan perangkat komunikasi, sehingga komunikasi di RAPI itu tidak 
sedikit kelihatan, begitu tsunami terjadi, jumlah anggota RAPI tidak banyak yang aktif, 
karena itu masa konflik, siapapun yang pegang radio sembarangan salah-salah putus 
kita di aceh ni, termasuk yang mengabarkan tsunami ke Jakarta, bahwa air tsunami 
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sudah naik ke aceh itu adalah anggota RAPI, namanya Julidar itu, di radionya 
JudetJZ01PKO, 
 
It has been... So, RAPI has been professional ever since the beginning. It’s just that at 
the time of tsunami, we were at the state of conflict. During conflict, almost all of radio 
units were confiscated by the center government, properly or forcefully, and most of us 
did hid our communication devices at that time. So, back then, communication within 
RAPI were done collusively. At the time of tsunami, the active members of RAPI were 
only a few people. And since we were in the time of conflict, whoever holding a radio 
device suspiciously could end up bad in Aceh. The person who sent the information 
about tsunami to Jakarta, that the water of tsunami was rising super high at the time, 
was one of our members in RAPI; His name is Julidar, and his radio channel was 
JudetJZ01PKO. 
 
beliau dengan perangkat seadanya gantung di badan bawa baterai mobil untuk 
komunikasi tembak jauh ke Jakarta, bahwasanya kami di aceh baru saja diguncang 
gempa yang sangat kuat, sekarang air sudah naik, kita tidak tau masa itu bahwa itu 
tsunami karena kita saat itu di SD, kita gak tau bahwa itu adalah tsunami, jadi yang kita 
tau melaporkan bahwa air laut naik. Berita itu sampai ketelinga presiden, presiden 
langsung memerintahkan pihak-pihak terkait, memerintahkan menteri untuk melihat ke 
aceh dan pertama yang dilihat adalah meulaboh. Jusuf kala langsung memerintahkan 
dan lngsung menyiapkan heli untuk ke aceh. 
 
He, with a very limited equipment, hanged and carried car batteries on his body, 
managed to communicate all the way to Jakarta and sent information that Aceh was 
just struck by a tremendously strong earthquake, and that the water was rising very 
high. We did not know back then that it was tsunami - we were still in primary school. 
We did not know it was tsunami, so we could only say on our report that the sea water 
was rising super high. That news reached the president, and the president immediately 
ordered the relevant parties and the Minister to look at the condition in Aceh, and the 
first place they checked was Meulaboh. Jusuf Kalla then directly ordered and prepared 
a helicopter unit for Aceh. 
 
3. Tantangan dan masalah apa yang masih dihadapi organisasi anda untuk 
melakukannya setelah tsunami 2004? 
 
What are the remaining challenges and problems faced by the government and 
the community in building tsunami resilience after the 2004 Indians Ocean 
tsunami in Aceh Province? 
 
Kendala yang sangat berarti diharapkan tidak ada, memobilisasi untuk anggota yang 
akan kita ajak kesana itu saja tidak ada pengertian dari pemerintah, sementara disana 
masih butuh jalur komunikasi belum ada. Tingkat kepedulian pemerintah belum ada, 
BPBA hanya menjaga gengsi, rupiah tinggal management yang bagus untuk RAPI. Staf 
BPBA sebagai pemegang amanat program, 2 tahun kemudian akan dimutasi, pindah 
dan program di mulai lagi dari nol, membuat hubungan emosional mulai dari nol lagi, 
begitu seterusnya, Bagaimana mau maksimal.  
 
Such significant challenges hopefully never exist, because even to mobilize our crews 
to the field, we receive no support from the government. Moreover, the communication 
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path on location is another problem. The government pays no attention to this issue [the 
government needs RAPI but do not care for their needs and do not listen to their ideas 
or requests]. BPBA [Disaster Management Agency of Aceh] staffs, who are primarily 
in charge of the disaster management program, will be on position transfer in the next 
2 years; moving. It means we will be restarting the whole program and rebuilding the 
emotional bonds from zero. How can it be possible to work on the program to the 
maximum? 
 
Itu adalah kendala kecil, masalahnya sekarang carenya mereka terhadap relawan RAPI 
tidak ada. Kita tidak minta mereka gaji kita, karena kita adalah relawan bagian dari 
TRC. Dilapangan kami yang pegang kendali, mereka hanya ketika datang bantuan 
logistik dibagikan. Mereka koordinator semua aliansi yang bergerak dalam 
kebencanaan, mereka tidak bisa merekrut, tidak bisa memanage aliansi lain.  
 
That’t just a small challenge. The problem now is there is no attention given to the 
volunteers of RAPI. We never asked them to pay us, since we are volunteers, part of 
the TRC [Emergency Responder team]. On the sites, we have the main control, they 
only come when it’s time for logistic distribution. They are the cooordinators of all 
organizations’ members responsible in disaster response, yet they are unable to recruit 
and manage them all. 
 
Misalnya ketika sampai di lapangan kami tidak tau harus tidur dimana, buat tenda 
dimana, buat posko dimana, saat kita datang kesana seperti orang mau minta sedekah 
aja, bingung. Kami tidak bisa bilang mereka gak punya ilmu, mereka punya ilmu, tapi 
aplikasinya masih tidak paham dan mereka selalu buat anggaran, tapi kenapa di 
anggaran itu tidak ada anggaran untuk kegiatan kita. Saat kejadian di takengon, kami 
berangkatnya uangnya kumpul bersama, Ketika sampai di sana kita tidak disediakan 
apa-apa, tempat tinggal tak ada, asuransi tak ada untuk kita kalau terjadi kecelakaan.  
 
For example, when we get there on site, we don’t know where to sleep, where to set up 
tents, and where to build [emergency] posts. We come as if we were asking for charities, 
getting flustered. We cannot say that those people don’t have the knowledge; they do. 
They just don’t know how to apply them. They also have made their budget allocation, 
yet why aren’t any of the budget allocated for our activities? On the Takengon incident 
[an earthquake], we went there by collecting our own donation. We arrived there with 
nothing provided, no shelter, and not even insurance if anything were to happen to us. 
 
Bencana ini kami bagi dalam tiga periode, yang pertama emergency periode, transisi 
periode dan long time periode. Jadi pada masa emergency dan periode memang RAPI 
yang dilapangan, sedangkan mereka menjadi pahlawan ketika long time periode, pada 
saat membangun rumah kembali orang kegiatan-kegiatan sosial, sedangkan 
meminimaliskan korban yang di emergency itu adalah RAPI dan mereka tidak ada, 
mereka sibuk dengan surat-menyurat, sibuk dengan kepanikannya sendiri.  
We divided disaster relief into 3 periods: the first one is emergency period, then 
transitional period, and ‘long time’ period [rehabilitation and reconstruction phases]. 
So, on the emergency and transitional periods, indeed RAPI were on site, while they 
[from the government] came as heroes in the `long time period´; that was during the 
houses reconstruction, the social projects. The ones who helped the victims in the 
emergency were RAPI members. Meanwhile, they were nowhere to be seen, being busy 
with their paper work, busy by their own panics. 
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Kita hanya makan pujian, dan itu sudah cukup mengenyangkan kita selama ini, 
sedangkan mereka hanya butuh informasi aja dari kami, kita gak tau kemampuan 
mereka apa selain membuat program, dan mereka adalah coordinator, SAR, TNI, 
RAPI, dan parpol-parpol lain, ini memang tugas BPBA, awal kejadian mereka entah 
dimana, kami kesana seperti pengamis, mereka hanya lapor kepusat, dibutuhkan rumah 
sekian unit.  
 
All we got are just compliments which have always been enough for us all these times. 
While they only need to get information from us. We never know what they could do 
beside making programs, not to mention that they are the coordinators of SAR, TNI 
[Indonesian Military Force], RAPI, and political parties. This is the job of BPBA. At 
the beginning of the incident, they were nowhere to be found. While we went there like 
beggers, they only made a report to the central [government] about how many house 
units they might need. 
 
Jadi bagaimana mau menangani bencana tanpa komunikasi, komunikasi adalah yang 
terpenting. Kami membantu masyarakat, mereka tidak ada perhatiannya sedikitpun, 
kami tidak minta diperhatikan, tetapi salah satu bidang mereka yang harus mereka 
tangani itu adalah logistik, transportasi, mobiler, dan komunikasi, hanya itu sebenarnya 
yang mereka harus kerjakan saat terjadi bencana dan ini adalah kelemahannya dari sisi 
pemerintah. Yang di lapangan kita yang pegang kendali, kalo untuk bagi-bagi sembako, 
ya mereka yang pegang kendali. Kita hanya mau pada saat emergency itu kita 
diperhatikan, misal, kita butuh tenda, butuh mobil untuk berangkat kelokasi, karena 
kita beranjak dari relawan murni, karena kita dari organisasi tidak ada biaya-biaya 
operasional yang seperti itu, semuanya dari pribadi,  
 
So how do you expect us to handle disasters without proper communication? 
Communication is crucial. We help the people, while they [the government] don’t care 
at all. We never asked to be cared for, but however they should participate to handle 
some parts such as logistics, transportation, mobility, and communication. Those are 
the only things they should take care every time disaster happens. But then again, this 
is the flaw of the government. On the site, we take control. When it comes to logistic 
distribution, they take over the control. We only ask for their attention during the 
emergency period, things like tents when we need them, cars to reach the site, etc. 
Because we started as pure volunteers, we came from organizations without such 
operational budget, and thus everything is on our personal expenses.  
 
RAPI ini sebenarnya organisasi hobi. RAPI ini hobinya bukan di kebencanaan, tapi 
hobby komunikasi sesama anggota RAPI, tetapi karena ada jiwa kemanusiaannya kami, 
kami bantu kebencanaan, tapi kenyataannya sekarang, RAPI ini adalah salah satu 
nyawa pemerintah dalam bidang komunikasi, dan pemerintah Aceh tidak bisa mengatur 
bidang komunikasi  
RAPI was just a ‘hobby’ [they established the organization to facilitate their interest in 
radio communication]. Our hobby was not the disaster related issues, but the radio 
broadcasting. It’s only due to our spirit of humanity that we help those in the disasters. 
RAPI is one of the government’s lives in term of communication, because unfortunately 
the government of Aceh cannot manage the matter of communication in emergency. 
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4. Dengan siapa saja atau organisasi apa saja, anda bekerja sama dan 
berkoordinasi? 
 
What are key stakeholders and networks that deal with disaster risk reduction 
and resilience building at the local level (municipalities) in the province of Aceh? 
 
Kita bekerjasama dengan semua stakeholder, semua ormas, pemerintah dan semua 
yang berhubungan dengan kebencanaan, dalam artian kita mensupport komunikasi, 
kita juga punya tenaga-tenaga skill komunikasi, satgas komunikasi yang juga harus 
mengerti radio, kita bekali juga mereka dengan hal-hal yang seperti itu. 
 
We cooperate with all the stakeholders, community organizations, government, and 
anyone who are related to disasters. In a sense that we support the communication, we 
also have staffs with good communication skills, the communication units who are 
obliged to understand radio. We also prepared them with such matters in their hands.  
 
Capacities to manage resilience 
5.  Apakah menurut anda, saat ini, jika terjadi peringatan sirene akan terjadi 
tsunami masyarakat akan aman atau mampu menyelamatkan diri jika anda 
berada di rumah, di kantor atau sedang berada dimanapun di kota ini? 
 
What do you think, today, if the tsunami early warning system rings and tell 
people that tsunami will approach, do the community members know how to save 
their life, if they are in their houses, at their offices or anywhere in this city? 
 
Mengobati trauma sangatlah sulit, apalagi mendidik aparaturnegara yang kurang care, 
ketika misalnya gempa mengguncang (misal 6 keatas) mereka yang lari terlebih dahulu, 
bukannya mengevakuasi masyarakat. Pada tanggal 11 april jika memang air naik, 
jumlah korban lebih banyak dari tsunami 2004, karena semua jalan dibanda aceh macet 
total, apalagi ada yang meninggalkan mobil ditengah jalan dan orangnya keluar. 
 
Healing a trauma is very difficult, while we lose hope in such uncaring government 
officers. When, for example, an earthquake strikes (on 6 SR or more), they would flee 
first instead of evacuating the people. On April 11th if the sea level were rising, the 
number of victims would be much higher compared to the tsunami 2004, because all 
road in Banda Aceh was in total traffic jam, especially where the people abandoned 
their cars just in the middle of the road. 
 
 
Karena aparatur pemerintah tidak berada pada tempatnya, tapi seandainya mereka ada 
di semua simpang, pasti tidak ada masalah yang terjadi, awalnya kita yang jadi polisi, 
trus saat polisi datang kita yang mundur. Kalau kita bandingkan dengan organisasi lain, 
saya berani bilang kalo RAPI ini adalah organisasi paling bodoh, radio beli sendiri, ijin 
urus sendiri, bayar lagi kepemerintah, kerja dikemanusiaan membantu operasional 
pemerintah, pemerintah bergaji dengan bidangnya masing-masing, RAPI 5 tahun ijin 
perangkat bayar kepemerintah 450.000. pernah datang tim Nasional Georgaphy untuk 
wawancara RAPI, karena mereka mendengar kehebatan RAPI, setelah mereka 
mendengar cerita kami, mereka heran. Mereka pikir kita dibina dengan baik oleh 
pemerintah, padahal tidak. Kami tidak peduli apakah pemerintah tidak care, tapi 
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kemanusiaan kami tetap kami jalankan, sejauh kami bisa membantu, kami akan bantu, 
itulah kepuasan kami.  
 
It was because none of the government officers was present in the evacuation process. 
If only they were there on each cross road, I’m sure no such problems would happen. 
At first, we were the ones who took the police role, and then when the actual police 
were coming, we went back off. If we compare it to other organizations, I’m quite sure 
that RAPI is the naivest of all organizations. We buy our own radio devices, apply for 
our own license, even pay the government and work for humanity to help the 
government operational unit, while they are paid well based on each working field. 
RAPI have paid the government 450.000 for a 5-years-long equipment license. There 
once came a National Geographic team to interview RAPI, because they said that they 
heard about the excellence of RAPI. After knowing the truth from our story, they were 
surprised. They thought that we were intensively trained by the government, while in 
fact we’re not. We don’t care whether the government care about us or not, and we will 
always fight for our spirit of humanity. As long as we can help, we will help; That’s 
where our satisfaction comes from. 
 
6. Menurut anda, apa yang masih dibutuhkan agar jika terjadi tsunami masyarakat 
dapat selamat dari bencana tersebut? 
 
What community members still need so they can safe from the future tsunami? 
 
Kalau kita lihat di pemerintah yang menangani kebencanaan ada dinsos, ada dapur 
umum yang bertugas untuk penyaluran bantuan masa panik, ada BPBA dan BPBD, ada 
basarnas, PMI, komunitas-komunitas radio, sekarang yang diperlukan pemerintah 
untuk mengaturnya saja, misal masyarakat butuh perban, bisa minta ke PMI atau 
dinkes, yang mengatur BPBD, sekarang yang dilihat apakah tepat waktu dan sasaran 
kepada masyarakat. Untuk kelengkapan di Aceh, pelatihan dan penelitian dibutuhkan, 
aplikasinya di balik. Pada saat emergency, kenapa tidak salurkan dulu, baru laporankan 
bisa menyusul, kita selalu menunggu LPJ (laporan pertanggung jawaban). Pemerintah 
tidak bisa mengatur itu, jangankan mengatur, skill sendiri aja mereka tidak ada. 
Seharusnya mereka sudah paham kelemahan mereka itu dimana, mereka tau, tapi tidak 
mau mempertajam lagi kelemahan mereka itu. Seperti berangkat ke takengon, mereka 
tidak memfasilitasi kendaraan, padahal itukan memang tugas pemerintah untuk 
masyarakat, lagipula uang mereka kan dari masyarakat. Skill pemerintah belum cukup 
untuk penanganan, perlu adanya pelatihan untuk aparatur dan masyarakat. 
 
When we take a look at the government that handle disasters; we have the social service, 
we have the public kitchen that was created for the aid distribution in panic situation, 
we have BPBA and BPBD, we have BASARNAS, PMI, and radio group-communities. 
Now what the government need to do is just to manage them properly. Like when 
people need bandages, you could ask for such an item to the PMI or the Health Ministry 
department, and then BPBD would take control. And what we need to watch is whether 
it is or not given at the right time and to the right people. As for Aceh, training and 
research are needed. We need to do the other way around. In times of emergency, why 
don’t we distribute [the aid] first, then do the report afterwards. All these times, we 
always need to wait for the report paper (LPJ). The government cannot regulate that. 
They don’t even have the skill set, let alone to regulate. They should have known their 
own weaknesses. Or they might have known, but they just don’t have the initiative to 
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narrow down those flaws they have. Like when we went to Takengon, they didn’t 
facilitate the transportation, while that’s definately the responsibility of the government 
to their society, especially that their money all came from the community. Those skills 
to become a proper government are not there yet. Therefore, the government and 
community still need to be trained. 
 
Aparatur pemerintah punya fasilitas, yang mereka butuhkan hanya pelatihan karena 
bencana kita tidak tau kapan datang, pembinaan untuk stakeholder yang harus 
diperhatikan. Jika tidak ada bencana mereka tidak tahu telepon RAPI, tapi ketika ada 
bencana mereka tahu telpon RAPI.  
 
The government staffs have all emergency response facilities. What they need is a 
training, because we’ll never know when the next disaster will come. Guidance for all 
stakeholders must have our attention. If nothing happens (in a normal situation), they 
will never call (forget about us); but when a disaster strike, they will call us. [They only 
come to us when they need RAPI’s help for a disaster and seem to forget us when 
nothing happens].  
 
Kadang-kadang kita ada sanksi moral, begitu kita terjun kelapangan, masyarakat 
mengadu apa yang dibutuhkan, kemudian humas sampaikan ke BPBA atau BPBD, tapi 
mereka tidak datang-datang memberikan bantuan, mereka sibuk dengan birokrasinya. 
Disaat kita ingin membantu mereka dan masyarakat juga sangat ingin dibantu, kita 
seakan-akan tak mampu berbuat apa-apa, gara-gara kepedulian pemerintah kurang. 
Mereka bilang tidak mudah memgeluarkan barang-barang, tapi tidak mungkin 
seterusnya tidak mudah. Mereka tidak mau belajar dari pengalaman, makanya mereka 
tidak punya ilmu. 
 
Sometimes we get a social sanction. The moment we jumped on the field, the people 
started giving requests or complained to us, and then our Public Relation section 
received and passed them to the BPBD and BPBA, but no response/no aid coming, 
because they were too busy with their own bureaucracy. In times when we really want 
to help the people, and the people truly need help, we seem helpless and unable to do 
anything, simply because the lack of caring/support by the government. They said that 
it was hard to take out some stuffs, but are you sure it’s possible that that’s happening 
everytime? They don’t want to learn from experience, that’s why they have no 
knowledge [-improvement].  
 
Paradigma masyarakat bahwa RAPI ini ada gaji sangking aktifnya, jadi ketika ada 
bencana, masyarakat langsung mencari pos RAPI maupun kerumahnya untuk 
mendengarkan informasi, karena masyarakat kita juga sudah terdidik yang seperti itu, 
tidak terlalu panik lagi mendengarkan informasi, sekarang masalahnya ketika kita tidak 
memberikan informasi atau kita juga harus maninggalkan lokasi atau mengbackup 
informasi ditempat lain yang lebih penting, masyarakat marah.  
 
Social paradigm, where they believe that RAPI are paid by the government, as they are 
active [in helping people in disasters], that whenever a disaster comes, people would 
immediately go and find RAPI posts, or even to the houses of RAPI members? to get 
information. Since they have been educated that way, not to be too panic when they 
received such an information. So now the problem is when we don’t give them the 
information, or in cases we have to leave the site, or when we have to backup the 
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information on other places that are more important [more affected/more emergency], 
they will get mad.  
 
Masyarakat yang di dengar bukan RAPI, tapi kepala desa mereka, karena inilah kami 
berfikir untuk mendidik dan bina kadesnya agar kita bisa mengarahkan masyarakat, 
seharusnya ini kebijakan pemerintah, bukan kami. Kami pernah buat pelatihan, semua 
menggunakan biaya sendiri, Mereka ada cara bagaimana harus membawa maasyarakat, 
tapi kenyataan di lapangannya, disitukan ada posko induk yang didalamnya terdapat 
berbagai instansi pemerintah, kita bantu untuk komunikasi, tapi kadang-kadang kita 
tidak hanya dikomunikasi, kita juga duduk di meja PMI karena anggota PMI tidak 
datang.  
 
The one who the people listen to is not RAPI, but their village ‘s leader. This is why 
we thought that it’s necessary to also teach and train the village ‘s leader, so we can 
guide the people [effectively]. This is supposed to be the initiative by the government, 
not us. We have done some training in the past though, and it’s all on our personal fund. 
They should have some ways to direct and guide the community, but the reality on site 
is poor. They have a central post that includes some government agencies in it that 
sometimes need our help in communication. And then, we do not only help them on 
the communication matter, but also on the [information-] table in the PMI post, as the 
members are sometimes not coming. 
 
7. Apakah menurutandapemerintah, LSM, atau organisasianda mampu 
menyediakan semua kebutuhan tersebut? 
 
Do you consider, the government, non-government organizations or the 
community can provide it? 
 
8. Menurut anda, apakah semua rencana, fasilitas, dan usaha pemerintah dan 
masyarakat untuk meningkatkan kemandirian dan ketahanan masyarakat dalam 
menghadapi risiko bencana sudah sesuai dengan kebutuhan masyarakat? 
 
Do you reckon, all the plans, infrastructures, and efforts that government and 
community provide for tsunami resilience building are fit with the community 
members need? 
 
9. Darimanakah masyarakat mendapatkan pengetahuan tentang apa yang harus 
dilakukan ketika suatu saat terjadi tsunami untuk menyelamatkan diri 
(evacuation plans and route, evacuation building?) 
 
How community members gain the knowledge about the evacuation plans and 
routes, evacuation building and where they have to run to save their life in future 
tsunami event?  
 
Resilience 
Self-organization 
10. Perubahan-perubahan apa saja yang terjadi untuk meningkatkan kemandirian 
dan ketahanan masyarakat dalam menghadapi risiko bencana setelah tsunami 
2004? 
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What evidence is there of change in the community after the 2004 Indians Ocean 
Tsunami in Aceh province in term of building tsunami resilience?  
 
Learning 
11. Apa saja yang telah organisasi anda pelajari dari pengalaman tsunami 2004? 
 
What do you learn or what can be learned from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
in Aceh province experience?  
 
Kami selalu ingin meningkatkan diri, kami selalu merasa kurang untuk menangani 
bencana, jadi walaupun kami sudah terbiasa, tapi kita tidak pernah merasa jenuh atau 
merasa lebih, kita tetap seperti keseharian dan tetap ingin menambah ilmu untuk 
kebencanaan. Contohnya BMKG ingin menyampaikan informasi gempa > 6 SR, BTS 
operator seluler padam, BTS overlow, PLN padam, sistem komunikasi terputus, satu-
satunya cara untuk menyampaikan informasi adalah dengan radio, jika RAPI jahat, saat 
emergency gempa kita matikan semua perangkat, BPBA dan BPBD mencuri informasi 
dari kami, karena ketika bencana terjadi mereka membuka jalur RAPI. RAPI langsung 
mendekati laut untuk memantau keadaan, meski hilang satu anggota RAPI tapi bisa 
menyelamatkan seribu nyawa itu sebuah kebanggaan. 
 
We always want to improve ourselves; we always feel that we are never enough to 
manage disasters. So eventhough on daily basis we’ve got used to it, we never feel 
exhausted or like it’s too much. So, we stick to the daily basis while keep improving 
our knowledge about disaster [management]. For example, when BMKG wants to 
broadcast the information of an earthquake that is bigger than 6 [SR], while BTS 
cellular operator off, BTS overflow and PLN black out, communication system is 
cut/failed, and the only way to communicate is through radio. If we wanted to be evil, 
we can just shut down all of our equipments during the emergency, preventing BPBA 
and BPBD from stealing information from us. Because when crisis happens, they 
always open the RAPI’s radio communication, while RAPI would directly go to the 
coastal area to check the live situation, even when it ‘s at the cost of one life of RAPI 
members, if that could save a thousand of lives, that would be an honor to us. 
 
Itu terbentuk secara alami, ada kepuasam. Kami punya kode etik, saat kami 
menyampaikan informasi apa yang kami lihat, apa kenyataan dilokasi. Memang kami 
masih ada kekurangan, tapi sudah 90% efektivitas laporan itu sudahbaik 
 
It is formed naturally, through some sort of satisfactions. We have our ethic codes: We 
only deliver the information of what we see live on the site. We do have weaknesses, 
but we think that if the report effectivity has reached the 90% level, this should be good 
enough. 
 
12. Apakah proses belajar ini masih berlangsung? 
 
Do you still learn now? 
 
13. Apa yang membatasi proses belajar ini? 
 
What limits it? 
Evaluation of the disaster resilience building strategies 
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14. Menurut anda, bagaimana perkembangan dari proses meningkatkan 
kemandirian dan ketahanan masyarakat dalam menghadapi risiko bencana 
setelah tsunami 2004 di masa yang akan datang? 
 
What do you think, the progress of tsunami resilience building in Aceh province 
after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh province? 
 
15. Bagaimana komitmen organisasi anda untuk terus melakukannya? 
 
How strong is your commitment to involve in tsunami resilience building in Aceh 
province? 
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